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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 2, April - June 1983

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29 February 1984

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 2, April - June 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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APPEAL TO THE SCIENTISTS OF THE WORLD

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 83 pp 3-5

We address this appeal to all people of good will, and above all to scientists, inasmuch as the task of preserving life and peace on earth has never been so urgent as it is today. All who are clearly aware of present-day realities realise what the unceasing buildup of deadly weapons and the development of ever new and more monstrous means of mass destruction portends. The security of the peoples can be ensured only by taking the road of nuclear disarmament through a series of purposeful agreements based on the self-evident principle of equality and equal security.

However, in his speech on March 23 of this year the US President offered the American people a different prospect—the creation of a new giant complex of land- and space-based anti-missile weapons, allegedly for defensive purposes, which, he said, would fully guarantee the United States' security in the event of a global nuclear conflict.

Proceeding from the knowledge we have as scientists and our understanding of the nature of nuclear weapons, we declare with full responsibility that there are no effective means of defence in a nuclear war and that it is practically impossible to develop such means.

This opinion of ours fully conforms to the authoritative and responsible statement of the presidents and representatives of 36 academies of sciences of different countries, signed, among others, by representatives of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, the Royal Society of Great Britain, the Academy of Sciences of France, and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

In fact, the attempt to develop so-called "defensive weapons" against the strategic nuclear forces of the other side, of which the US President speaks, will inevitably create one more element increasing the US "first-strike" potential. It is not accidental that the practical actions of the US Administration are now concentrated on the rapid development of precisely this potential. Such "defensive weapons" could give almost nothing to a country subjected to a sudden massive attack, inasmuch as they are clearly incapable of protecting the vast majority of the population. The use of anti-missile weapons most of all suits the purposes of the attacking side out to lessen the power of a retaliatory blow. However, they are also incapable of fully warding off this retaliatory blow.

Thus, the initiative of the US President who promises to develop new anti-missile weapons, is obviously aimed at destabilising the existing strategic balance. By his statement, the President creates a very dangerous illusion, which could lead to an even more menacing round of the arms race. We are firmly convinced that this move will sharply impair international security, including the security of the United States itself. The US Administration demonstrates its utter irresponsibility in the matter of the very existence of mankind.

Today, when our future and the future of coming generations is being decided, every scientist, guided by his knowledge and his conscience, must take an honest and definite stand on what direction the world should advance—towards the development of new types of strategic weapons, increasing the danger of a mutually-annihilating conflict, or towards limiting the arms race and subsequently achieving disarmament. This is the historic moral duty of scientists to humanity.

Proceeding from a strictly scientific analysis of all aspects of this problem, we are firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament is the only way for the states and peoples to achieve genuine security.

Signed by

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THE IDEAS OF KARL MARK ON THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE AND
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORKS BY V. I. LENIN

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 83 pp 6-20

[Article by N. G. Senin, doctor of philosophy]

In 1983, progressive mankind marked the 165th birthday and the 100th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. During the past hundred years the situation in the world has changed radically. But these changes occurred, without doubt, in conformity with the basic principles outlined in the brilliant teaching of Marx, which took shape when world capitalism was on the rise. Frederick Engels, the closest associate of Marx, died on the eve of a new stage in the development of capitalism, its transition to imperialism.

It was Lenin who continued and developed the teaching of Marx at a new stage. Lenin's teaching—Leninism—is "Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, the collapse of the colonial system, and the transition of mankind from capitalism to socialism".¹

Though the statements of Marx and Engels were made many decades ago, the classical works of the founders of scientific communism, their assessments of the events, and their forecasts as regards future development of the world, to say nothing of their scientific methodology, are valid to this day. Lenin said: "The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true".

During their almost half-century of multifaceted activity Marx and Engels devoted much attention to the problems of the East, in particular the situation in China. They have written quite a few articles on China in which they responded to the key developments in that country in the 1840s-1860s. Notes and remarks on China can be found in the basic works of Marx and Engels, such as *Capital*, *Theories of Surplus Value*, *Anti-Dühring*, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, and others. The correspondence between Marx and Engels, as well as their correspondence with many people from different countries, contain many valuable statements about China.

The range of questions they raised was extremely broad and diverse. But all of them, however, are concentrated around the same theme, i. e., the liberation struggle waged by the Chinese people.

¹ Y. V. Andropov, "The Teaching of Karl Marx and Certain Questions of Socialist Construction in the USSR", *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1983 (in Russian).

The "discovery" of China for Europe, i. e., its colonial enslavement by the capitalist countries of the West, began with the so-called Opium War of 1840, unleashed by Britain against China, and with the first unequal colonial treaty imposed by Britain on China after the latter's defeat in the war.

Marx and Engels, who kept a watchful eye on the development of capitalism in Britain which by the mid-19th century became the most industrialised and the largest colonial power in the world, provided an in-depth analysis of the economic causes of the infiltration of foreign capital in China and its influence on the modification of China's traditions. They also showed that the penetration of foreign capital which speeded up the disintegration of the feudal foundations of Chinese society with all the ensuing consequences failed to create conditions and necessary space for the capitalist development of that country. Moreover, in the course of the unbridled pursuit of profits, foreign, particularly British, merchants erected every kind of obstacle on the road towards China's free development. The smuggling of opium, which gave rise to the first Opium War, did not stop after the establishment of the British colonial regime in the main ports of China and assumed an even greater scope, depleting the Chinese treasure, ruining and corrupting the population.

In pointing to the obstacles which prevented the Chinese economy from developing freely along capitalist lines, Marx stated: "With the present economical framework of Chinese society, which turns upon diminutive agriculture and domestic manufactures as its pivots, any large import of foreign produce is out of the question... It might gradually absorb a surplus quantity of English and American goods, if the opium trade were suppressed."² Since opium was the main object of trade and the main source of profits extracted by Britain in China and since its piratical imports were growing year in year out, the disastrous situation of the Chinese population worsened. The British government did not care about it, and the situation suited it perfectly. Moreover, it looked for a pretext to consolidate even deeper its colonial positions in China. The bellicose Foreign Minister of Britain Lord Palmerston instructed his representative on Chinese affairs in 1850: "I clearly see that the time is coming fast when we shall have to deliver one more strike at China, and that this strike should serve to seize positions on the Yangtze, to cut navigation on the Great Canal. It would be undesirable, however, to give any hint to the Chinese about our future actions... They should not only see a stick, but also feel it on their back before they succumb to the sole argument which would convince them, the argument of the stick."³

With the purpose of using the "argument of the stick", i. e., the British stick of colonial domination, Lord Palmerston who became Prime Minister, and his government provoked an incident near Guangzhou (Canton) and slanderously accused the Guangdong authorities of a number of "crimes", including the alleged infringement on contractual commitments and the insulting of the British flag. This was followed by a merciless bombardment of Guangzhou and a massacre of its population. The interventionists needed the fabricated accusations to launch a new war against China, which was called the second Opium War.

² K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, Vol. 16, p. 32.

³ *Modern History of China*, Moscow, 1972, p. 124 (in Russian).

Marx and Engels condemned this "highly unjust war". Marx wrote with extreme indignation about the false pretext and the barbarous methods of that "piratical war" in an article carried by the *US New York Daily Tribune* on April 10, 1857 (both he and Engels were correspondent of that paper): "The unoffending citizens and peaceful tradesmen of Canton have been slaughtered, their habitations battered to the ground, and the claims of humanity violated, on the flimsy pretense that 'English life and property are endangered by the aggressive acts of the Chinese!'" "The British Government and the British people," Marx added, "at least, those who have chosen to examine the question, know how false and hollow are such charges."⁴

British "civilisers" described their behaviour and their activity in Asian countries as a selfless and generous act of spreading advanced European culture among Eastern "barbarians", though they of course could not be regarded as vehicles of advanced culture. Tearing the mask off these self-styled "carriers of culture", Marx and Engels exposed to the whole world the disgusting face of colonialism and its proponents, and noted heroism of fighters against it.

In his article "The New English Expedition in China" (1857) Engels stressed that a new war in China started by Britain was accompanied by "brutal ferocity" and that it was "conducted by the English throughout in a spirit of brutal ferocity, which was a fitting counterpart to the spirit of smuggling cupidity in which it had originated". But in spite of all atrocities and intimidation, the Chinese soldiers were not lacking in courage and spirit, however deficient they might be in military skill.⁵

In developing his views on the nature of war waged by the Chinese against the British colonialists who were soon joined by the French and US colonisers, Engels laid bare the arguments of Western propaganda to the effect that the atrocities in China were allegedly a response to the "meanness", "barbarianism", "cruelty", and so on of the Chinese themselves. In the article "Persia—China" (1857) written with the approval and full consent of Marx, Engels raised a number of highly important theoretical and practical issues of the liberation war.

"... In short, instead of moralising on the horrible atrocities of the Chinese, as the chivalrous English press does," Engels said, "we had better recognise that this is a war *pro aris et focis*, a popular war for the maintenance of Chinese nationality, with all its overbearing prejudice, stupidity, learned ignorance and pedantic barbarism, if you like, but yet a popular war. And in a popular war the means used by the insurgent nation cannot be measured by the commonly recognised rules of regular warfare, nor by any other abstract standard, but by the degree of civilisation only attained by that insurgent nation".⁶

The assessment of the war which was waged by the Chinese side as a national, people's and just war in which the nation, in order to protect its territory, its houses, and its life, had the right to resort to the methods which corresponded to the level of its culture, is of great importance to the Marxist theory of the national liberation war.

Marx and Engels believed in the ultimate victory of the Chinese people. The abovementioned article read in conclusion: "...And before many years pass away, we shall have to witness the death-struggle of the oldest empire in the world, and the opening day of a new era for all Asia."⁷

⁴ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 169 (in Russian).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

* * *

The British armed intervention in China, which since the second Opium War was actively joined by France and the USA, was covered extensively by the world bourgeois press, and Marx and Engels could analyse from the proletarian class positions the articles carried by bourgeois periodicals, extricating the grain of historic truth from them. The domestic revolutionary events in China at that time—the powerful Taiping revolution which swept a vast territory in the inner regions of China—were passed over by the bourgeois press in silence. Nevertheless, drawing on the meagre data Marx and Engels had at their disposal, they succeeded in revealing the social causes of those development and in giving them a scientifically substantiated assessment.

Marx devoted two articles—“Revolution in China and in Europe” (1853) and “Chinese Affairs” (1862)—to the Taiping revolution. In addition, Marx and Engels touched upon the different aspects of that issue in a number of other articles of the time of the Taiping revolution. Even prior to the revolution, in the *First International Review* (1850) Marx and Engels gave a graphic characterisation of the situation that took shape in the “Celestial Empire” at that time. “The slowly but steadily growing overpopulation in this country had long made social conditions there particularly oppressive for the great majority of the nation. Then came the English and extorted free trade for themselves in five ports. Thousands of English and American ships sailed to China and before long the country was glutted with inexpensive British and American industrial manufactures. Chinese industry, dependent on manual labour, succumbed to competition from the machine. The imperturbable Middle Kingdom was aroused by a social crisis. The taxes no longer came in, the state reached the brink of bankruptcy, the population sank *en masse* into pauperism, erupted in revolts, refused to acknowledge the mandarins of the Emperor or the priests of Fó, mishandled and killed them.”⁸

In evaluating optimistically the prospects for the developments in China, Marx and Engels predicted their great importance for the destinies of mankind. The abovementioned *Review* said: “It is a gratifying fact that in eight years the calico bales of the English bourgeoisie have brought the oldest and least perturbable kingdom on earth to the eve of a socialist upheaval, which, in any event, is bound to have the most significant results for civilisation.”⁹

In predicting the forthcoming “social upheaval” in China, Marx linked it not only with a large-scale inflow of foreign manufactures, which undermined the foundations of traditional Chinese economy, but also with the “unexpected upheaval” of the existing political regime in that country. In his article “Revolution in China and in Europe” Marx pointed out: “Whatever be the social causes, and whatever religious, dynastic or national shape they may assume, that have brought about the chronic rebellious subsisting in China for about ten years past, and now gathered together in one formidable revolution, the occasion of this outbreak has unquestionably been afforded by the English cannon forcing upon China that soporific drug called opium. Before the British arms the authority of the Manchu dynasty fell to pieces; the superstitious faith in the eternity of the Celestial Empire broke down; the barbarous and hermetic isolation from the civilised world was infringed; and an opening was made for that intercourse which has since proceeded so rapidly”.¹⁰

⁸ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Moscow, 1980, Vol. 10, p. 266.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

¹⁰ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 93-94.

Marx paid attention to the "religious form" of the slogans and programmes elaborated by the leaders of the Taiping revolution. However, in his article "Chinese Affairs" he stressed that "religious colouring" was in no way a specific feature of the Taiping revolution but a trait common for all liberation movements in the East.¹¹

The social causes of the "powerful revolution" of the Taipings which Marx dealt with found their expression in a peculiar "socialist" ideology. According to the German missionary Gützlaff who returned from China, "among the rebellious plebs individuals appeared [there.—*Ed.*] who pointed to the poverty of some and to the wealth of others, and who demanded, and are still demanding a different distribution of property, and even the complete abolition of private property".¹²

The above-mentioned "socialist ideas" were elaborated by Hong Xinquan, leader of the Taiping revolution. He began propagating them several years prior to the revolution, and they later became its ideological foundation. Marx criticised the Taipings' "socialist ideal" which reflected the anti-feudal aspirations of peasants. Although, as Marx put it, the "socialism" of the Taipings "may admittedly be the same in relation to European socialism as Chinese philosophy in relation to Hegelian philosophy",¹³ the "socialist" ideas of the Taipings encouraged broad popular masses to struggle for their social emancipation.

* * *

Keeping a watchful eye on the situation in Asia, especially in its largest countries—India and China—and studying the struggle of the oppressed peoples against the colonial domination, the founders of scientific communism elaborated their teaching on the national and colonial movement in the course of a sharp struggle against bourgeois and opportunistic concepts. The question of the connection and interdependence between the revolutionary movements in Europe and in the East loomed large in the works of Marx and Engels in the 1850s.

In his article "Revolution in China and in Europe" Marx asked: "England having brought about the revolution of China... how that revolution will in time react on England, and through England on Europe?"¹⁴ The answer was, according to Marx, closely connected with the economic situation in Europe and, in particular, with the deep and acute nature of the cyclic economic crisis in the developed European countries. "Neither wars nor revolutions," Marx stressed, "are likely to put Europe by the ears, unless in consequence of a general commercial and industrial crisis, the signal of which has, as usual, to be given by England, the representative of European industry in the market of the world."¹⁵

The "discovery" of China did not enable England to expand the market of its goods. The intensified inflow of opium in China ousted the exports of industrial goods, which adversely affected the British economy. Marx noted in 1853: "Under these circumstances, as the greater part of the regular commercial cycle has already been run through by British trade, it may safely be augured that the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long-prepared general crisis, which, spreading abroad, will be closely followed by political revolutions on the Continent."¹⁶

¹¹ See K. Marx, F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. 15, p. 529 (in Russian).

¹² K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 266.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

¹⁴ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 95.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

Making a point of the immense share of a state with a population accounting for almost one-third of the mankind in the development of world events, Marx wrote: "It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement for republican freedom and economy of government, may depend more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire—the very opposite of Europe—than on any other political cause that now exists."¹⁷

Marx and Engels lived in the epoch of ascending capitalism when the colonial system had not yet formed completely and capitalism could contribute objectively to the development of the productive forces in colonies. But it was unable, by virtue of its nature, to bring freedom to the popular masses and to substantially improve their condition. In his article "The Future Results of British Rule in India" Marx wrote that both depended "not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people".¹⁸ Marx qualified his thought stressing that a rebirth of an oppressed country might occur either as a result of the proletarian revolution in a metropolitan country or in case the oppressed people were strong enough to throw off the colonial yoke. Though this referred to India, it was fully applicable to China of that time.

The founders of scientific communism were well aware of how difficult it was to fuse the proletarian revolution in the West with the national liberation movement in the East. In a letter to Engels of October 8, 1858, Marx wrote: "The difficult question for us is this: on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will moreover assume a socialist character. It is not bound to be crushed in this little corner, considering that in a far greater territory the movement of bourgeois society is still in the ascendant".¹⁹

History answered this "difficult question": the Paris Commune—the first proletarian revolution in Europe—was crushed and the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia triumphed.

The profound ideas voiced by Marx and Engels on the national-liberation movement in the epoch of developing capitalism, on the strength of the Chinese example, served as a point of departure for the creative elaboration of the national-colonial question by Lenin in the epoch of imperialism.

2

From the very outset of his revolutionary activities Lenin exhibited great interest in China and in the struggle waged by the Chinese people for their national and social emancipation. Lenin studied exhaustively the works of the founders of Marxism, their analysis of the prospects for the development of a single revolutionary movement and the place in it of the liberation struggle of the peoples of the East through the prism of new conditions which took shape in the world at the turn of the 20th century, and of the new tasks which the international working-class movement faced when the "peaceful" period (1872-1904) of social development, as Lenin put it, "has passed, never to return".²⁰

Lenin was the first among the Russian Marxists to write about China and the Chinese liberation movement. In his article "The War in China",

¹⁷ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 93.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 104.

²⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 585.

published in the first issue of *Iskra* and written in connection with the Russian troops' participation, together with the armed forces of Western imperialist powers, in suppressing the Yihetuan (Boxers') rebellion in China, Lenin resolutely condemned the policy of these powers in China and its colonial nature. In exposing the concoctions of bourgeois propaganda that the actions of the great powers were allegedly caused by the "hostility of the yellow race to the white race", the "Chinese hatred for European culture and civilization", Lenin said: "The Chinese do not hate the European peoples, they have never had any quarrel with them—they hate the European capitalists and the European governments obedient to them. How can the Chinese not hate those who have come to China solely for the sake of gain; who have utilised their vaunted civilization solely for the purpose of deception, plunder, and violence; who have waged wars against China in order to win the right to trade in opium with which to drug the people (the war of England and France with China in 1856); and who hypocritically carried their policy of plunder under the guise of spreading Christianity? The bourgeois governments of Europe have long been conducting this policy of plunder with respect to China, and now they have been joined by the autocratic Russian Government."²¹

Having dissociated himself from the policy of the tsarist government, Lenin expressed his sympathy for the struggle waged by the Chinese people: "Journalists who crawl on their bellies before the government and the money-bags are straining every nerve to rouse the hatred of the people against China. But the Chinese people have at no time and in no way oppressed the Russian people. The Chinese people suffer from the same evils as those from which the Russian people suffer—they suffer from an Asiatic government that squeezes taxes from the starving peasantry and that suppresses every aspiration towards liberty by military force; they suffer from the oppression of capital, which has penetrated into the Middle Kingdom."²²

The 1905 Revolution in Russia had a tremendous influence on Asia. It was a powerful impetus which shook the oppressed peoples of the East and awoke them from their age-old slumber. In his article "The Awakening of Asia", Lenin noted: "Hundreds of millions of the downtrodden and benighted have awakened from medieval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for elementary human rights and democracy."²³

While living abroad, Lenin watched with particular attention the revolutionary developments in China in the early 20th century. In his article "Inflammable Material in World Politics" (1908) he noted: "In China, too, the revolutionary movement against the medieval order has made itself felt with particular force in recent months. True, nothing definite can yet be said about the present movement—there is such scanty information about it and such a spate of reports about revolts in various parts of the country. But there can be no doubt about the vigorous growth of the 'new spirit' and the 'European currents' that are stirring in China, especially since the Russo-Japanese war, and consequently, the old-style Chinese revolts will inevitably develop into a conscious democratic movement."²⁴

Lenin's prediction about the inevitable development of conscious revolutionary democratic movement in China was corroborated by the revolu-

²¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 373.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 376-377.

²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, p. 86.

²⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 185.

tion of 1911 which overthrew monarchy and proclaimed the republic in China. That was the first bourgeois democratic revolution there and the largest revolution in Asia in the early 20th century.

The Sixth All-Russia Conference of the Bolshevik Party, held in Prague early in 1912, adopted the resolution "On the Chinese Revolution" proposed by Lenin. It stated in part that "the Conference recognises the worldwide importance of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, which is bringing emancipation to Asia and is undermining the rule of the European bourgeoisie. The Conference hails the revolutionary republicans of China, testifies to the profound enthusiasm and complete sympathy with which the proletariat of Russia is following the successes of the revolutionary people of China, and condemns the behaviour of the Russian liberals who are supporting tsarism's policy of conquest."²⁵

The appeal of the Russian Bolsheviks to the Chinese revolutionaries and the solidarity with them were an expression of the proletarian internationalism and the support of the liberation struggle given to the Chinese people at a crucial point in their history. Lenin wrote a number of special articles on the revolutionary developments in China. His most thorough article—"Democracy and Narodism in China" carried by the Bolshevik paper *Nevskaya Zvezda* (July 1912)—contains an in-depth analysis of the economic, ideological and political platform of Sun Yatsen, the leader of the Chinese democracy, which he prepared for the 1911 revolution. Lenin's article was written under the impression of the initial successes scored by the Chinese revolution, and was an answer of sorts to Sun Yatsen's article "Social Significance of the Chinese Revolution" carried by the Brussels socialist paper *Le Peuple*. Lenin wrote: "Every line of Sun Yatsen's platform breathes a spirit of militant and sincere democracy. It reveals a thorough understanding of the inadequacy of a 'racial' revolution. There is not a trace in it of indifference to political issues, or even of underestimation of political liberty, or of the idea that Chinese 'social reform', Chinese constitutional reforms, etc., could be compatible with Chinese autocracy. It stands for complete democracy and the demand for a republic. It squarely poses the question of the condition of the masses, of the mass struggle. It expresses warm sympathy for the toiling and exploited people, faith in their strength and in the justice of their cause."²⁶

Summing up the characteristic he gave to Sun Yatsen's platform, Lenin emphasised: "Before us is the truly great ideology of a truly great people capable not only of lamenting its age-long slavery and dreaming of liberty and equality, but of *fighting* the age-long oppressors of China."²⁷ While highly appreciating Sun Yatsen's "progressive, militant and revolutionary programme", Lenin stressed at the same time that it had a "Narodist colouring". "But the Chinese Narodnik combines this ideology of militant democracy, firstly, with socialist dreams, with hopes of China avoiding the capitalist path, of preventing capitalism, and, secondly, with a plan for, and advocacy of, radical agrarian reform."²⁸

Strong hatred of the Chinese democrats for oppressors and exploiters, their sincere sympathy for socialism whose ideas they borrowed from the West, inevitably engendered their dream about an early triumph of socialism in China, their "subjective socialism". However, the objective conditions in China at that time put on the agenda the economic programme

²⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 485.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 18, p. 164.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

of "eradicating *only* feudal exploitation". Sun Yatsen's agrarian programme reduced to the "transfer of the rent to the state, i. e., to the nationalisation of land by a single tax in the spirit of Henry George", was of "*purely capitalist, maximally capitalist*" character and did not contain a single grain of socialism. Lenin described Sun Yatsen's theory on the possibility of "avoiding" capitalism in China by means of his agrarian programme and the allegedly comparatively "easy nature" of the social revolution in China, due to the latter's backwardness, as a "reactionary Narodnik theory".

In noting the contradictory character of Sun Yatsen's views, Lenin stressed that while advocating the ideas of socialism, Sun Yatsen actually proposed a capitalist land reform and at the same time admitted that China faced a "gigantic industrial" (that is, capitalist) development.

Description of revolutionary democratism, its merits and weak points on the basis of China's example was of great importance not only to China, but also was significant and continues to be significant to the newly-free Asian, African and Latin American countries going through the same stages of political and economic development as China.

In his articles "Regenerated China", "Big Achievement of the Chinese Republic", "The Awakening of Asia", "The Struggle of Parties in China", "Backward Europe and Advanced Asia" which were carried by *Pravda* in November 1912-May 1913, Lenin explained with his usual profundity the stand taken by Russian Bolsheviks vis-à-vis the Chinese developments, gave them a class evaluation, showed their role and place in the international revolutionary movement and predicted the possible near prospects for their development. At the same time Lenin laid bare the behaviour of the imperialist bourgeoisie of different countries and of their governments as regards China.

In the article "Big Achievement of the Chinese Republic", Lenin stressed: "The Chinese Revolution did not evoke among the European bourgeoisie any enthusiasm for freedom and democracy—only the proletariat can entertain that feeling, which is alien to the knights of profit; it gave rise to the urge to *plunder* China, partition her and take away some of her territories."²⁹ The article "Backward Europe and Advanced Asia" read in part: "In civilised and advanced Europe, with its highly developed machine industry, its rich, multiform culture and its constitutions, a point in history has been reached when the commanding bourgeoisie, fearing the growth and increasing strength of the proletariat, comes out in support of everything backward, moribund and medieval. The bourgeoisie is living out its last days, and is joining with all obsolete and obsolescent forces in an attempt to preserve tottering wage-slavery.

"...All the commanders of Europe, all the European bourgeoisie are *in alliance* with all the forces of reaction and medievalism in China."³⁰

Seventy years have passed since the time when these articles were published. But the evaluation of the policies pursued by the ruling quarters of the imperialist powers is still valid today: the same fear of the working-class movement, of the revolution, the same policy of supporting everything obsolete and obsolescent for the sake of preserving their domination, and the same line toward an alliance with all forces of reaction against the forces of democracy, progress and socialism.

The analysis of Sun Yatsen's economic, ideological and political programme, and also of the character of the liberation struggle waged by

²⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 29.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

the Chinese people during the first decade of the 20th century, led Lenin to the conclusion that China embarked on the Western road and was fighting for the same European ideals that the West had reached. This created a basis for the uniting of China's revolutionary forces with the international revolutionary movement in the common struggle for national and social emancipation.

* * *

The defeat of the Chinese revolution of 1911-1913, due to internal and international conditions, was not fatal to the destinies of the liberation struggle of the Chinese people. It showed, however, that the isolated struggle of separate countries against imperialism and internal reaction cannot bring about any success.

The First World War and the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new stage in the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples. In characterising that stage, Lenin wrote: "The period of the awakening of the East in the contemporary revolution is being succeeded by a period in which all the Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world, so as not to be simply objects of the enrichment of others. The peoples of the East are becoming alive to the need for practical action, the need for every nation to take part in shaping the destiny of all mankind."³¹

To guide the movement and elaborate a proper strategy and tactics, it was highly important to define correctly its character, Lenin provided an exhaustive answer to his question. He wrote that in the East "inexorably and with mounting momentum they are approaching their 1905, with the essential and important difference that in 1905 the revolution in Russia could still proceed (at any rate at the beginning) in isolation, that is, without other countries being immediately drawn in. But the revolutions that are maturing in India and China are being drawn into—have already been drawn into—the revolutionary struggle, the revolutionary movement, the world revolution."³²

Thus prior to the October Revolution the national emancipation of the peoples was a component part of the world democratic revolution, whereas after its triumph it turned into an organic integral part of the world socialist revolution with all the ensuing consequences. "The socialist revolution," Lenin pointed out, "which is impending for the whole world will not be merely the victory of the proletariat of each country over its own bourgeoisie... The socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie—no, it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism."³³

Due to historical conditions, Russia was the first in the world to deliver a crushing blow at imperialism, and this placed it in the vanguard of the world liberation movement, "and we regard that as a great honour", Lenin noted.³⁴ The relations between Soviet Russia—the country of the triumphant socialist revolution—and imperialism which continued to oppress the working people in the capitalist countries and the working masses in colonial and dependent countries became the principal contra-

³¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 160.

³² *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 350.

³³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 159.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 151.

diction of the post-October period. "World political developments," Lenin stressed, "are of necessity concentrated on a single focus—the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet Russian Republic, around which are inevitably grouped, on the one hand, the Soviet movements of the advanced workers in all countries and, on the other, all the national liberation movements in the colonies and among the oppressed nationalities." ³⁵ Lenin emphasised that if this factor were neglected, it would be impossible "to pose a single national or colonial problem correctly, even if it concerns a most outlying part of the world". ³⁶

Lenin's guiding principles and provisions on the national and colonial question were of invaluable assistance to the Chinese people in its liberation struggle. After the Soviet socialist state had been formed, the assistance to the liberation struggle of the Chinese people was placed on a governmental basis. China's progressive forces heartily welcomed the victorious October Revolution. Sun Yatsen saw in the latter the "great hope for mankind". In 1918 he sent Lenin a cable of greetings from Shanghai in which he noted that the Chinese and the Russian revolutions "have common goals". Li Dazhao also spoke highly of the victory won by the Russian people: "We should welcome with pride the Russian revolution as the light of a new world civilisation. We should listen attentively to the news from new Russia which is being built on the principles of freedom and humanism. Only then shall we go hand-in-hand with the world progress". ³⁷

Under the conditions of a hard and devastating Civil War imposed on revolutionary Russia by the world imperialism, the Soviet government never forgot about its internationalist duty with respect to the liberation struggle of the Chinese people. In July 1919 it addressed the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China with an extremely important statement containing a clearcut explanation of the policy pursued by Soviet Russia in respect to the peoples of the East, notably the Chinese people. "We are bringing help not only to our toiling classes," the Address pointed out, "but also to the Chinese people, and we remind again of what we told it after the Great October Revolution of 1917 but which might have been concealed from it by the corrupt American and European press." ³⁸

The Address reaffirmed the statement of the Soviet government about the renunciation of all secret treaties concluded by the tsarist government with Japan and Western allies, which gave them special privileges on Chinese soil, and proposed to start negotiations on the formalisation of new, just relations by means of signing a corresponding treaty between Soviet Russia and China. "If the Chinese people wishes, like the Russian people, to become free and to escape the plight prepared for it by the allies in Versailles with the purpose of turning it into another Korea or another India, it must realise that the Russian worker and peasant and his Red Army are the only ally and brother in the struggle for freedom." ³⁹

Although the imperialist powers and China's North government, which was under their influence, were going out of their way to conceal from the Chinese people the Address of the government of Soviet Russia, it appeared in the Chinese press, though it took almost a year. Sun Yatsen,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 146.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

³⁷ Li Dazhao, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1965, p. 66 (in Russian).

³⁸ *Soviet-Chinese Relations—1917-1957. Collection of Documents*, Moscow, 1959, p. 43 (in Russian).

³⁹ *Soviet-Chinese Relations—1917-1957*, p. 45.

who headed the South government at that time, reacted positively to the Address of the Soviet government. In his letter to Georgi Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, of August 28, 1921, Sun Yatsen described the complicated situation in China and asked to acquaint him with the organisation of Soviets, the Army and the system of education, and with the building of socialism in Soviet Russia in general. "Like Moscow", he wrote, "I would like to lay the foundations of the Chinese republic deep in the minds of the younger generation, the toilers of tomorrow."⁴⁰

In the difficult conditions of the political and diplomatic struggle, the Soviet government overcame the frenzied resistance put up by the imperialist powers and the militaristic and feudal reactionaries in China and finally succeeded in signing the Agreement on the General Principles for Settling Problems Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Republic. The signing of a joint agreement which provided for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two great neighbouring countries was a major historic development. "During the past century it was China's first treaty with a great power, based on equality, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. It marked the beginning of applying new principles in relations of great powers with China. The Soviet-Chinese agreement was the first blow at the entire system of unequal treaties imposed on China by Western powers."⁴¹

Sun Yatsen and, in his person, the whole working people of China who continued to experience national and social oppression hailed the establishment of relations between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. "Genuine interests of our countries," Sun Yatsen wrote, "require the shaping of a common policy which will enable us to live in conditions of equality with other powers, will free us from political and economic slavery imposed on us by the international system relying on force and applying methods of economic imperialism... In her attitude toward China, Russia has established the principle of complete and absolute equality."⁴²

After the death of Lenin, which was an irreplaceable loss for the revolutionary movement in China as well, the Soviet government continued rendering it allround assistance in its hard and long liberation struggle against the combined forces of imperialism and internal reactionaries, which was ultimately crowned by a victory and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949.

In assessing the aid given by the Soviet Union in that struggle as a major factor contributing to the victory of the Chinese people, Mao Zedong in 1949 said: "But for the existence of the Soviet Union, but for the victory in the anti-fascist Second World War, but for the rout of the Japanese imperialism... could we win under such circumstances? Of course, not. It would also be inconceivable to consolidate the victory after it has been attained."⁴³

The Soviet Union continued giving multifarious assistance to China after the latter had embarked on the socialist development. The Chinese leaders repeatedly recognised and reaffirmed the significance of this fraternal assistance.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁴¹ *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-1957*, p. 15.

⁴² *New East*, No. 6, 1924, p. XXX.

⁴³ Mao Zedong, *On the Dictatorship of People's Democracy*, Moscow, 1949, p. 9 (in Russian).

Though the advocates of the obsolescent capitalist world are bending every effort to "refute", "roll back", emasculate, slander and smear Marxism, for more than 125 years it continues to live and develop, spreading far and wide on our planet and winning over the minds and hearts of the people.

Prior to the 20th century China never heard of Marx. The great founder of scientific socialism and his teaching were first mentioned in the Chinese emigrant press in 1902. The journal of reformers *Xinmin congbao* printed in Japan wrote: "Marx is an insurmountable example of German socialism."⁴⁴ In the same year the publishing house owned by the reformists put out in Chinese a translation of *Modern Socialism* by the Japanese author Fukui Zyundo. One of the chapters was devoted to German socialism, with the main emphasis placed on the teaching of Karl Marx. It was stated in that chapter that the doctrine of Marx, "relying on carefully examined economic principles proved the genuine truth". That is why, the author went on, "the implementation of this teaching presents no difficulties for the majority of the working people, and it has won general approval and support".⁴⁵

The names of Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific communism, appeared for the first time in China's revolutionary democratic press in 1903. *Zhejiangchao*, the journal of the revolutionary Chinese students, called the teaching of Marx a doctrine which "now is shaking Europe and America".⁴⁶ *Minbao* (Nos. 2 and 3) printed in Japan, carried in 1906 an article by Zhu Zhixin, an associate of Sun Yatsen and a prominent figure of the Union League, which was entitled "Short Biographies of the German Revolutionary-Socialists". The article contained biographical data on Marx, Engels and Lassalle and quoted some provisions from the *Communist Manifesto* with the author's comments, trying to criticise some aspects of Marxism from petty-bourgeois positions.

The first chapter of the *Communist Manifesto* with the foreword written by Engels, as well as part of *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* by Engels were translated and published prior to the 1911 revolution. These materials were published in 1908 in *Tanyibao*, a progressive magazine. In 1919 *Xin shijie*, a Shanghai magazine, which propagated European ideas of socialism, carried an incomplete translation of *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* by Engels. After the defeat of the revolution, which caused vacillations and disappointment among many revolutionaries, there was much less propaganda of socialist ideas in China.

Thus, prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution, China was only slightly acquainted with Marxism. The translations of works by Marx and Engels were published abroad (mainly in Japan) with the help of Chinese emigres and students and were disseminated in China illegally. They were available only to a narrow group of the Chinese petty-bourgeois intelligentsia whose knowledge of Marxism was very vague.

The Marxist ideas began to be widespread in China only after the Great October Socialist Revolution when the Chinese working class was emerging onto the political scene as an independent force. Professor Li Dazhao of Peking University, one of the founders of the Communist Party of China, was the first and outstanding proponent of Marxism in China.

⁴⁴ Quoted from *Xin jianshe*, No. 3, 1953, p. 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ *Zhejiangchao*, No. 3, 1903.

From 1917 to 1927 he wrote and published many dozens of articles dealing especially with Marx and his teaching. He used the method and the theory of Marxism as a methodological basis in his studies of that period, i. e., during the last ten years of his short life.

The May Fourth 1919 Movement and, later, the establishment of the Communist Party of China were landmarks in the spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Apart from Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo, Chen Duxiu, Deng Zhongxia, Cai Hesen, Zhang Tailai, Peng Bai and other active participants in the May Fourth Movement were among the most prominent propagandists of Marxism-Leninism in China. The full text of the Chinese translation of the *Communist Manifesto*, *Wage Labour and Capital*, and *Critique of the Gotha Programme* by Marx, and also *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (Part II) by Engels were published in 1919-1921. Such Lenin's works as *Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat*, *Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, *The Great Beginning*, *From the Destruction of the Old Social System to the Creation of the New*, *Report on the Party Programme*, *The State and Revolution* (partially), *The Terms of Admission into the Communist International* and others were translated into Chinese and published. While determining the significance of the published works of that period, Jiang Chunfang, deputy director of the bureau for translating works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin at the CPC Central Committee, noted: "The translations of works by Marx, Engels and Lenin, as well as the materials on the lives and activities of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, which were printed by periodicals in different regions of the country, have undoubtedly played a highly important role in creating the Chinese Communist Party. The spread of Marxism-Leninism laid down the theoretical foundation for the Communist Party of China."⁴⁷

After the establishment of the CPC and up to the proclamation of the PRC, the translations of the works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism were printed in China irregularly, subject to the development of the liberation movement in the country. Lenin's articles on China—"The War in China", "Regenerated China", "The Awakening of Asia", "Backward Europe and Advanced Asia"—became known in China in 1924 when their translations were published in *Xinqingnian*, an organ of the CPC Central Committee. *On China*, a collection of Lenin's articles, was put out in 1940.

In 1930 the Soviet Foreign Worker Publishing House, with the help of Chinese communists in the Soviet Union, began putting out collected works by Lenin (beginning with the third edition) which were printed in Yunnan. More than fifty per cent of the volumes were issued before the war. In 1955-1959 the Renmin chubanche Publishing House put out all the 38 volumes of the fourth edition of his collected works.

The number of works by Marx and Engels translated and published in Chinese was fewer. Nevertheless, prior to the formation of the PRC *The Poverty of Philosophy*, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Volume One of *the Capital* (in different translations), *The Civil War in France* by Karl Marx, *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition From Ape to Man*, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of the German Classical Philosophy*, *Anti-Dühring*, *The Peasant War in Germany*, *Selected Articles on Military Matters*, *The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State* by Engels were published. Several collections of works by Marx and Engels on different matters, including *German Ideology* and *Corres-*

⁴⁷ *Publication and Dissemination of the Works of V. I. Lenin*, Moscow, 1960, p. 281 (in Russian).

pondence, On China (1938) and *On Literature and Art* (1940) were put out.

The number of copies was of course rather limited and the readership was relatively small, consisting mainly of intellectuals. Only after the victory of the people's revolution in China did there emerge real possibilities for the mastering of the immortal teaching of Marxism-Leninism by the broad popular masses.

The centenary of the death of Karl Marx is marked in China this year on a broad scale. The fifty-volume works by Marx and Engels (a translation from the Soviet edition) is being completed. Separate works by Marx and Engels, verified with the latest editions in the original, are now prepared for printing in mass editions. The plan of 1983 includes translations into Chinese of books about Marx and Engels by foreign, including Soviet, authors. (B. M. Kedrov, *On the Dialectics of Nature by F. Engels*, N. E. Lapin, *Young Marx*, D. I. Rosenberg, *Commentaries to the Three Volumes of the Capital*); a team of authors from the GDR, headed by H. Gemkow, *K. Marx. Biography, F. Engels. Biography*). The translation of the first volume of *The Capital* from the French edition is being prepared. As compared with the German edition, it contains a number of amendments and supplements which are of great theoretical importance, and this volume differs structurally from the German original. A number of other undertakings is also afoot.

* * *

Lenin's brilliant prediction in his article "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx", written seventy years ago, that the forthcoming historical epoch will bring an ever greater triumph to Marxism, is coming true. Today we see this triumph in the existence of the powerful socialist system, in the victory of the national liberation movement in many countries, and in the intensification of the struggle waged by the working class of all continents for its legitimate rights. This is why the whole of progressive mankind, waging a struggle for peace, freedom, democracy, and social progress, a worldwide struggle, whose banner carries a gold inscription of the names of Marx and Engels, marks the 165th birthday and 100th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx.

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ASIA'S MOST URGENT PROBLEM

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 83 pp 21-29

[Article by Mangalyn Dugerseren (Mongolia)]

Preserving peace has become the most urgent task of our day and age. The world developments have called into question the most fundamental and sacred right of every inhabitant of our planet, the right to life and creation. Survival of the human race has become a cause for great concern to the world public. Why is this so?

The more reactionary imperialist quarters are out on a highly adventurous mission of stemming mankind's advancement toward national independence, democracy and social progress. The leading force of world reaction—the US administration—has raised anti-communism to the level of state policy. This implies primarily a “crusade” against real socialism, the main bulwark of peace, democracy and socialism. This also implies a concerted attack against the forces of national and social liberation and cruel persecution of all that is progressive, just and reasonable.

President Reagan and the “hawks” from among his entourage entertain blind and reckless hopes of making force the decisive factor in international relations. They are taking feverish steps aimed at attaining military and strategic superiority over the socialist world, and at preparing for various scenarios of a nuclear war. Washington's conduct is sufficiently adventurous to make real the threat of a nuclear holocaust. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov described it as “not only irresponsible, but insane”.

The main course toward military confrontation is concomitant with an unbridled psychological war, economic sanctions and political and ideologic subversion against the socialist community countries and other progressive forces. The imperialist forces are zealously spreading the hidebound lie about a so-called “Soviet military threat”. They are doing this in a bid to cover up and justify their reactionary moves aimed at undermining the pillars of peaceful coexistence and international detente.

The socialist countries are unanimously agreed that the future belongs to the policy of detente. In keeping with this they propose realistic alternatives to confrontation and nuclear brinkmanship.

The Prague meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's Political Consultative Committee has given a new powerful impetus to the peace initiatives advanced by the fraternal countries. It adopted the Political Declaration which suggests concrete ways of getting over the present-day stage marked by a dangerous exacerbation of international relations. A set of constructive proposals contained in this historical document accord with the vital interests of European nations and those of the world at large.

Of particularly great practical importance is the proposal for signing a treaty of the mutual non-use of military force and on maintaining relations between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries.

The Prague Declaration pays considerable regard to eliminating the hotbeds of tension and conflicts in Asia and improving the political situation there. This is natural, since the entire postwar period has seen not a single day free from wars or armed conflicts provoked by the reactionary forces in Asia. It was on this continent, notably in Vietnam and Korea, that three attempts to implement the imperialist policy of "containing communism" and "rolling back socialism" with the force of arms were made. Today, too, dangerous conflicts frequently flare up in Asia. It is a scene of intrigues by the imperialists and other reactionary forces.

The imperialist powers have arbitrarily declared many regions of the continent the spheres of their "vital interests". Crack detachments of and strong points for, the interventionist rapid deployment force are being set up in the Middle East and other "strategic" regions. The creation of the so-called US Central Command signifies a new stage in the US war preparations effort, marking the emergence of an integrated bridgehead for aggression against scores of Asian countries and the adjoining regions.

An increasing number of countries and regions of Asia get involved in the USA's military and political strategy and in the arms race. The main factor behind the sharply deteriorated situation in Asia is the notorious policy of "parallel interests" pursued by the imperialist and the hegemonistic forces.

Southeast and Southwest Asia as well as the Far East are the regions most effected by the negative consequences ensuing from the cooperation of those forces on the anti-Soviet and anti-socialist basis.

The farce of the so-called coalition government of "Democratic Kampuchea" is the result of joint efforts by Washington and Peking. In scaring the ASEAN countries with the invented "communist threat", these forces push them toward a confrontation with the states of Indochina.

There are mounting attempts to turn ASEAN into a military bloc. Exploited to achieve this end are the bilateral agreements the USA has with some of its member-states, and the anti-Kampuchean, anti-communist prejudices of these countries' ruling elites.

The undeclared war against Afghanistan continues. The USA and its Asian allies are seeking to exacerbate the situation around the DRA. Moreover, the Reagan administration has come out in open support of the Afghan counterrevolutionaries and has started up vigorous supplies of arms and money to them.

The Japanese ruling circles promote military and strategic cooperation with the USA and NATO, and are in fact turning their country into a bridgehead of US aggression in Asia and the Far East. The militaristic nature of the US-Japanese "security treaty" manifests itself in ominous practical measures. A trend reveals itself increasingly clearly for this treaty growing a "nuclear bristle".

Militarism is rearing its head in that country, putting forward dangerous revanchist claims. The Asian peoples are increasingly concerned over the Japanese strategic concept of the so-called "comprehensive security" aimed at ensuring Tokyo's political, economic and military domination, mainly in Asia. To arrive at this goal, the Japanese ruling elite intend to use a projected military and political organisation, the so-called "Pacific community".

The south of the Korean peninsula is becoming a US nuclear bridgehead. Taiwan remains the USA's strongpoint. Moreover, Washington

has stepped up its deliveries of the latest weaponry to Taipei, despite its promises to Peking to the contrary. Asian countries are being covered with a network of military bases. Today there are over 90 major US military bases in Asia, including 40 in South Korea, and 32 in Japan. The ASEAN countries' military spending has trebled over the last 5 years, while the inflow of US arms there will double by 1985 as compared with the previous 5 years. The major recipients of US arms are Israel, South Korea and Pakistan.

The threat to peace and security in Asia is growing particularly serious due to the USA's stepped-up efforts to turn this continent, notably the Far East and the Indian Ocean, into a bridgehead for a nuclear war.

The Mongolian government proceeds from the belief that peace and security in Asia, like all over the world, can be preserved and consolidated. The champions of peace, national independence and social progress are strong enough to curb those who seek confrontation and military adventures.

The world socialist community, primarily the great Soviet Union, plays a decisive role in the continent. All the positive changes that have taken place there are inseparably linked with the consistent peaceful foreign policies and constructive efforts of the socialist community countries. The initiatives put forward in the Peace Programme for the 1980s and the subsequent major moves by the Soviet Union are in accord with the vital interests of both the socialist nations and those who hold dear peace and peaceful progress.

The implementation of the Soviet proposal for an international conference on Middle East settlement would help eliminate the most dangerous crisis in the postwar history, the one that only tends to worsen. This proposal is aimed at a just and comprehensive settlement of the problem in the interests of all nations of the region, primarily the Palestinians. It is intended to clear the baneful consequences of US-Israeli "strategic cooperation", i. e., to have support of Israel in its role of Middle Eastern policeman discontinued, and to check a further increase in the US military presence in this region.

The Declaration adopted by the Arab Fez summit reiterated that the Soviet proposal was fully in accord with the key interests of the Arab countries.

The Soviet proposal on confidence-building measures in the Far East merits special attention. The traditional August 1982 Crimea meeting between the Soviet and the Mongolian leaders reiterated both countries' unqualified support for this proposal and the new Soviet initiatives addressed to Japan and China. Both sides stated that they proceeded from the fact that "the Far Eastern states are able to build their relations exclusively on the principles of goodneighbourly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation. Given the sincere interest of the sides and their renunciation of prejudices and distrust, there are no problems that cannot be solved at the negotiating table". There is no doubt that the implementation of the confidence-building measures, either collectively, or on a bilateral basis and with the lawful interests of each party being taken into account, would promote detente in this region.

In this connection, the Mongolian government attaches much importance to the consultations on normalising relations now under way between the USSR and China. We regard the beginning of this dialogue as a victory for the line toward confidence and goodneighbourly relations, and as a result of the Soviet Union's constructive initiatives and persevering efforts in this sphere. The outcome of the dialogue will depend on the

extent to which Peking will be inclined to cope with the realities that are in accord with the vital interests of the Chinese people, as well as the broader interests of peace, independence and progress of Asian, and not only Asian, peoples.

Following the Soviet-Chinese dialogue with some concern are the imperialist forces who have pinned high hopes on the anti-Soviet and anti-socialist slant of Peking's foreign policy. They fear normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations, their representatives repeating over and over again that a genuine normalisation between the Soviet Union and China as socialist powers will not be reached.

A realistic and constructive stand vis-à-vis the initiatives aimed at promoting confidence and mutual understanding taken by Japan's ruling quarters would be conducive to greater security of the continent's nations, including the Japanese people themselves, who were the first to fall victim to an A-bomb attack.

It is natural that each sensible Japanese should not want this tragedy to be repeated, as he should not want his country to become an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the USA.

The Mongolian people, like all peaceloving world public, wants the Japanese economic, scientific and technological potential to serve the cause of peace and construction, not destruction and annihilation.

Speaking about the situation in the Far East, one must stress the great urgency of stepping up efforts for withdrawing US troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea and for unifying this country on a democratic and peaceful basis. As was emphasised earlier, the US military presence in South Korea has a direct bearing on the increased nuclear danger in Asia.

The Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) regards the new initiatives advanced by the February 1983 Vientiane summit of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea as a timely and positive step toward reducing tensions in Southeast Asia, restoring mutual confidence and friendly cooperation between the two groups of states in this region. The implementation of proposals by the leaders of the three fraternal Indochinese countries would open up broad possibilities for peaceful progress of the Southeast Asian countries. The character of the future developments in Southeast Asia will be determined primarily by whether the ASEAN policies will be guided by common sense, and whether these countries will be to maintain the same sense of realism as their partners, the Indochinese countries.

What is paradoxical about the ASEAN countries' policies vis-à-vis the socialist countries of Indochina is their desire to weaken their own reliable allies in the struggle against imperialist and hegemonistic expansionism in Southeast Asia.

A healthier situation in Asia will be conducive to an early settlement of the situation round Afghanistan. All peaceloving forces justly hold that the settlement can and must be reached via the implementation of the DRA's constructive proposals of May 14, 1980, and August 24, 1981. It was with interest that the people of Mongolia took the news of the dialogue between the foreign ministers of the DRA and Pakistan conducted with the mediation of the representative of the UN Secretary-General.

Mongolia backs up the nonaligned countries' efforts to bring about an end to the Iranian-Iraqi war. This is the most senseless, fratricidal war that can only play into the hands of the imperialists.

The MPR is fully in favour of the Indian Ocean littoral states' desire to have this vast area, so vitally important for them, turned into a zone

of peace free of all foreign military bases and of the threat to their security, independence and sovereignty. The USA's wide-scale military preparations in the Indian Ocean evoke deep concern of all those who seek peace and security, notably the littoral nations.

Along with all the peaceloving countries, the MPR calls for an early implementation of the 1971 UN Declaration on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and for an immediate convocation of an international conference for the purpose.

In conjunction with the reactionary Islamic regimes, the USA is seeking to prevent the alignment of forces in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area from being changed in favour of peace and social progress. It is also seeking to establish its domination in this exclusively important military and strategic area adjoining the oil-rich Middle East and the USSR borders. The Soviet Union has advanced exceptionally clear and concrete proposals concerning the Persian Gulf. These are: not to create foreign military bases in the region, not to deploy there nuclear or any other types of mass destruction weapons, not to threaten or use force against the Persian Gulf countries, not to interfere in their internal affairs, to respect their nonaligned status, not to draw them into military groupings with the participation of the nuclear powers, etc. These proposals that are fully in accord with the vital interests of the region's nations should be implemented without delay. They echo many initiatives advanced by the littoral states. Realising all these initiatives and proposals would undoubtedly promote a much healthier situation in the region. For this reason, the priority must be to ensure that the territory of no country in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region would be used for subversion against the territorial integrity and political independence of any other state in the region.

The results of the Delhi conference of the heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries demonstrated anew that in this influential movement the socialist countries had a major ally in their drive for peace and against the expansionist policies of the imperialist forces. The Political Declaration adopted by the conference emphasises that in our day and age there is no alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence, detente and cooperation, and that the quintessence of the nonaligned policy has always consisted in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism.

The Declaration's stand on the pressing issues of Asia on the whole coincides with the stance of the socialist countries.

In connection with the growing significance of the nonaligned movement, we should like to point to the great positive role played in Asian and world affairs by the realistic foreign policy of the Republic of India. This policy based on the principles of goodwill, goodneighbourly relations and nonalignment, is an important factor of international life.

* * *

One of the most important tasks of the MPR's foreign policy is to promote by every possible means the cause of peace, security and cooperation in Asia and the world over. The Party and government of the MPR have been paying particular regard to strengthening Asian peace and security and to developing normal and goodneighbourly relations between nations and countries of the continent.

Mongolia maintains friendly relations with almost all the Asian countries. We have particularly fruitful and large-scale relations with the

Great Soviet Union which is both a European and an Asian power. The combat alliance between the MPR and the USSR, born more than 60 years ago in the course of their joint struggle for the independence of the Mongolian people and against the enemies of the young Soviet Republic, their fraternal friendship and comprehensive cooperation are the reliable guarantees of Mongolia's progress toward peace and socialism. The Mongolian-Soviet concord has always been an important factor of peace and stability in the Far East and Asia.

There is valuable progress in Mongolia's relations with other socialist countries of the continent—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Mongolia's cooperation and solidarity with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, whose people are building a new life are steadily strengthening. Our ties with the Republic of India, Asia's biggest peaceloving power, are becoming increasingly stronger. The MPR maintains political contacts and develops cultural ties with many other countries of the Asian continent.

In the Report to the 18th Congress of the Party, Yu. Tsedenbal, General Secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, emphasised that the "Mongolian People's Republic invariably favours extending friendly relations with the Asian states. In so doing, we proceed from the urgent need to help search for ways of strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation between the countries of the continent".

Along with many other peaceloving countries, the MPR has been making continuous efforts to preserve peace and security in Asia, strengthen mutual understanding and confidence, and develop cooperation between states of the continent. Their concrete manifestation was Mongolia's May 1981 proposal to sign a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between the states of Asia and the Pacific.

The main purpose behind this initiative is to obviate aggression and the use of force in the interstate relations, notably in the Asian and Pacific region, and to help strengthen peace and security in Asia. We proceed from the conviction that a treaty based on the principle of renunciation of the use of force in relations between the region's countries would create one of the most important prerequisites for consolidating the foundations of security in Asia. The considerations we were guided by in advancing these initiatives were explained in the Appeal of the Great People's Khural of the MPR to the Parliaments of the Countries of Asia and the Pacific, as well as in the Mongolian head of state's messages to the heads of state and government of 50 countries, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The overall reaction shows that the Asian nations regard our proposal as an important step dictated by the present-day realities of Asia. Our first demand is to eliminate the crisis and conflict situations in the continent through using political means of settlement and renouncing the use of force in interstate relations. Blocking off the appearance of new seats of tension calls for a strict observance of the same principle. Lastly, barring violence from interstate relations is a prerequisite of democratisation of international intercourse.

After praising highly the Mongolian proposal as one helping consolidate peace in Asia, the Soviet government noted that if progress were achieved in restructuring interstate relations in this huge region on the basis of ideas contained in this proposal, it "would constitute a major, historic, we may say, shift in Asian developments". In voicing satisfaction

with this initiative, the Prime Minister of India stressed that it was an important step toward mobilising public opinion and that it reflected the Mongolian people's devotion to the cause of peace and security.

Political quarters of the various states responding to the Mongolian proposal share concern over the state of affairs in Asia and the understanding of the need to improve it. This is the principal thing that, naturally, gives us deep satisfaction.

The MPR proceeds from the assumption that renunciation of the threat or use of force in interstate relations is a point of departure of sorts, the cornerstone of all efforts to consolidate peace and security. It confirms such fundamental principles of relations among states as respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and equitable cooperation. These, in their turn, give essence to the concept of the non-use of force and constitute the foundation of the policy of peaceful coexistence and nonalignment. It is only on the basis of a clear-cut negotiated commitment to observe these principles, undertaken by the states, that mutual confidence as a necessary condition of equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation between states can be consolidated.

Peace must not depend on some poles of strength, or on the balancing of time-serving circumstances. It must be based on reasonable and constructive analysis of realities and on respect for lawful rights and interests of all countries, large and small.

We are profoundly convinced that, to take practical steps toward normalising the political climate in Asia and the Pacific, it is necessary to recognise the exceptional importance of the political dialogue in our day and age. A broad and equitable dialogue, based on a desire for cooperation, will undoubtedly contribute to an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding in relations between states, and to a constructive discussion of urgent problems aimed at solving them by peaceful means, i. e., through negotiations.

Dialogue and negotiations are the means capable of paving the way toward stronger peace and security.

Proceeding from this, the MPR suggests that a conference of the countries of Asia and the Pacific should be convened with the purpose of all the states concerned elaborating provisions of the convention proposed by us and deciding on other related issues. The constructive participation of all countries of Asia and the Pacific as well as the permanent members of the UN Security Council in such a conference will be a pledge of success in working out and signing a convention on non-aggression and the non-use of force in relations between states of these regions.

The Asian states have an experience of joint work for peace, security and goodneighbourly relations. The Bandung Conference which took place more than 25 years ago on the initiative of a number of Asian countries, came up with the principles of goodneighbourly relations and cooperation, and with the foundations for joint solution of urgent international problems.

As to the substance and the main elements of the abovementioned convention, Mongolia suggests that the member-countries solemnly reiterate that the principle of the non-use or threat of force formalised by the UN Charter is the fundamental principle of relations between states. Each member-state of the future convention might undertake a commitment to refrain from aggression, from the use or threat of force against territorial integrity and political independence of any other member-state. The use of force involving employment of any types of weapons, including

nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, as well as any other use of force incompatible with the UN Charter must be recognised as an act contravening the principal commitment under the convention.

The member-states of the proposed convention may undertake to adopt all necessary measures to strengthen mutual understanding and confidence between states, to reduce military confrontation, curb the arms race and take practical steps toward disarmament, something that is the most vital and urgent need of present-day international life.

It must be noted that our proposal for a convention that would formalise in a treaty the commitment not to use force in relations between Asian states is by no means a simple reiteration, as some seek to claim, of the commitment already contained in the UN Charter. We proceed from the assumption that the UN Charter's general provisions for banning aggression and the non-use of force can and must be specified and developed in accordance with the practice and specific character of the situation in individual regions. Most member-states of the UN call for adapting general provisions to the specific conditions of international situation.

As evidence of this is the November 29, 1972 resolution of the UN General Assembly "On the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and the Perpetual Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", and the Assembly's December 9, 1981 declaration "On the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States". The principle of the non-use of force came in for an in-depth elaboration at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It may be asserted that it was put into the foundation of the Conference's Final Act.

Article 52 of the UN Charter specifically provides for regional agreements on maintaining international peace and security to be concluded. International practice knows quite a few instances of some or other general principles of the Charter being developed and legalised in separate international agreements.

The critics of the MPR proposal, pointing to the well-known "hot spots" in Asia, assert that it is allegedly unrealistic so long as there are so many outstanding problems. Such excuses are prompted by the desire to oppose all actions aimed at eliminating the imperialist interference in the affairs of the peace-loving countries, that is, by the urge to justify such interference. It is clear to anyone that should there be no moot problem, such convention would have been superfluous. In addition, it is understood that the efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement of controversies and conflicts precisely imply taking measures to stop violence. So, the MPR proposal substantially pursues, among others, the aim of eliminating situations that have arisen as a result of the use of force in international relations. The idea itself of concluding an international agreement banning the use or threat of force can spur on the collective efforts to eliminate crisis situations.

Mongolia's proposal, naturally, goes hand in hand with the initiatives and measures aimed at strengthening confidence and cooperation in various regions and subregions of the continent. What is meant here are the initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Afghanistan, India, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and a number of other peace-loving countries of Asia and the Pacific. We resolutely support these countries' initiatives and proposals, since the motives and aims behind the MPR's and these countries' moves are either identical or similar. After all, underpinning all these initiatives and proposals put forward at national, regional and the world scale is the Asian countries'

common sincere desire to legalise the renunciation of the use of force in international relations in the Asian continent and elsewhere.

It must be stressed that the agreements on peace and cooperation between socialist countries as well as between these countries and other Asian states have provided for the appearing of regions in Asia enjoying stable peace and security.

New important elements of an Asian system of collective security, which is the quintessence of our proposal, would appear following implementation of such proposals as turning Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and other subregions into zones of peace, stability and cooperation.

In keeping with the foregoing, the concrete provisions of the convention might be discussed and agreed upon at a conference of all countries of Asia and the Pacific with the participation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. By virtue of the special responsibility for the preservation and maintenance of world peace vested in them by the UN Charter, the permanent members of the UN Security Council might guarantee the commitments which are likely to be undertaken by the participants in the agreement. In this sense it is of importance that the USSR and China lie in Asia, while the USA directly adjoins the Pacific.

The Mongolian proposal is based on a soberminded consideration of the present-day Asian realities and is in accord with the vital interests of the peoples and countries of the continent. The overwhelming majority of them need peace and goodneighbourly relations to make greater use of their resources in order to overcome as quickly as possible socio-economic backwardness which is the legacy of the colonial period.

Naturally, our initiative will require time to be implemented. It will also require persistent efforts and the goodwill of all Asian states, efforts that are prompted by a deep understanding of their high responsibility for the destiny of their nations.

The MPR is convinced that in view of the present-day dangerous developments in the continent the concern alone is not enough. What is needed are the most decisive steps to establish, through joint efforts, mutual understanding and friendly cooperation between nations, and to consolidate peace in Asia, an important link in the overall system of security.

It must be noted that the further worsening of the situation in Asia caused by imperial and hegemonistic moves throws in greater relief the urgency of the MPR's proposal.

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INDIA'S POLICY--AN IMPORTANT FACTOR OF THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIA

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[Article by V. N. Georgiyev]

The growing importance in world affairs of the nonaligned countries, which have become an active subject of international relations, is a characteristic specificity of our time. This fully applies to one of the leading members of the nonaligned movement, its chairman—India, whose independent peaceloving policy has earned it high acclaim in the world arena.

The Asian direction plays an important, it can be said key role in independent India's foreign policy course. New Delhi attaches prime importance to questions of ensuring detente, peace and stability in Asia. The determining factor here, of course, is India's position of an Asian power with a 700 million population. It is understandable that Asian problems as a component part of global problems affect to a considerable extent that country's national security and interests. Also making itself felt, without doubt, is the understanding by India's leaders of their country's importance in the present-day world. The state of affairs on our planet in general will depend considerably on the situation in the continent that accounts for more than a half of the world's population.

India has traditionally paid special attention to the development of its relations with other Asian states. With many of them it has long-established multifaceted ties. Everybody knows the deep impact that Indian civilisation has had on the emergence and development of the national cultures of a whole number of Asian countries, while in turn enriching itself with the cultural influences from there.

The ideas of solidarity with the struggle of the other Asian peoples against colonial oppression, for national independence were widespread in the progressive circles of Indian society during the period of the national liberation movement. It was not by chance that the first conference on relations between Asian countries (New Delhi, March 23-April 2, 1947) was held precisely in India where the biggest bastion of British colonialism was crushed. Delegates of the public from 28 countries attended this forum organised by the outstanding leader of the national liberation movement, the first Prime Minister of the country Jawaharlal Nehru, even before the formal proclamation of India's independence. The conference was also attended by representatives of the Soviet Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics. The condemnation of all forms of colonialism, the ideas of the resurgence of Asian countries to new life as full-fledged members of the world community sounded at the conference with particular force. Jawaharlal Nehru stressed in his speech at the conference that Asia for too long a time had remained a pleading applicant in Western courts and offices, and the time has come to put an end to this

situation. The countries of Asia have stopped to be pawns in other people's play. They will now carry out their own policy in world affairs.¹ The conference in New Dehli reflected the striving of Asian countries to strengthen solidarity on an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial basis and convincingly demonstrated India's important role in this process.

As the Republic of India asserted itself it increased its contribution to the solution of pressing Asian problems. India took an active part in the settlement of crisis situations. The Indian government's proposals to stop the Korean war, which was unleashed by American imperialism, enjoyed positive response and were supported in many countries, including the Soviet Union. India's weighty contribution to the peaceful settlement of the almost eight-year-long war in Indochina is generally recognised. There is no doubt that India's involvement in the work of the 1954 Geneva conference, although it was not a formal participant, had facilitated the drafting and signing of the Geneva accords. A representative of India was nominated to chair the international commissions to control the fulfilment of the ceasefire agreements in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The plans of imperialists to retain their rule over the peoples of Indochina were foiled and the peaceful settlement of the Indochina problem became possible thanks to the joint persistent efforts of the socialist countries and young independent states.

India's crucial role in the preparation and holding of the Bandung conference, which was a major milestone in the struggle of the peoples of Afro-Asian countries against imperialism, for consolidating their independence and sovereignty, was rewarded with extensive international recognition. It was largely due to India's efforts that the conference concentrated on tasks of liquidating colonialism, of the struggle for social progress, for overcoming the economic backwardness of Afro-Asian countries. The importance of the Bandung conference is also attributed by the fact that it enhanced the assertion among developing countries of the ideas of the policy of nonalignment as a means of vigorously resisting the imperialist forces. It is indicative that the "five principles" of peaceful coexistence, one of the initiators of which was India, formed the basis of the famous "ten principles of Bandung" that represent a political and legal system of relations between states with different social systems.

The role of India's foreign policy as an important factor of international relations, especially in Asia, has grown even more in the present conditions. This is connected to a considerable extent with the impressive successes achieved by that country on the road of independence. India is one of the most developed agrarian-industrial countries in the zone of national liberation. By volume of industrial output it is among the top ten countries of the world. India's weight in world affairs was substantially increased by its active role in founding and developing the nonaligned movement, by its contribution to the struggle for peace and detente, against the policy of neocolonialism and racism, by the constructive steps taken by it to facilitate the implementation of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

A fundamental role in this is played by the understanding by that country's more far-sighted politicians and statesmen of the fact that the cardinal problems of Asian states, including India as well, are connected with the pressing issues of our time. "In today's world," Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said in an interview for the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri shimbun*, "one is bound to be influenced by what is happening in other

¹ J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 52-53 (in Russian).

countries... We have raised our voice in favour of disarmament because if there is war, even if it is somewhere else, it affects us and it aggravates our own problems."² These words echo the well-known statement by Jawaharlal Nehru to the effect that he perceived peace as not just an abstention from wars but as an active and positive approach to international affairs.³

It should be specially stressed that the growth of India's role in the world arena and of its influence on the development of the situation in Asia is taking place in conditions of mounting changes in the alignment of forces between the world capitalist system and world socialism, and of the strengthening of the socialist community's positions. This opens up broad possibilities for invigorating the role of nonaligned countries and the nonaligned movement as a whole.

INDIA AND SOME REGIONAL PROBLEMS

India is seriously concerned by the growth of tension in Asia as a result of actions taken by the imperialist circles which strive for hegemonism and world domination, want to achieve superiority on the road of the arms race, torpedo detente, and draw the Asian continent into the orbit of the cold war. The domination in Asia and in the Pacific remains one of the most important strategic tasks of the United States. It is noteworthy in this connection that among the prime causes of the growth of tension in Asia the report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for the 1981-1982 fiscal year names the "search for new allies or bases, formation of rapid deployment forces, plans to build up a so-called strategic consensus in Southwest and West Asia..."⁴ All this, as is known, is an inalienable part of American imperialism's foreign policy.

In conditions of the noticeable complication of the general situation in the Asian continent the tasks of ensuring India's national security are closely intertwined with the need of easing tension, ensuring peace and stability not only in direct proximity of India's borders but also in Asia as a whole. The thesis on the interconnection of the security problems of South, Southwest and Southeast Asia sounds in the statements by India's statesmen and politicians and is reflected in official documents. As the most important tasks of the country's foreign policy the Indian leaders name counteraction to the whipping up of tension in the South Asian region, militarisation of the Indian Ocean basin, active assistance to the attainment of a political settlement in Southeast and Southwest Asia, and in the Middle East.

Washington's attempts to disrupt the existing alignment of forces in the South Asian subcontinent and to impose a new spiral of the arms race on its countries gives rise to natural and justified apprehensions in India's political and public circles. It is these aims that are being pursued by the massive deliveries of American arms to Pakistan. During the visit to Washington by President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan in December 1982 the Reagan Administration confirmed the commitment of the United States to grant Islamabad military and economic aid to the sum of \$3.2 billion over a period of six years. This includes deliveries of F-16

² *Times of India*, Nov. 18, 1982.

³ J. Nehru, *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁴ *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Annual Report, 1981-1982*, New Delhi, 1982, p. IV.

supersonic fighter-bombers, anti-tank missiles, helicopters, night vision equipment, tanks and modern communications equipment. American arms are already being delivered to Pakistan. Pakistan's measures to purchase modern armaments, it was stated in this connection by India's Defence Minister R. Venkataraman, are far in excess of its legitimate security needs. He added that this made it necessary for India, in turn, to strengthen its own defences.

Washington's course of rearming Pakistan and expanding military ties with it is a component part of the overall efforts of the United States to set up and strengthen its strongpoints in the Middle East and South-west Asia, and to whip up tension there and in other regions.

India's policy of creating an atmosphere of peace and friendship, of developing relations of genuine goodneighbourliness, friendship and co-operation, of promoting the cause of the independence and security of South Asian countries acquires special importance in conditions when the imperialists want to destabilise the situation in the South Asian region. Being guided precisely by these aims, New Delhi is taking steps to normalise relations with Islamabad, to facilitate the development of the process started by the 1972 Simla agreement between the two countries. In doing so India consistently adheres to the principles incorporated into this agreement and according to which disputes between the two countries should be resolved on a bilateral basis.

Political consultations between New Delhi and Islamabad are being conducted since the end of 1981. At these consultations India proposed to conclude a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. According to reports in the Indian press the draft treaty provides, in particular, for a commitment of the sides not to make their territory available for the establishment of foreign bases and strictly to adhere to the principle of bilateralism when resolving outstanding issues, that is not to make them a subject of discussion at international forums. Although the sides have not yet managed to reach agreement on this matter it was noted in the report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for the 1982-1983 fiscal year that the setting up of the joint Indian-Pakistani commission for cooperation in the field of economy, trade, public health and a number of other fields was a concrete result of the efforts to improve relations with Pakistan.

It should be stressed, however, that the state of Indian-Pakistani relations continues to be affected by the deep differences in the approach of the two countries to pressing problems of the situation in the Hindustan subcontinent and beyond it, and by the differences of their foreign policy priorities.

Relations between India and Bangladesh have become noticeably livelier lately. The scope of economic cooperation between the two countries is growing. The visit to New Delhi by the head of the Bangladesh Martial Law Administration H. M. Ershad in October 1982 and his talks with the Indian leaders was a major event for both countries. The visit demonstrated the mutual interest of the sides in developing friendly relations, their readiness to solve outstanding issues in the spirit of mutual concession, restraint, and by way of talks. This is patently demonstrated by the approach of the two countries to the problem of distributing the waters of the Ganges in the area of the Farakka dam. The joint commission on rivers has been instructed to study the question and formulate mutually acceptable proposals. Since the operation of the agreement on the sharing of waters had expired in November 1982 it was decided to extend it for an indefinite period of time.

It is indicative that the report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for the 1982-1983 fiscal year speaks of noticeable progress in the solution of the most important bilateral problems owing to the good-neighbourliness and friendly cooperation that characterised relations between India and Bangladesh during the period under review.

The strengthening of the atmosphere of trust and accord between India and Bangladesh narrows the scope for manoeuvre for the imperialist and reactionary forces which speculate on the differences between the two countries. It should be recalled that it was already in 1978 that Washington had come up with the idea of the joint use of the waters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra by India, Nepal and Bangladesh with the participation of international financial centres, and set aside for itself the role of arbiter. In effect it pursued the aim of ensuring "American participation" in one way or another in the hope that differences between the South Asian countries would acquire an irrevocable nature. It is understandable that the development of goodneighbourly friendly relations between India, Bangladesh and Nepal and the resultant strengthening of their independence do not "fit" into the plans of the imperialists.

Sentiments favouring the development of regional cooperation in such spheres as economy, science and technology are becoming widespread lately in countries of South Asia. Secretaries of the foreign ministries of seven countries of the region held a number of conferences since 1981 and discussed the setting of concrete spheres and directions of cooperation. Both India's participation in these conferences and the response in India's political circles to this speak of that country's positive attitude to the idea of regional cooperation as such. Our neighbours in the South Asian subcontinent are making efforts to arrange regional cooperation on the basis of mutual advantage, India's Minister of External Affairs Narasimha Rao said in this connection in his speech at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly. He said India was satisfied with these desirable developments which are consonant with its own perennial efforts to strengthen mutual understanding with that region's countries.

It follows from statements by India's politicians that the development of cooperation between countries of the South Asian subcontinent should create conditions for ensuring economic independence, for strengthening peace and stability in the region. In the already mentioned speech the head of the Indian foreign ministry specially stressed the harmfulness of the concept of the so-called "strategic consensus", set forth by the imperialist circles, and its incompatibility with the idea of regional cooperation.

It is stressed in India that the specificities of the given region's historical evolution and the objective realities of South Asia must be taken into account when translating the idea of regional cooperation into life.

An opinion voiced in the influential newspaper *Times of India* is typical of the sentiments in India. In his article on problems of regional cooperation S. Muni, a columnist, opposed transferring the ASEAN model to South Asian soil and noted in particular the unacceptability of the road of "dependent development" as well as the stable influence of the factor of bilateral relations in cooperation between South Asian states.⁵

India's relations with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are developing successfully. The resumption of work by the joint Indian-Afghan commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation in 1982 after an interval of many years was a remarkable milestone in this process. In-

⁵ See *Times of India*, Nov. 17, 1982.

dia's position on the question of the situation around Afghanistan is realistic and considered. The government of Indira Gandhi comes out for an all-embracing political settlement of this question and proceeds from the need to terminate outside interference in the DRA's internal affairs as one of the most important conditions of the settlement.

India shows an understanding of the measures taken by the DRA government to ensure the sovereignty, independence and national security of the republic, including its appeal to the USSR for assistance in this. Speaking at a press conference in New Delhi in March 1983 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi pointed out that if any country feels in danger and asks for military assistance from another state, this is exclusively its internal affair. I believe, Indira Gandhi added, that the hue and cry raised around Afghanistan in no way contributes to the solution of the problem.

At international forums India comes out against attempts by imperialist countries to whip up a campaign around the so-called "Afghan question". Thus, at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly the Indian representative declared that the Indian delegation did not intend to support the anti-Afghan resolution which was submitted for the Session's consideration and regarded it as an attempt to use the rostrum of the United Nations for the propaganda of the ideas of the cold war.

The attempts by right-wing, pro-imperialist forces to place the discussion of the so-called "Afghan question" in the centre of the work of the 7th Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi were foiled by the efforts of India, as well as by those of Afghanistan, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and a number of other countries.

THE POSITIVE INFLUENCE OF INDIA'S POLICY ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

India's policy in Southeast Asia plays a constructive role. The steps taken by India together with other peaceloving forces to ensure peace and stability in that region are especially important in the present conditions when the American imperialists are trying to turn Southeast Asia into a binding link between the systems of their military bases and agreements in the Middle East and in the Western Pacific.

The whipping up of tension in Southeast Asia is correctly viewed in India as a threat to the security of the South Asian subcontinent as well, including India itself. The influential Indian newspaper *National Herald* sounded the alarm in connection with the development of events in Southeast Asia and stressed the importance of a peaceful settlement of the region's problems noting that this would accord with the interests of India's national security.⁶

India consistently comes out for the starting of a dialogue between the ASEAN countries and the countries of Indochina, for the normalisation of relations between them and for an end to interference by external forces into the region's affairs.

An important place among India's constructive measures directed at ensuring peace and stability in Asia is held by the development of its friendly relations with the states of Indochina—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

⁶ See *National Herald*, Oct. 8, 1981.

Indian-Vietnamese relations are developing fruitfully. India's Minister of External Affairs N. Rao visited the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in February 1982. During the visit both sides expressed confidence that the development of Vietnamese-Indian ties accords with the interests of both countries and the tasks of strengthening peace in Asia.

The Indian side stressed that cooperation and friendly relations with socialist Vietnam constituted a permanent factor of India's foreign policy and should develop on a long-term basis. The talks revealed the identity or closeness of Vietnam's and India's positions on the key international questions, such as the need to ease tension, disarmament, the safeguarding of peace and stability in the Asian continent. It was specially noted that the problems of Southeast Asia should be solved on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence ruling out aggression or interference in the internal affairs of the region's countries.

The visit to India by Vietnam's Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach in December 1982 was an important event in the sphere of Indian-Vietnamese relations. As a result of talks held in New Delhi it was decided to set up a joint Indian-Vietnamese commission on economic and technical cooperation, headed by the foreign ministers of the two countries. The commission's task is to place the cooperation of the two countries in the development of a whole number of branches of their economies on a permanent and long-term basis. It was agreed that India will give Vietnam assistance in the training of national personnel.

A trade protocol between the two countries was signed during that visit by Nguyen Co Thach to New Delhi. India undertook to supply the SRV with chemicals, spares for textile machinery, raw materials for the chemical industry, etc. In turn, the SRV undertook to export to India cement, rubber, apatite and other products. India and Vietnam cooperated fruitfully during the preparation and holding of the New Delhi nonaligned summit conference in March 1983 and this did much to ensure the success of this forum. The stable development of friendly relations between India and Vietnam is highly assessed by the leaders of socialist Vietnam. "Apart from our relations with member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, our multifaceted cooperation with India is of special importance to us", stated the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SRV Nguyen Co Thach. "The cooperation between Vietnam and India is an important factor of peace in Asia and in Southeast Asia in particular and it also is of much importance for the development of the nonaligned movement."

India attaches much importance to the development of relations with the People's Republic of Kampuchea. It was before coming to power in 1980, during the election campaign, that the INC (I) Party headed by Indira Gandhi, promised in its election manifesto to recognise the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Hostile forces made a very big effort to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and the PRK. But all their attempts were futile. In 1980 India recognised the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The establishment of diplomatic relations between India and the PRK accorded with the actual situation existing in Southeast Asia.

India comes out in support of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRK and notes the importance of this for the normalisation of the situation in Southeast Asia.

The visit to India in August 1981 by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRK Hun Sen made a substantial contribution to the strengthening of friendly relations

between the peoples of India and Kampuchea. That was the first visit to India by a delegation of the PRK after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was noted in the joint Indian-Kampuchean communique published on the completion of the visit that "the Indian side highly evaluated the achievements of the people of Kampuchea in the years since liberation, especially in normalising and stabilising daily life in the country". Questions of cooperation in the economic and other spheres were discussed in detail during the visit and concrete directions of India's assistance to the government and people of the PRK in reviving the country's economy after the ravages of the Pol Pot regime were outlined.

India's support for the just cause of the Kampuchean people is of special importance in conditions when the imperialists and their allies are trying to isolate the PRK in the international arena, in the nonaligned movement and are trying to secure the legalisation of the puppet "coalition" headed by Sihanouk. India rejected the persistent proposals of the Pol-Potists' well-wishers to attend the so-called international conference on Kampuchea in 1981. As it was noted in the Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for the 1981-1982 fiscal year, a conference that recognised the inhuman and discredited Pol Pot regime was hardly capable of improving the prospects of the normalisation of the situation in that country.⁷

Together with all the anti-imperialist forces in the nonaligned movement India blocked the attempts by certain forces to admit by all means the head of the so-called coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea Sihanouk to the New Delhi conference of heads of state and government of nonaligned countries. The present PRK government is in firm control of the situation in the country—this statement made by Indira Gandhi at a press conference on the eve of the summit in New Delhi is characteristic of India's position.

At other international forums India's representatives note the irreversibility of the changes in Kampuchea and express solidarity with the Kampuchean people who are building a new life. Speaking at the United Nations, K. Ramalingam, a member of the Indian delegation, declared that all attempts to reverse the process of normalisation in Kampuchea have no future. He added that it appeared senseless to call on the people of Kampuchea to allow the former tyrants to return to power under any guise so that they could again drown the population in a wave of terror and violence.

It can be said, with confidence that India's good relations with the states of Indochina facilitate the consolidation of the positions of those forces in Southeast Asia which come out for a normalisation of the situation in the region, for the creation of a climate of trust between all countries of Southeast Asia.

The Indian leadership attaches much importance to the development of relations with ASEAN countries. The Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Indonesia and the Philippines in 1981, while Vice-President M. Hidayatullah visited Singapore. India's Minister of External Affairs N. Rao made a tour of several ASEAN countries in 1982.

Economic ties hold a place of prominence in India's relations with the five ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. Their deve-

⁷ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. *Annual Report. 1981-1982*, p. VII.

lopment has acquired special importance in conditions of the serious difficulties encountered by the developing countries on Western markets as a result of the discriminatory trade policy pursued by the imperialist powers. India counts on increasing its export to the countries of South-east Asia and remains interested in exporting from there oil, tin, copper and rubber, which abound in ASEAN countries. The expansion of economic cooperation with these countries forms one of the directions of India's course of mobilising the collective efforts of developing countries in protecting their interests from the neocolonialist policy of the West.

It should be particularly stressed that India's ties with ASEAN countries are largely based on stable traditions and have the backing of their certain historical, cultural, religious and ethnic affinity. The cooperation of Indian business circles with local business has become widespread in ASEAN countries. Some 80 mixed enterprises with the participation of Indian industrialists and Indian trade capital have been set up there. These include textile mills, engine assembly plants, enterprises manufacturing household electrical appliances. Most of the mixed enterprises are in Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1981 Indian firms won a contract to expand a large cement works in Pedang (Indonesia). A representative delegation of Indian industrialists visited ASEAN countries during the same year and drew the conclusion that "a big desire for industrial cooperation with India is felt in these countries".

Visible distinctions exist between India and the five ASEAN countries in their approach to a whole number of questions on the situation in the Asian continent and beyond it but this does not change the general direction of the Indira Gandhi government's course of developing friendly relations with all countries of Southeast Asia on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

On the whole, India's policy in Southeast Asia runs counter to that of the USA and its allies which aims at preserving tension and drawing the ASEAN countries into its global strategy. There is no doubt that India exerts a stabilising influence on the situation in this troubled region.

INDIA STANDS FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF CONFLICTS AND FOR EXPANDING THE ZONE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA

India plays an active role in the settlement of conflict situations in the Asian continent.

The explosive situation in the nearby Middle East area gives rise to the legitimate alarm of India's political and public circles. The broadest sections of the Indian society sharply condemn the open brigandage and genocide in respect of the Lebanese and Palestinians elevated by Israel's ruling circles with Washington's support to the rank of state policy. Expressing these feelings the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi described the actions of the Israeli aggressors in Lebanon as a monstrous violation of all norms of international law, a flagrant disregard for other countries and peoples.

India sees the key to the solution of the Middle East problem in Israel's unconditional withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied by it and the holding of talks to achieve a just and comprehensive solution of the problem with the participation of all the interested sides. The Indira Gandhi government states in no uncertain terms that this solution must provide for guarantees of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and the rights of the people of Palestine, including the right to create its own state.

India is making considerable efforts to mobilise the nonaligned countries to support the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples and is actively coming out for the unity and cooperation of the Arab countries in the struggle against the Israeli aggressors. Much work in this direction was done by the Indian delegation headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the 7th Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries in New Delhi. Of principal importance is India's resolute opposition to the attempts by certain circles in the West to replace the settlement of the Middle East problem with manoeuvres around the Lebanese events.

India's consistent support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the sole lawful representative of the Palestinian people has won it widespread appreciation. The granting of the status of a diplomatic mission to the PLO representation in New Delhi was a convincing confirmation of this support. There is no doubt that this helped strengthen this organisation's positions in the international arena, especially among nonaligned countries.

India holds a constructive position in the question of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict. India's leaders have repeatedly stressed that the continuing bloodshed between Iran and Iraq inflicts a tremendous damage to the cardinal interests of these countries, increases the senseless loss of life and complicates the solution of the pressing social and economic problems facing them. India is straining a persistent effort to see this conflict terminated. It is indicative that at the closing of the New Delhi nonaligned summit conference Indira Gandhi again called on Iraq and Iran to "stop the tragic war".

Measures to ensure a relaxation of the dangerous situation in the Indian Ocean hold a special place in India's efforts to ensure peace and stability in Asia. India is deeply interested in turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace first of all because of the need to protect its own security. India is the most populous country in the Indian Ocean basin. Its sea borders stretch for more than 6,000 kilometres. A situation of peace in the region also means security of these borders and of the major industrial, trade and cultural centres located on the coast, of the islands belonging to India in the Indian Ocean and also of India's ramified sea communications. It should also be remembered that the ocean "feeds" millions of Indians and that India links plans of if not solving then at least of alleviating its energy problem with the working of oil and gas deposits on the shelf. It is understandable, therefore, that peaceful oceanic waters are a question of vital necessity for India.

But the Western powers, and first of all the United States, are intensively pursuing the course of building up their military presence there with the aim of turning the entire Indian Ocean basin into a sphere of their military and political domination and creating thereby a real threat to the security of littoral states.

The American plan of "developing" this region in 1980-1985 provides for military expenditures of \$25 billion. Presently the United States has 25 military installations in the Indian Ocean area with 140,000 American servicemen stationed at them. These include the important Diego-Garcia strategic base at which nuclear weapons are stored and stockpiles of chemical weapons are being set up. The creation of the US Central Command (Centcom) to carry out operations in Southwest Asia, in the Persian Gulf area and adjoining regions was a new stage in the escalation of American military presence in the Indian Ocean. The American military fist is raised over a huge territory encompassing 19 countries—from Egypt in the west to Pakistan in the east, from Kenya and

Somalia in the south, to Iran and Afghanistan in the north. The United States is setting up new bridgeheads for interference in the affairs of developing states.

It is realised in India what such actions are fraught with. That is why New Delhi actively comes out for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. This provides for the liquidation of foreign military bases there, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear arms and weapons of mass annihilation, the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against littoral and continental states, the renunciation of the deployment of armed forces and armaments that would threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the region's countries. At the 7th Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries Indira Gandhi stated that the participants in the conference were unanimous in denouncing the rigorous militarisation of the Indian Ocean and the nuclear equipment of the base of Diego-Garcia. All of us, Indira Gandhi went on, should redouble our efforts to ensure the convocation of an international conference on the Indian Ocean. The Indian Prime Minister emphasised that the Indian Ocean must become a zone of peace.

The idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, set forth by India and other developing countries, found its embodiment in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly already in 1971 and again got full and unconditional support at the New Delhi summit meeting of the nonaligned movement. But the imperialist circles are hampering its implementation in every way. This is eloquently demonstrated by the openly obstructionist stand taken by the United States and its allies on the question of convening an international conference to draft an agreement on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Contrary to the will of the peoples Washington wants to prevent the holding of this conference, in any case before the fulfilment of the five-year programme of US military expansion in that area.

In these conditions joint concerted actions by the nonaligned countries, the further invigoration of their activities in collectively repulsing the imperialists' sabotage have never been more important.

INDIA AND THE USSR: JOINT ADHERENCE TO THE CAUSE OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND EASING TENSION

The successfully developing relations of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and India are an important factor of strengthening peace and stability in Asia. The results of the visit to our country by the Indian Prime Minister in September 1982 and also the meetings in Moscow in November of that year between Yuri Andropov and Indira Gandhi convincingly confirmed that the Soviet Union and India hold common or close positions on the most pressing problems of our time. Our countries proceed from the premise that resistance to the arms race, first of all the nuclear arms race, and the fulfilment of effective measures aimed at general and complete disarmament and at preventing thermonuclear war are a top-priority task.

The USSR and India are firmly convinced that the outstanding issues in Asia, just as in the world as a whole, can and must be settled only by peaceful means, and express their unreserved support to the principles of peaceful coexistence. It is noted in the joint Soviet-Indian Declaration signed during Indira Gandhi's visit to the USSR in September 1982 that the Soviet Union and India reiterate their firm conviction that the inter-

national relations should evolve on the basis of strictly observing such generally recognised and fundamental principles as the denial of the use or threat of use of force, equality, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, inviolability of borders, and noninterference in any form in each other's affairs.

The mutual interest of the Soviet Union and India in strengthening relations of friendship and multifaceted cooperation, in their further development for the good of our peoples and the cause of universal peace, that was confirmed at the summit meeting in Moscow in November 1982, was received in Indian political and public circles with deep satisfaction. The *National Herald* wrote in this connection that India highly appreciated the fact that General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi favoured further strengthening and expanding Soviet-Indian cooperation in all spheres. This policy in bilateral relations which was developed step by step rests on a solid foundation of the principles of equality and mutual benefit. The ties between the two countries are exceptionally important both for themselves and for the cause of peace at large.

A number of peace proposals made by the USSR lately either unilaterally or jointly with other socialist countries have evoked a positive response in India. The major proposals to strengthen peace in Asia and in other continents, made at the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequently, were received in broad sections of the Indian society as confirmation of the invincibility of the forces of peace and detente. The fulfilment of the Soviet proposals to spread confidence-building measures to seas and oceans and also to the Far East would be a substantial contribution to the liquidation and prevention of crisis situations in the world, including in the Asian continent. They are consonant with the efforts of India and other nonaligned countries directed at turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. This fully applies also to the Soviet proposal to create a favourable situation for holding an international conference on the Indian Ocean by inducing all states using its waters to refrain prior to the convocation of the conference from steps capable of complicating the situation in that area.

The Indian leaders welcomed the USSR's unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear arms, regarding this as an important step on the road to the total and final prohibition of the use or threat to use nuclear arms.

There was a positive response in India to the "peace offensive of Warsaw Treaty countries", as the Indian newspaper *Statesman* described the initiatives set forth by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee member-states in Prague in January 1983.⁸ These initiatives were assessed by the Indian public as being of fundamental importance for improving the situation in the world, for removing the existing and preventing the appearance of new seats of military conflicts in Asia, Africa and other regions. Special attention was attracted by the assurance pronounced by the Warsaw Treaty countries that they have no intention to expand the sphere of operation of their alliance, and by their call on the NATO countries to refrain from expanding the zone of operation of their bloc to any areas of the world, including the Persian Gulf. The proposal made by the Warsaw Treaty countries to the NATO countries to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and on the maintenance of rela-

⁸ See *Statesman*, Jan. 16, 1983.

tions of peace is regarded in India as an exceptionally important precondition for returning to the policy of detente and eliminating the threat of war. The *Indian Express* wrote that the new proposals can serve as a basis for constructive talks and that it is totally clear that the Soviet Union is ready for them.⁹

The high evaluation of the role of the nonaligned movement in international life and the confirmation of the Soviet Union's invariable support for and solidarity with the struggle of the young states for strengthening independence, for peace and progress, contained in the report made by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov at the celebration meeting in Moscow to mark the 60th anniversary of the USSR, and in the message of greetings from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Chairman of the 7th Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries Indira Gandhi, were received in India with appreciation.

INDIA'S RESPONSIBLE ROLE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

The holding of the nonaligned summit conference in New Delhi was a recognition of India's high prestige among the nonaligned states, in the international arena as a whole, and of the substantial role it plays in solving the pressing problems facing the countries which have thrown off the colonial yoke. At the conference India in the person of its Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was elected Chairman of the Nonaligned Movement for the next three years.

The New Delhi forum took place in conditions of a most aggravated international situation, in conditions when imperialist circles whipped up tension and started a new round of the arms race. At the same time the imperialists stepped up their efforts to split nonaligned movement and weaken its anti-imperialist and anti-militaristic character. It is noteworthy that on the eve of the conference transparent hints were made in US political circles about the supposed need of "bringing back" the non-aligned movement to the position of "genuine" nonalignment "equally distanced from the great powers". Long before the summit meeting in New Delhi the imperialist forces and their allies made persistent attempts to impose on the participants in the forthcoming forum the discussion of questions totally unrelated to the truly pressing problems of our time. The ultimate aim of this was to move the nonaligned movement off the main road, to "neutralise" it in respect of war and peace, as well as in respect of other pressing issues of our time.

Much credit goes to India as the host country of the conference for ensuring the failure of these plans and the adoption by the New Delhi Conference of important constructive decisions in the interests of strengthening peace and security, of defending the freedom of countries and peoples. Jointly with other members of the nonaligned movement upholding its loyalty to the principles of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, India did much to centre the entire work of the conference on questions of struggle against the danger of nuclear war, for ending the arms race, for disarmament, against colonialism and racism, for the economic progress of nonaligned countries. It is said in the New Delhi Appeal, adopted by the conference on Indira Gandhi's proposal, that peace and peaceful coexistence, disarmament and development are crucial problems of our

⁹ See *Indian Express*, Jan. 13, 1983.

day and age. Peace, however, should be based on justice and equality because the unbearable inequality and exploitation established by colonialism and imperialism remain major sources of tension, conflicts and violence throughout the world.

The participants in the New Delhi Conference demanded discontinuation of the arms race which is swallowing, on an ever greater scope, the limited material resources of our planet, and an immediate halt to the sliding towards a nuclear conflict. The heads of state and government of non-aligned countries called on the nuclear powers to conclude an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear arms and the threat to use them.

The work and results of the New Delhi Conference have demonstrated the growing conviction of the participants in the nonaligned movement that the struggle for ensuring peace in present-day conditions is a question of mankind's survival, of preserving life on earth, and that it is only in conditions of peace and security that the young states can solve their urgent problems of development and resist neocolonialist pressure.

The vigorous efforts of India and other countries upholding the movement's adherence to its fundamental principles, directed at countering various centrifugal tendencies, at strengthening the unity of the nonaligned movement and further increasing its role in the world arena, were of much importance for the success of the forum in New Delhi.

Questions of eliminating tension in Asia and the Indian Ocean basin held a prominent place in the work of the conference. Serious concern with the continuing complexity of the situation in Southeast Asia is expressed in the political declaration of the New Delhi forum and a call is made in it to all states of the region to start a dialogue with the aim of establishing lasting peace and stability.

The participants in the conference confirmed the need to restore the inalienable right of the people of Palestine to the creation of its own national sovereign state. Israel's aggression in Lebanon and its occupation of Arab lands were condemned. It is also characteristic that the discussion of the situation in the Middle East, just as in a number of other regions, was accompanied by strong criticism of US policy. The demand for turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and returning the Chagos Archipelago, including the Diego-Garcia island, rented by the United States from Britain, to its lawful owner—Mauritius—was reflected in the materials of the conference and is directed against anti-imperialism.

There is no doubt that the consistent fulfilment of the decisions adopted by the nonaligned summit conference in New Delhi will facilitate the consolidation of the efforts of the participants in the nonaligned movement in the struggle for the cause of peace, security and national independence, against imperialism and neocolonialism. As the country heading the nonaligned movement India is faced with a lofty and responsible mission.

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CHINA'S SIXTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

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[Article by A. P. Morozov, candidate of economic sciences, and I. N. Naumov, candidate of economic sciences]

On December 10, 1982, the fifth session of the Fifth National People's Congress approved the sixth five-year plan for the economic and social development of the People's Republic of China in 1981-1985.¹ Although, as we see, this happened after a two-year delay, the very fact that this plan was adopted is a matter of positive significance for the development of the country's economy. For, in the 25 years after the completion of the first five-year plan in 1957, it is admitted in China, there was not a single scientifically substantiated plan drawn up, and "production and construction were carried out half according to plan and half anarchically", without taking account of the economic laws and the actual potentialities of the Chinese economy, in a "blind drive" for super-high rates of development, with an excessive rate of accumulation for China and emphasis on development of heavy industry, particularly iron-and-steel. Investments in agriculture, light industry, the unproductive sphere, and housing were reduced to the minimum. As a result, a critical situation had taken shape in China's economy by the beginning of the 1980s: the old disproportions had grown deeper and new ones appeared. As a consequence of the acute shortage of energy and fuel, 30 per cent of industry's capacity remained idle. Dissipation of investments widened the front of capital construction and delayed the commissioning of new projects.

The lag of agriculture, light industry, transport, and fuel, energy and raw-material complexes was especially sharp. Because of the rapid increase in the population and low rate of growth of farm output, the provision of people with foodstuffs and fabrics worsened. In 1977, per capita consumption in the countryside of grain was 5.9 per cent less than in 1957, vegetable oil 43.2 per cent less, and cotton fabrics 5.7 per cent less.

Industrial and agricultural production in the past 25 years has been extremely unstable: there have been several sharp slumps. In 1961 and 1962 it declined by 30.9 and 10.1 per cent respectively and in 1967 and 1968 by 9.6 and 4.2 per cent.² The effectiveness of social production badly deteriorated, the quality of goods dropped, and outlays of materials and energy per unit of production increased. While in the first five-year-plan period the national income per 100 yuan of accumulation was 35 yuan, annually, in 1981 it was only 20 yuan, while the national income produced with one ton of reference fuel was 1,167 and 576 yuan, respectively.

The country's difficult economic situation was discussed at the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in December 1978. The decision it adopted spoke of the need to "embark upon socialist modernisation in 1979", to "shift the Par-

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 13, 1982.

² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 10, 1983.

ty's and the people's work into the economic sphere", to "conduct affairs on the basis of objective economic laws", notably the law of value, and to carry out a number of economic and administrative reforms. In April of that same year the CPC Central Committee at its working meeting approved a "course of regulating, reorganising, readjusting and raising the level of the economy", originally calculated for three years (1979-1981).

As provided for by this course, a number of important economic measures were taken in 1979-1980: the purchase prices of farm products were raised, restrictions on subsidiary husbandries and trades were lifted, the poorest teams were exempted from agricultural tax, and rural markets were opened. Permission was granted to institute material incentives in all spheres of activity, wages and salaries of a large contingent of factory and office workers were increased, by way of experiment a number of large and medium-size enterprises were given the right to purchase and sell their products, and funds for the development of production, promotion of social measures and material incentives were established with deductions from profits.

Though important, the measures did not have the expected economic effect. Some of them produced, in fact, contrary results. Relaxation of centralised control over material supplies, prices, wholesale and retail trade, finances, wages and purchases of farm products immediately gave rise to an unprecedented wave of inflation and an increase in profiteering and economic crimes. The hopes of spontaneous operation of the law of value proved groundless. The material and technical provision of large industrial enterprises deteriorated and there were increasing stoppages on account of shortages of energy and raw materials. The budget deficit was enormous: 11.7 billion yuan in 1977, slightly less — 10.5 billion — in 1978, an increase to 17,070 billion yuan in 1979, and 12.7 billion in 1980. Nor did any tangible changes occur in the stabilisation of material production and easing of interbranch disproportions.

A number of emergency measures were taken to balance the state budget at the end of 1980 and in 1981. They included decisions on strict control and readjustment of prices, on control of the balance of incomes and expenses, and on resolute steps to put an end to abuses with the distribution of bonus funds. The implementation of the economic reform was suspended. It became obvious that it was impossible to "readjust" the economy, eliminate the disproportions therein and put things in order within three years. The period of readjustment was therefore extended to the sixth and then in fact to the seventh five-year plan. Hence it is clear how important a scientifically substantiated plan may be for the Chinese economy.

Chinese economists and planners underscore the specific character of the approach to modern planning in their country. In their opinion, the thing is that planning in China must take into account three kinds of economic management: by means of directives, guidelines, and free market regulation on the basis of the spontaneous operation of the law of value. This approach was approved at the 12th CPC Congress in September 1982. Since this innovation is still at the stage of elaboration, only highly general explanation is given with regard to what must be planned and how. The guidelines, for instance, are worked out for the production and distribution of the most important means of production and consumer goods at the key enterprises of decisive significance for the economy on the whole. For agriculture there are directives for the purchases of the most important products: grain, cotton, oil-bearing and other crops.

Guidelines are applied to certain categories of medium-size and small state enterprises producing goods in mass demand. Production and sale at such enterprises must be regulated mainly with the help of economic levers (price, tax, credit). Lastly, small consumer goods, goods of local production and seasonal products must be made and sold on the basis of the spontaneous operation of the law governing demand and supply. The sixth five-year plan was drawn up in line with the policy of readjusting China's economy. And so its main task is gradually to resolve the problems inherited from the past that hamper economic development, radically improve the financial and economic situation and lay the groundwork for economic and social development in the seventh five-year-plan period. In this connection the plan envisages the solution of a number of urgent economic problems, including the elimination of the ups and downs in economic development and assurance of stable rates of growth in industry and agriculture; reorientation of heavy industry from working "for itself" to providing transport, light industry, agriculture and other branches of the economy with means of production; approximation of the rates of development of the production of means of production and consumer goods, and considerable increase in light industry and farm output; efforts to balance demand and supply, stabilise prices, and strengthen the state budget.

The sixth five-year plan also provides for important measures in the military sphere. Among other things, it is planned to continue developing both conventional and strategic weapons and better to equip the armed forces with up-to-date hardware.

An attempt is made in the sixth five-year plan to take in all the sides of economic development, including the people's well-being. It takes into account the serious lessons of the "blind drive" for super-high rates of development. The planned figure of the increase of the gross industrial and farm product is relatively not high—21.7 per cent, while the increase in the output of light industry (5 per cent a year) is to outpace the increase in heavy industry (3 per cent) (see table).

It should be borne in mind, however, that in the past two years the situation in the economy shaped out differently from that planned. Thus, in 1981, the first year of the sixth plan, the volume of heavy industry decreased by 4.7 per cent and the volume of light industry increased by 14.1 per cent. In 1982, on the contrary, it increased by 9 per cent in heavy industry and declined to 5.1 per cent in light industry. This naturally creates big difficulties for economic development.

It is proposed that the main prerequisite for the increase of social production in the sixth five-year-plan period will be the enhancement of the efficiency of social production through the improvement of the quality of goods, economy of energy and metal, higher labour productivity and lower cost prices and distribution costs. It is thus intended to reduce the expenditure of energy at state enterprises from 81,500 tons of reference fuel per 100 million yuan worth of gross production in 1980 to 71,500-68,200 tons of reference fuel in 1985, or by 2.6-3.5 per cent a year; labour productivity is to grow by 2 per cent a year, cost prices go down by 1-2 per cent, and distribution costs in state trade by 1-2 per cent. Capital turnover in industry is to be reduced in the five years from 114 to 105 days and in state trade from 165 to 163 days.

It is considered that one of the most important conditions for the fulfilment of the tasks set by the sixth five-year plan will be the steady financing of the planned measures. For in the course of the reorganisation of material and technical supply, trade and crediting, of which the

article spoke above, centralised control over the financial resources was weakened. The result was an increase in the budget and symptoms of growing inflation. Another heavy burden for the budget are the subsidies to cover the losses sustained by enterprises and the differences between the purchase and retail prices of farm products. The amount spent on that came to 14.3 per cent of the expenditure part of the budget in 1978, to 25.9 per cent in 1979, to 32.7 per cent in 1980 and to 42.7 per cent in 1981. There was an unprecedented growth of inflation in China in 1978-1981. In November 1979, for instance, the prices of animal products, vegetables and fish were officially upped by 30, 40 and more per cent.³

Table

Basic indices of China's development in 1981-1985

	Unit of measurement	1980	1981	1982	1985 (plan)	1985 in per cent to 1980	Average annual increase 1981-85 (per cent)
Gross social product	bln yuan	850.0	889.0	989.4	1,030.0	121.7	4.0
National income	"	366.7	388.0	424.7	445.0	121.7	4.0
Gross industrial and farm output	"	715.9	749.0	829.1	871.0	121.7	4.0
Gross industrial output	"	497.2	517.8	550.6	605.0	121.7	4.0
of which:							
gross heavy industry output	"	263.9	251.5	274.0	305.0	115.9	3.0
gross light industry output	"	233.4	266.3	276.6	300.0	127.6	5.0
coal	mln tons	620.0	620.0	666.0	700.0	112.9	2.5
oil	"	105.9	101.2	102.1	100.0	94.4	—
electrical energy	bln kwh	300.6	309.3	327.7	362.0	120.5	3.8
steel	mln tons	37.10	35.60	37.2	39.0	105.1	1.0
rolled steel	"	27.20	26.70	29.0	29.3	107.9	1.6
cement	"	79.86	84.00	95.2	98.0	123.0	4.2
Gross farm output	bln yuan	218.7	231.2	278.5	266.0	121.7	4.0
grain	mln tons	320.0	325.0	353.4	360.0	112.3	2.35
cotton fibre	"	2.70	2.97	3.6	3.6	133.0	5.9
oil-bearing crops	"	7.70	10.20	11.8	10.5	136.5	6.4
Chemical fertilizers (in 100 per cent of effective substance)		12.32	12.39	12.8	13.4	108.8	1.7
Cotton fabrics	bln metres	13.47	14.27	15.35	15.3	113.6	2.6
Chemical fibre	thous tons	450.00	527.00	517.00	780.0	173.3	11.6
Transport							
length of railway lines	thous km	50.00	50.00	—	52.0	104.0	0.8
total seaport capacity	mln tons	217.00	—	—	317.0	146.1	7.9
Foreign trade	bln yuan	57.00	73.5	77.2	85.5	150.0	8.7
export	"	27.1	36.7	41.4	40.2	148.3	8.1
import	"	29.9	36.8	35.8	45.3	151.5	9.2

Source: *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 13, 1982, April 30, 1983.

The sixth five-year plan envisages measures to bolster the financial system and enhance its role in controlling social production and society's public affairs and strengthening centralised planning of monetary resources. The financial plan is regarded as an important instrument of economic

³ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 1, 1979.

policy and also as a means of strengthening state and economic discipline. The state is trying to cover all the spheres of financial activity—budget, credit, financial resources of enterprises, departments, cooperatives and organisations—by a single plan. A number of rigid measures have been taken since 1981 to balance the state budget, as a result of which it has been possible considerably to reduce the budget deficit.

The financial plan is directed above all towards solving the problems of economic readjustment. It takes a more sober view of the difficulty of expanding the sources of financial resources as well as of the highly urgent needs of some of the weakest branches of the economy. The increase in budget revenues, for instance, is estimated at 17.6 per cent, i. e., less than the increase of the gross product and national income. In the current five-year-plan period the budget revenues are expected to reach 595.3 billion yuan. The main source of revenue is deductions from the profits of enterprises and diverse taxes on enterprises, cooperatives and organisations. It has been decided to replace deductions from the profits of enterprises by a progressive income tax, which will become the main source of state budget revenue on July 1 of this year.

The relatively moderate rates of growth of state budget revenues will substantially restrict the state's possibility to finance the economy and socio-cultural development. The state budget expenses are estimated at 609.8 billion yuan, which tops revenues by 14.5 billion yuan. The biggest item of expenditure will be capital construction—170 billion yuan. But its share of the state budget expenditure will decrease from 38.1 per cent in the fifth five-year-plan period to 27.9 per cent. The second biggest item will be the expenditures on education, science, culture and public health. All in all, it is intended to spend 96.7 billion yuan for this purpose, or 16.8 per cent of the budget (as against 11 per cent in the preceding plan years).

The third biggest item of expenditures will be military spending—88.3 billion yuan, as against 87.3 billion in the preceding five years. This sum is only 9 per cent less than the amount appropriated for science, culture, public education and health.

Administrative expenses have been increased from 4.9 to 6.7 per cent. The aid to agriculture is planned at the level of the preceding five years.

Other important sources of financing economic development are the funds of enterprises, departments, organisations, local bodies, cooperatives, and the credit resources of banks. Taking these sources into account, it is planned to spend 360 billion yuan on capital construction—230 billion yuan to build new projects and the rest to rebuild the ones in operation.

Four hundred out of the 890 large and medium-size projects under construction in the sixth plan years are to be completed. It is held that the fulfilment of the capital construction tasks is to be the pivot of the entire plan. Limitation of investments and strict control over their use are regarded as "the basic prerequisite for the stabilisation of the economy on the whole". Only slightly more than in the preceding five years will be invested in the construction of new projects—the total will top it by less than 6 billion yuan.

The plan provides for the concentration of financial and material resources on bolstering the weakest links of the economy: construction of highly important fuel, energy and transport projects and technical reconstruction of enterprises. It is believed that "the radical improvement of the state of the entire economy" depends on progress in these fields. Investments into the fuel-energy complex in these five years will exceed

those in the preceding plan period by more than 20.5 per cent: by 31.8 per cent in the coal industry and 17.7 per cent in the oil industry among them. The amount allocated for the development of transport and communications is 29,830 million yuan.

A special state fund for the construction of highly important power and transport projects is to be created, with part of it made up of 10 per cent of the non-budget funds of districts, departments, enterprises and organisations and part of the profits of large urban and rural co-operatives. It is expected that 12 billion yuan will be put into the fund this year.

Despite certain cuts in investments in the metallurgical industry—17,510 million yuan as against 19,000 million in 1976-1980—it remains the priority branch of the economy. Investments are being badly axed in the chemical industry (from 16,790 million yuan in 1976-1980 to 11,430 million in 1981-1985) and especially in the engineering industry (from 17,850 million yuan to 2,890 million).

The sixth five-year plan is distinguished by the heightened attention devoted to the reconstruction of the existing enterprises. How urgent this task is may be seen from the following figures. Only one-third of the 2,830,000 lathes now in operation in China are assessed as "relatively good". Another third require major repairs and the rest must be replaced. The funds allocated for reconstruction are to be increased from 20-25 per cent in the five years of the preceding plan to 36 per cent in 1981-1985. These projects are to be financed chiefly by local bodies, ministries, enterprises, foreign loans (amounting to 78.4 billion yuan) and bank credits (38.5 billion yuan). The sum appropriated for these needs from the state budget comes to 13.1 billion yuan.

One cannot of course deny the exceptional importance of the concentration of material and financial resources on the development of the power industry and transport. But these are not the only weak links in the Chinese economy. One of the biggest tasks is to eliminate disproportions between industry and agriculture, light and heavy industries, and production and consumption.

Much has been said for a long time about the need to build up these vitally important branches of the Chinese economy. The slogan that "agriculture is the basis of the economy" was advanced back at the end of the 1950s. Appeals to intensify agricultural development began to resound with redoubled force after 1978. Prior to the 12th CPC Congress modernisation of agriculture headed the list of the "four modernisations" policy.

How is it proposed to fulfil this task in the sixth five-year-plan period? Insofar as the distribution of investments is concerned, only 14,130 million yuan of the 230 billion invested in new construction, i. e., 6 per cent of the total, is appropriated for agriculture, forestry, irrigation and meteorology. If one takes into consideration the amount going for reconstruction, the share will decrease to 3.9 per cent. It is planned to invest still less in light industry—13,980 million yuan. Generally speaking, the industries producing consumer goods or raw materials for them will not receive any real support from the state despite certain improvement of the structure of investment.

An important feature of China's finance policy in this plan period is the intention comprehensively to balance investments both out of the state budget and the funds of enterprises and local bodies, as well as bank loans. All the investments are included in the single state plan and are subject to control by the State Planning Committee and the planning

committees of provinces, cities directly subordinated to the capital, and autonomous districts. Unplanned investments are qualified as violation of financial and plan discipline. Stricter order is established for the inclusion of new projects in the plan: all large and medium-size projects of capital construction must be considered and approved by the State Planning Committee and all small building projects by the planning committees of provinces, cities directly subordinated to the capital, and autonomous districts.

The acute shortage of means and raw materials vitally important for industry makes it indispensable to increase farm output. Nevertheless, agriculture is not among those given priority in the distribution of investments, although the planned rates of growth are high—4 per cent on the average a year. It is intended to increase the output of cotton by 33 per cent, oil-seed by 36.5 per cent, sugar beet and cane by 60.4 per cent, and tobacco by 81 per cent. The small and ever-decreasing amount of land available per capita makes it necessary to intensify production to achieve such an increase in the output of industrial crops. Big hopes are pinned on the development of small-scale rural industry and subsidiary husbandries which, together with crop production, stock rearing, forestry and fishery, are included by the Chinese statistics in the cost of agriculture and the share of which in the structure of agriculture is steadily growing (from 9.1 per cent in 1976 to 17.3 per cent in 1981).⁴ The lowest rates of development are planned in the main branch of farming—in the production of grain—12.3 per cent.

The highest rates of increase in industry are planned for the production of durable goods. For instance, the production of bicycles is to increase by 150 per cent, washing machines by 1,200 per cent, television sets by 180 per cent, tape recorders by 500 per cent, sewing machines by 82 per cent, and clocks and watches by 98.5 per cent. The output of these articles will probably somewhat ease the tension created by the fast growing demand and the slower increase in the supply of these necessities. True, due to the saturation of the demand the prices of these consumer goods have latterly been declining and the rate of their production slowing down. In the use of agricultural raw materials a big increase is planned only in the production of sugar (67.3 per cent) and cigarettes (32 per cent).

The rates of increase in the production of the most essential consumer goods, which have the biggest effect on the improvement of people's material and cultural standards, will also be low. For instance, it is intended to raise the output of fabrics in the five years under review by 13.3 per cent only and paper by 12 per cent.

None-too-high rates of increase are planned in the key branches of heavy industry. New capacities for producing 80 million tons of coal, 35 million tons of oil and 2.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas are expected to be commissioned by the end of 1985. New coal mines will allow to increase output to 700 million tons. As for oil and gas, the commissioning of the new capacities will merely compensate for the decline of output at the wells in operation and make it possible to keep oil production at 100 million tons and ensure the output of 10 billion cubic metres of gas. With the minimum average annual rates of increase in industry at 4 per cent, every per cent of the increase of gross industrial production will mean only 0.35 per cent of the increase of energy. This obviously will not be enough not only to solve the fuel-energy problem, but

⁴ *Chinese Statistical Yearbook for 1981*, Peking, 1982, p. 5.

also to lessen to any tangible extent the sharp disproportions between the production of energy and the requirements of the economy. The main stake in the plan is on economising and using less energy. In the five years it is planned to save 70-90 million tons of reference fuel. Higher energy efficiency, however, requires considerable capital outlays and time.

The plan envisages low rates of development of the iron-and-steel industry: the output of steel is to increase only by 5 per cent, cast iron will be decreased by 9.3-7.7 per cent on account of the need to economise on energy, and rolled metal will go up by 7.9 per cent. The stress in the engineering industry is on improving quality. All in all, the cost of the output of this industry is to rise by 25.6 per cent.

The three-year programme (1983-1985) of transport development is highly intensive. It provides for the building of 1,700 kilometres of single-track railway lines and 1,500 kilometres of double-track lines, as well as electrification of 2,000 kilometres of the existing lines. The carrying capacity will be 1.2 billion tons in 1985, or 10.5 per cent more than in 1980, while the freight turnover will increase by 15.6 per cent to reach 660 billion ton-kilometres. The average annual rates of growth of cargo traffic and freight turnover (2 and 2.9 per cent, respectively) will be almost twice as low as the rates of growth of both industry and agriculture.

It is still planned to make use of diverse forms of foreign economic ties to promote China's socio-economic progress. The plan envisages a 52 per cent increase in foreign trade in 1985 over the 1980 figure. What is more, import is to outpace export. It is also intended to attract more investments in the Chinese economy from the capitalist countries, this including the establishment of all kinds of mixed enterprises and purely foreign ones—in the so-called special economic zones.

Of late science has been regarded in China as a major factor of scientific and technological progress and economic growth. The fulfilment of the sixth five-year plan is directly linked with the use of its achievements. The directive documents lay stress on the development of applied research. At the same time it is recommended to devote attention also to fundamental research, which ensures a reliable reserve for the development of science and technology in general. The sixth five-year plan sets the scientists the task of reducing the distance in China's lag in science behind the rest of the world. The plan also points to the need to develop social sciences.

The plan draws attention to the necessity of raising the people's educational, professional and technical levels. There are very many problems here. As the census carried out last summer shows, there are 236 million people in China above the age of 12 years who do not know how to read and write. By the end of 1985 it is planned to introduce primary education fully or in the main in most of the counties, and incomplete secondary education in towns and cities. Enrolment in the higher educational institutions will increase from 280,000 people in 1980 to 400,000 in 1985. In the five-year-plan period these institutions will graduate 1.5 million specialists.

In the current plan period an attempt is made, after an interval of 25 years, to return to planning social development. Important tasks are set to slow down the growth of the population, ensure employment, improve labour protection, increase incomes and consumption, build housing and promote communal services. Thus, it is necessary to prevent the population from topping 1,060 million by 1984 (the increase in five years being 67

million) and the annual rate of growth from exceeding 1.3 per cent. The plan recommends that families should have only one child.

The five-year plan testifies to the vast increase of labour resources—in 1981-1985 it will come to approximately 100 million people. It is intended to create jobs for 29 million in cities, towns and villages and to provide work for all the economically active population in the cities. The wage fund is to be increased by 27.2 per cent and the average wages by about 15 per cent. The peasants' incomes are to go up at a somewhat faster rate. Public consumption is to increase by 4.1 per cent a year. In 1985 it will reach 16 per cent per capita on the average in the cities and 22.5 per cent in the countryside. The gap between demand and supply will still be considerable.

Large sums are earmarked for housing construction. It is intended to build 310 million square metres of floor space in the cities and 2,500 million square metres in the countryside. Measures are envisaged to improve fresh water supplies to the cities badly needing them.

The plan provides for the development of culture, art and public health, stronger environmental protection measures, and stricter public order.

Since the main objective of the sixth five-year plan is to put the economy on the road of stable and balanced development and raise production efficiency, the most difficult thing in its realisation is not to achieve generalised quantitative indices (increase of gross output, national income, etc.), though this is highly important, but to fulfil the plan in all its aspects, including social. If one bears in mind that problems had been piling up for years, if one takes into account the depth and diversity of disproportions and the sad state of management, one must concede, of course, that five years are too short a time to readjust the economy of a country with a population of one billion.

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POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS IN CHINA

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[Article by Professor Ye. A. Konovalov and Ye. F. Selivanova, candidate of economic sciences]

The problems of population cover a very wide range of aspects—social, economic, biological and others. It is impossible to solve any tasks relating to the development of human society without taking into account the demographic factor, at whatever historical stage the given society may be. And in China, as in no other country the demographic factor played and still plays an enormous role. This article analyses above all the economic aspects of the population problem of the People's Republic of China.

China's population constitutes a vast proportion of the population of the world. In 1800 it accounted for 300 million of the world's population of one billion, or for 30 per cent; in 1930 the figures were respectively 475 million, two billion and 23.7 per cent; in 1960 they were 660 million, three billion and 22 per cent. In 1975, when the world had a population of four billion, China accounted for 920 million of them or 23 per cent. In this last quarter of our century China's share is declining on account of the faster rate of population growth in most of the developing countries. According to UN forecasts, there will be five billion people in the world in 1987, and 1,080 million will be living in China, or slightly more than 20 per cent, while in 1997 the figures will be six billion and about 1.2 billion, or 20 per cent.

It is not surprising that keen attention has long been devoted to the population problems in China not only in economic policy, but in scientific research. After the establishment of the PRC, the demographic problems were made the subject of wide and interesting, though not regular studies. In the 1950s, there was a discussion about the role of the population in socio-economic development. Most scientists, particularly Ma Yinchu, held that in China's conditions a huge population and the high rate of its growth impeded economic development, improvement of living standards, promotion of education and technical progress. And so, Ma Yinchu proposed urgent birth control measures. Initially, this suggestion was backed, not only by scientists, but by official circles too.

Nevertheless, in the course of the campaign of criticism of "right-wing elements" in 1957, there appeared a contrary view, namely, "the more people the better", a "man has not only one mouth but two hands", a man "can always provide for himself". This was the view not only of the participants in the discussion, but also of high-ranking officials. As a result of the campaign, Ma Yinchu was removed from all his posts, debarred from scientific activity and branded a "Malthusian", "anti-Marxist", "betrayer of the Chinese nation", and so on. As it is now written, "it is to be deeply regretted that this correct proposition failed not only to be accepted but, on the contrary, it was discredited as extremely harmful and was blocked and criticised. After that theoretical questions concerning the population became a 'forbidden zone' for research and the upper hand

was gained by the conception 'the more people the better' which caused enormous damage."¹ The discussion was discontinued and all the science organisations occupying themselves with the problems of population were practically disbanded.

It was only at the end of the 1970s, i. e., 20 years later, that centres and organisations, as well as periodicals and surveys on the questions of the population began to reappear in China. At present there are more than 20 population research centres and the All-China Population Science Society with 20 branches. There appeared such periodicals as *Population Survey* and *Population and Economy*. Vast significance is attached to these problems, and the population growth tendencies have become, not only an object of scientific study but also a point of departure for the elaboration of the entire strategy of socio-economic development.

Of the statements on questions of population made at the present stage, one should single out those reflecting the extreme importance of the problems in the strategy of development. For instance, "Work in the sphere of planned childbirth is a strategic task", "It is necessary simultaneously to control not only the production of material values, but also the growth of the population", and "We must have not only an economic plan, but a population plan as well, for only then will we be able to conceive the growth of production and the growth of the population and their correlation".² The population plan is becoming a highly important part of the Chinese long-term economic and social development plans. The prospects of realising the "four modernisations" will depend to an enormous extent on the success or failure of the task of controlling the growth of the population.³

Lastly, the draft sixth five-year plan of China's economic development in 1981-1985, adopted by the fifth session of the Fifth National People's Congress contained the following special provision in the section entitled "Basic Tasks and Complex Indices": "9. Strictly control the growth of the population and properly employ manpower in the cities".⁴

In the "Social Development Plan" section a whole chapter is devoted to the population and one of its paragraphs is entitled "Strictly Restrain Population Growth" and another — "Measures of Control Over Population Growth".

China's sixth five-year plan is the first in the socialist countries' practice of planning to contain the following directive: to prevent the population of mainland China from exceeding 1,060 million by 1985, birth rate—1.9 per cent, and natural increase—1.3 per cent.

The measures to restrict the birth rate envisaged by the plan include one-child family propaganda: "To aim at a family having one child, strictly control families with two children, and resolutely prevent the birth of further children".⁵ Besides making use of propaganda it is "essential to adopt the necessary economic sanctions and organisational measures to fulfil the tasks set. To acquaint every people's commune, team and citizen with the childbirth plans."⁶

Such statements and measures testify to serious anxiety about the demographic situation, the possible consequences of the population growth and the pressure it exerts on means of subsistence and employment.

¹ *Study of the Structure of China's Economy*, Peking, 1981, p. 485.

² *Renkou yanjiu*, 1981, No. 3, pp. 1-2.

³ *Renkou yanjiu*, 1982, No. 6, p. 21.

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 13, 1982.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

And so, the population of China increased by 470 million in 1949-1982 (from 542 million in 1949 to 1,015 million in 1982) i. e., on the average by 1.9 per cent a year. It grew by 113 million in the 1950s, 169 million in the 1960s, and 157 million in the 1970s.

Though the average rates of growth are high, they are at times not even: in 1950-1957 the rate of increase ranged from 1.9 to 2.3 per cent and in 1959-1961 there was a sharp decline in the increment and even an absolute fall in the number as a result of disastrous slumps in the production of food crops and the ensuing mass famine. In 1962-1970 the rates of population growth again rose to 2.9 per cent, but in the subsequent years they dropped to 1.2 per cent thanks to the measures taken to restrict the birth rate.

As may be seen from the analysis of demographic tendencies, the growth of the population in China was highly uneven in the years under review: it reflected birth rate peaks and falls, a new lengthy period of high birth rate and its gradual decrease due to control over the growth of the population. Despite the tangible successes in reducing the birth rate (from 26 million births in 1971 to 18 million in 1980), it must be admitted that China has failed to secure these successes for any lengthy period or get new families to have only one child. What is more, the policy of the past few years (universal introduction of the so-called household contract* in the countryside) has led to a new "explosion" of births, for it revived the petty-peasant traditions, according to which a large number of children, especially male, meant a possibility of using more hands in production and, consequently, making bigger profit.

China's population of one billion is retarding the growth of consumption of important means of subsistence. Over 30 per cent of the national income has been spent every year on the growing population in the past 30-odd years.

The possibility of satisfying the vital requirements in these conditions is determined, not by the growth of the national income, but by the most important factor of its formation—by higher labour productivity. The growth of labour productivity depends in its turn, as is well known, on the funding of working places and the quality of manpower. And yet the solution of these problems is being deferred for decades because of the need to meet vital requirements in food, clothes, housing, etc., and the necessity of expanding the "labour field", i. e., increasing the number of new relatively low-paying jobs. Closer ties between the demographic situation and economic development of China manifest themselves in the correlation of the population growth and the growth of the food crops output. But here, too, a simple comparison of rates is not enough: the growth of the population is attended by changes in its age structure and, consequently, there are changes between the age categories of the population, between economically active people and dependants, between urban and rural dwellers. In 1953, for instance, 36.3 per cent of the population were children of 14 and below and 59.3 per cent were people aged between 15 and 64 years; in 1963 the figures were 40.4 and 56.1 per cent, respectively; in 1978—35.8 and 59.4 per cent; in 1985 the figures will apparently alter considerably—28.6 and 65.7 per cent, and in the year 2000 they will be 23 and 70 per cent. Consumption of grain differs from one age group to another: children below three years of age consume up to two kilograms a month, three to six years—up to 3.5 kilograms, six to ten years—

* Peasants are provided with land, fertilizers, etc., and cultivate it as they wish on the condition that they turn in part of the harvest to the state.

5.5 kilograms, and upwards of ten years—up to seven kilograms. Adults consume 11-14 kilograms of grain a month, depending on the work they do. Consequently, changes in the age structure entail changes in the volume of food consumed. When the proportion of the young age groups increases, the average food requirements grow relatively slowly, but with the transition to the structure where the proportion of the economically active population increases (from 56 per cent in 1963 to 66 per cent in 1985) per capita consumption grows too.

A still bigger change occurs in the structure of requirements given the division of the population into economically active people and dependants. If the ratio points to a considerable predominance of the latter (in 1952 it was 2.6:1), the family's requirements are made up of the simplest, basic means of subsistence, but with the change of this ratio, i. e., the size of the family (in 1980—0.8:1) ⁷ the structure of vital requirements alters substantially: people want better food and clothes, their demands for transport, services, recreation, etc., grow.

The burden borne by society in general grows along with the urban population. The upkeep of a city dweller in China costs two to three times as much as that of a rural dweller. The doubling of the urban population (99 million in 1957 and 206 million according to the 1982 census) has considerably increased state expenditure on the satisfaction of the requirements of the population. For instance, the upkeep of children in the countryside comes to 1,600 yuan for 16 years, in towns to 4,800 yuan and in cities to 6,900 yuan.⁸

The increase in production in the conditions of socialism inevitably leads to a bigger demand for goods. This is happening in China too. Apart from satisfying their most essential needs, more and more people in city and countryside need durable goods and want better housing, education and cultural pastime. Their demand for all that, bolstered by growing incomes, forms a different structure of production, i. e., engenders the need to develop light and building materials industries and to finance the educational system, culture and urban development additionally.

The huge population also presupposes a considerable volume of production. For instance, only 80,000 bicycles were made in China in 1957, but their output increased from 8.5 million in 1978 to 17.5 million in 1981. In 1957 only 66,000 sewing machines were made and from 1978 to 1981 the number rose from 13.5 to 28.7 million.⁹

Housing construction has been sharply stepped up in China's cities and countryside in the past few years. The outlays for this purpose in the cities rose from 3.8 billion yuan in 1978 to 10.9 billion yuan in 1981. The urban population in this period increased by 6,250,000 a year. With four square metres of floor space allocated per capita, this required 136 million square metres, i. e., 61 per cent of all newly-built floor space. Actually only 65 million square metres, or only one-third of a square metre per capita, went for the improvement of the housing conditions of the regular city dwellers (the average floor space in the cities remains at 3.6 square metres).¹⁰ Despite the expansion of public transport, there were only four vehicles for 10,000 of the population in 1981, or 13 per cent less than in 1957.¹¹

⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 23, 1981.

⁸ *Ibid.*, July 22, 1980.

⁹ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1982*, Peking, 1982, Section VIII, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Study of the Structure of China's Economy*, pp. 534, 19.

¹¹ *Tongji*, 1982, No. 4, p. 18.

To solve the population problem in China's specific conditions, it is necessary not only to elaborate a scientifically substantiated strategy of economic development, but also to follow a demographic policy restraining the rapid growth of the population. The birth control policy is difficult to pursue on account of the deep-rooted traditions of feudal society and traditions of petty-peasant ideology. For centuries the view prevailed in China that a "big family means wealth" and that "many sons will bring prosperity to the family". The realisation of a tough demographic policy constantly met with opposition from the broad peasant masses. The tangible successes achieved in birth control in the 1970s were due, not to the propaganda of "late marriages" and "big intervals between the first and the second child" or to appeals to families to have only one child, but were rather the result of a whole system of economic sanctions against families with many children and stimuli for one-child families. Widely practised in the 1970s were such measures as rejection of applications for new housing from big families and accommodation for their children in preschool institutions. Young couples promising to have only one child were, on the contrary, granted all kinds of privileges—accommodation of the child in a crèche or kindergarten free of charge, provision of jobs out of turn, bigger household plot allotments in the countryside, etc. These measures produced a definite effect: nearly half the children born in recent years were first children and the overall number of births in ten years decreased by seven million. But no sooner was the system of labour organisation in the countryside altered and the absolute majority of peasant families put on household contract than the results of production again began to depend directly on the expenditure of manual labour and the number of hands in the family, small-scale farming traditions revived, and economic privileges to families with one child lost their meaning. Chinese peasants now say that "it is easier to bring up a child than to grow vegetables" or that "if I grow what I want on my plot, I can have as many children as I want in the family". The number of births increased by 2.7 million in 1981 and by another 500,000 in 1982. The planned reduction of the natural increase in 1980 to one per cent proved unrealistic (it was 1.16 per cent; 1.45 per cent in 1981 and 1.47 per cent in 1982). This necessitated the revision of the population growth figures. By 1985 it is planned to confine natural growth to 1.3 per cent a year. But it is problematic, whether the plan figures can be kept at this level, considering the growth of the population in the first two years of the sixth five-year-plan period.

The official press has made some characteristic statements about the present difficulties in keeping the growth of the population in check, especially in view of the peasants' reluctance to have only one child if that child is a girl. A member of the Communist Party of China was reported by *Renmin ribao* as saying: "I am ready to resign from the party and pay a fine of several thousand yuan for the birth of an 'unplanned' son if I can be sure of preserving male lineage."¹² A member of a provincial people's congress was deprived of her mandate because, having seven daughters, she gave birth to another child in the hope of getting a boy.¹³

And yet the new wave of births in recent years is linked with the changes in the economic conditions in the Chinese countryside. "With the transition to the system of production responsibility, when work on the plots is done by a family, by a household, peasants dream of boys being born into the family in order to increase and improve the labour force",

¹² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 28, 1983.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1983.

wrote *Guangming ribao*. At the same time it admitted that "economic reasons are not the most important reasons for the birth of the second and subsequent children, there are also social and psychological reasons".¹⁴ According to sample surveys made in the countryside in Hubei Province in July 1981, only 5 per cent of the families wanted to have one child, 51 per cent wanted two children, and 44 per cent—three and more. Peasant families with one child revealed a strong desire to have boys: 61 per cent of the one-girl families covered by the survey expressed a wish to have another child. Asked what family structure they wanted, 2.2 per cent of the parents wished to have one girl, 36.7 per cent—one boy, and 61.1 per cent—a girl and a boy. Only 14 per cent of the women asked wanted to have one child, 83 per cent favoured two children, and 3 per cent—three and more children.

Thus, to achieve its objective—not to have a population of more than 1.2 billion by the year 2000—China will have constantly to exert enormous effort linked with a whole complex of measures to organise propaganda, raise the cultural and educational levels of the peasants and improve the public health system, as well as with other aspects of social policy.

As shown by the developments in China in past years, the huge population is exerting a growing pressure on the solution of many economic problems, including that of employment. With the passage of years the cares of the families and the state gradually shifted from the upkeep of children to the employment of the rising generation. In other words, the population problems turned first and foremost into problems of employment. In this connection demographers say that "the problem of the PRC's overpopulation arose on account of the disparity between the size of the population and society's possibilities to employ people".¹⁵

Therein the essence of the employment problem in China—vast labour resources and limited possibilities of creating jobs and raising labour productivity. "In our country," *Renmin ribao* writes, "the number of people reaching working age now does not conform to the increase of the means of production."¹⁶ A considerable part of the economically active population is used in the none-too-productive branches, primarily in agriculture where manual labour prevails and where 75 per cent of the economically active population is employed. The labour force is being redistributed between the highly productive and the none-too-productive branches very slowly: for decades the percentage of those employed in large-scale modern production has remained low—2.5-3 per cent.

It has been possible considerably to extend the sphere of employment in the 30-odd years of the PRC's existence. The total number of employed people has doubled and exceeds 400 million; in agriculture it has almost doubled and in the cities it has increased more than five times over. While 20 per cent of the urban and non-agrarian population were employed in the cities in 1949, at the beginning of the 1980s, the figure reached 50 per cent, and in some cities even 60 and 70 per cent.¹⁷

In the initial post-liberation period the country's industrialisation, the establishment of centres of large-scale modern industry, the implementation of the agrarian reform and the organisation of a single statewide system of employment in the public and other sectors of the economy

¹⁴ *Guangming ribao*, Jan. 7, 1983.

¹⁵ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1982, No. 11, p. 43.

¹⁶ *Renmin ribao*, March 7, 1980.

¹⁷ *Renkou yanjiu*, 1982, No. 5, p. 9.

helped solve the problems of employment. The unemployment inherited in the cities from old China was wiped out by finding jobs for four million unemployed. Simultaneously it became possible to make a balanced use of labour resources in production, raise labour productivity and lessen overpopulation in the countryside. The first five-year-plan period is now called in China one of "accumulation of experience in the successful solution of the problems of employment".¹⁸

The solution of the problems of employment is complicated by its irrational branch structure. The attitude to the priorities in the distribution of investments in the past three decades has led to a point where, with an overall 15-fold increase, they have grown 17 times over in heavy industry and 7.7 times over in light industry.¹⁹ "As a result of the lengthy predominance in the country of 'steel for the sake of steel' and 'production for the sake of production' conceptions there came into existence," *Renmin ribao* wrote, "an irrational branch structure with a big proportion of workers in heavy industry and a sharp reduction of their proportion in light industry, trade and the services industry."²⁰

Two-thirds of the overall increment of the labour force was directed into different branches of heavy industry, primarily engineering and metal industries. The number of people employed in industry rose from 12.4 million in 1952 to 50.1 million in 1978, or more than four times over—the number in the Group A (means of production) industries increased eight-fold and that in the Group B (consumer goods) industries 2.3-fold.²¹ The structure of employment was such that 50 per cent of all factory and office workers were occupied in industry and 70 per cent of industrial personnel in various branches of heavy industry.²² At the same time the proportion of people employed in trade, the services industry, science, education and public health decreased. The proportion of the people employed in state trade, for instance, declined from 18.5 per cent in 1952 to 11.9 per cent in 1978.²³

At some stages these disproportions were still sharper. The orientation on the development of "small-scale metal industry" in the years of the "Big Leap Forward" led to a big influx of peasants into cities. In 1958 alone, 15 million people were sent from the countryside to the cities to work in industry—12.5 million of them in heavy industry—making up 83 per cent of the total increase of those employed in industry.²⁴ Such a redistribution of the labour force between city and countryside had an adverse effect on farm production and caused a shortage of hands in the rural areas. In 1958, the proportion of those engaged in agriculture dropped from 81.2 per cent to 58.2 per cent.²⁵ What is more, the possibility and extent of providing additional hands with the most important means of production were ignored. "We could not assure the correlation of the size of the work force and the means of employment", *Jingji yanjiu* wrote.²⁶ But it was precisely in this period that the "theory of full employment" in the conditions of socialism was being imposed. According to this "theory", the factor of living labour was not only a decisive, but

¹⁸ *Hongqi*, 1981, No. 11, p. 28.

¹⁹ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian*, 1981, Section VI, p. 20.

²⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 19, 1980.

²¹ *Study of the Structure of China's Economy*, p. 527.

²² *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 8, p. 23; *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1980, No. 3, p. 28.

²³ *Study of the Structure of China's Economy*, p. 528.

²⁴ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 8, p. 22.

²⁵ *Study of the Structure of China's Economy*, p. 527.

²⁶ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 8, p. 22.

also favourable element of economic development, while cheap manpower would more than compensate the shortage of modern means of production.

The branch proportions of employment were seriously upset at the time of the "cultural revolution" too. The concentration of investments in the capital-intensive branches of heavy industry, linked primarily with war production, considerably restricted the funds going for the creation of additional jobs, for the increase of employment in the sphere of civilian production. The Chinese press has admitted that "particular attention in heavy industry was paid to the development of war branches which inevitably created disproportions in the economy and complicated the employment problem".²⁷ As a result only 800,000 people out of the three million who increased the labour force in the cities every year could find work.²⁸

The employment policy underwent a sharp change at the beginning of the 1970s: a multitude of small enterprises requiring little investment and capable of employing a large number of people were built all over the country. In 1966-1978 the number of industrial enterprises increased from 160,000 to 350,000, and 340,000 of them were small and middle-sized.²⁹ The number of people employed at small enterprises rose from 57 per cent of the total industrial labour force in 1962 to 70 per cent in 1975 and 80 per cent in 1978.³⁰ This led to the growth of low-paying, ill-organised jobs and reduction of capital per worker.

The expansion of the network of small enterprises with a closed production cycle, frequently in industries requiring modern technology (steel, heavy engineering, automobile), and the duplication of enterprises producing the same goods not only reduced the effect of the employment of vast masses of living and materialised labour, but precluded specialisation in production, which is one of the factors of growth of labour productivity.

The solution of the employment problem through the development of small-scale production directly clashed with the problem of making social production effective. It is now admitted in China that the low level of development of the productive forces and the destruction of the material and technical base at some stages hampered the simultaneous solution of the problem of increasing employment and raising labour productivity. "For a long time," *Renmin ribao* wrote, "there were obvious contradictions between the expansion of employment and the rise of labour productivity."³¹ Despite a sharp increase in the number of people employed, labour productivity noticeably declined all along, with the exception of the first five-year-plan period, when planned development of production helped to increase employment and the rise of labour productivity was the basic factor of the growth of production (60 per cent of the increment of industrial production was due to higher labour productivity). Thus, the trebling of the number of people employed in industry in the years of the "Big Leap Forward" led to a 5.4 per cent per annum decline in labour productivity on the average, while in the period of "readjustment", in the conditions of a sharp decrease in the numbers of those employed in the cities, primarily in industry, labour productivity rose at a very high rate (by 23 per cent on the average a year) without any additional invest-

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 5, p. 11.

²⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 7, 1979; *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 1, p. 41.

³⁰ *Hongqi*, 1980, No. 11, p. 22.

³¹ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 23, 1981.

ments.³² In the period of the third five-year plan, when the increase in the number of people employed in industry was relatively small, only 9 million in five years, the average annual rate of growth of labour productivity was 2.5 per cent. The extensive development of industrial production at the beginning of the fourth plan period and the increase of industrial personnel by 15 million in five years caused the average annual rate of growth to drop to 1.3 per cent.³³ In the key branches of heavy industry (including metal and coal), however, productivity remained practically at the same level. The increment in industrial production of that period was due entirely to the increase in the number of people employed.³⁴

The stagnation of labour productivity at a low level was due chiefly to the fact that instead of going to increase capital per worker, investments went to create millions of additional technically weakly equipped, low-paying jobs.

In 1978 the conditions for full and effective employment began to deteriorate because of a substantial increase in the number of people reaching the working age. It rose from 10 million in 1953 to 13 million in 1964, and 24 million in 1978.³⁵ The average annual rates of growth of labour resources are also increasing sharply: in the 1950s they were 1.5 per cent, in the 1960s and 1970s they were 2.1 and 2.2 per cent, and in the 1980s they are expected to be 3.2 per cent.

The change in the demographic situation and the need to "readjust" the economy made it indispensable to alter the strategy of employment and, consequently, to restructure production. Important in this connection was the correlation of capital-intensive and labour-intensive industries. Chinese economists now stress that, "bearing in mind our country's specific character, namely the vast population, the acute employment problem and the low level of the productive forces, we must devote attention in the process of four modernisations to the development of branches that do not require much capital, quickly pay for themselves and employ a large number of hands".³⁶

In China such branches are primarily agriculture, where capital per worker is 150 yuan, the services industry—from 800 to 3,600 yuan, and public catering establishments—625 yuan.³⁷ In industrial production the least capital-intensive branches are the Group B branches in which the cost of a working place is equal to 4,000-6,000 yuan (in the arts and crafts branch it is approximately 80 yuan), while in the Group A branches it is 10,000-12,000 yuan.³⁸

But capital per worker, the cost of a working place, is not the only factor determining the possibility of expanding the sphere of employment in labour-intensive branches. In agriculture the increase in the number of people employed is limited by the shortage of arable land, underdevelopment of multibranch farming, and poor use of natural resources in some parts of the country. The tasks of modernisation of agriculture make it difficult fully to use labour resources because mechanisation releases tens of millions of hands. The transition to the "system of production responsibility" leads to the same thing: intensification of peasant labour, according to the Chinese press, immediately makes "redundant" from one-third

³² *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1980, No. 3, p. 29.

³³ *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 12, p. 17.

³⁴ *Study of the Structure of China's Economy*, p. 728.

³⁵ *Renkou yanjiu*, 1981, No. 4, p. 9.

³⁶ *Renmin ribao*, June 2, 1980.

³⁷ *Renmin ribao*, May 2, 1980.

³⁸ *Renmin ribao*, June 2, 1980.

to one-half of the labour force. And if one bears in mind the growth of the scale of labour resources in the 1980s, it will become obvious that the problem of employment in agriculture is a complicated task. Its solution, Chinese economists affirm, will depend on the level of development of multibranch farming, subsidiary husbandries and the development of rural industry. "Redundant labour force in the countryside," *Renmin ribao* wrote, "will increase in the future, and so it is necessary to create additional jobs within brief periods by developing rural industry."³⁹

The priority development of the labour-intensive branches of industry is a complex and contradictory process linked with the difficulties of expanding the raw-material base, commodity markets and lack of trained personnel. Some kinds of labour-intensive production call for complex manual operations requiring a high level of skill and technical know-how. Moreover, expansion of labour-intensive production often requires equipment that is scarce and high-quality materials. All this has not made it possible considerably to increase employment in those branches: in the three years of "readjustment" (1979-1981) the number of people employed in industry increased by eight million and only 2.5 million were accounted for by the Group B branches.⁴⁰ The 1981 results, however, make it possible to judge that major changes have taken place in the distribution of the increment in the number of factory and office workers between the labour- and capital-intensive branches of industry: the increase in that year was 2.3 million, including 1.7 million in the Group B branches and 500,000 in the Group A branches.⁴¹ Having assessed the possibilities of increasing production in Group B and all the consequences of the under-capacity operation of large heavy industry enterprises, the Chinese now admit that "it is impossible to keep the development of the Group A branches in check for a long time and increase production at the expense of Group B. If only considerations of employment are taken into account, this will lead to new disproportions and will tell on stability and eventually on the solution of the employment problem".⁴²

Some possibilities of solving the problem of employment are seen in the expansion of the services industry. China has managed rather quickly to increase the number of people employed in this sphere: from 9.5 per cent of the total labour force in 1978 to 14 per cent in 1981, thus almost reaching the 1957 level. The absolute number of people employed in the services industry has reached 15 million.⁴³

The sphere of services in China is developing in a fundamentally different way from that in the economically developed countries, where the volume of the surplus products suffices to maintain unproductive service personnel and to develop and improve the services industry. The low level of labour productivity in China objectively limits, above all in the government sector of the economy, the possibility of considerably expanding the sphere of services and increasing the number of people employed in it. "With our low labour productivity and low standard of living, we cannot keep a vast number of service personnel", *Renkou yanjiu* wrote.⁴⁴

Since the labour resources are exerting ever-increasing pressure on the possibilities available to the state to create the necessary means of production, the state centralised system of distributing and hiring man-

³⁹ *Renmin ribao*, May 8, 1981.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1982.

⁴¹ *Zhongguo tongji nianjian*, 1981, Peking, 1981, p. 108.

⁴² *Renkou yanjiu*, 1982, No. 5, p. 8.

⁴³ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 13, 1980; *Zhongguo tongji nianjian*, 1981, p. 108.

⁴⁴ *Renkou yanjiu*, 1982, No. 5, p. 9.

power is being reexamined as one that has become "obsolete and does not now fit in with the objective conditions of using the labour force".⁴⁵ What we see is diversification of the ways of employment through the development of the collective and private sectors of the economy.

For decades the questions of employment within the centralised system were solved by directives from the Ministry of Labour, and enterprises were deprived of the right to hire or fire personnel not required by production. In these conditions, the efforts to achieve "full employment everywhere" cost dearly—the price was oversaturation of production with living labour and redundant staffs at enterprises. "To find occupation for a few million people every year, some districts and branches do not take into account the actual demand for manpower, but employ people for the sake of employment and divide work done by three persons among five", *Renkou yanjiu* wrote.⁴⁶ Moreover, this system "guaranteed the preservation of the job for a worker irrespective of the quality of his work",⁴⁷ and sanctioned "inheritance of jobs" by children from their parents. This, the Chinese press admitted, gave rise to new problems: decline of labour productivity, deterioration of the quality of the labour force, and the disturbance of the traditional sex composition of the labour force in certain industries (metal and textile, for instance).

The transition from the strictly centralised system of employment in the state sector to the expansion of the sphere of employment through the development of the collective sector of the economy and the revival of private enterprise envisages a reduction in the cost of the newly-created jobs inasmuch as the cost of jobs at enterprises of the collective sector is but a fraction of that in the state economic sector. In industry, for instance, capital per worker at collective enterprises is less than 2,000 yuan, or 5-6 times as little as at state enterprises, and in the sphere of services 20-22 times as little.⁴⁸

As decided by the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, private enterprises are developing to a certain extent in the cities. Initially based upon family, the so-called "three-generation shops", the private enterprises have in the past two years been given permission to increase their staff up to seven persons with "assistants and apprentices".

In the initial period of "readjustment", about half the new jobs were created at collective and private enterprises, and in some cities, including such big ones as Peking, Tianjin, Xian, Harbin and Shijiazhuang, 70-80 per cent of applicants were given work at these enterprises. Although in the past few years there have been signs of reduction of the proportion of new workers in these sectors (in 1980 and 1981 the figures were 31 and 33 per cent respectively at collective enterprises and 5.5 and 3.9 per cent⁴⁹ at the private ones), this is a long-term policy in the opinion of Chinese economists and one designed to serve as a strategy of socio-economic development. "In the conditions where total public ownership prevails," *Renmin ribao* wrote, "a multi-structural economy and its long existence is a strategy and not a tribute to our time."⁵⁰ According to the sixth five-year plan, against the background of reduction of the rate of growth of the number of factory and office workers in the state sector, in which it

⁴⁵ *Renmin ribao*, July 20, 1979; Aug. 19, 1980.

⁴⁶ *Renkou yanjiu*, 1982, No. 5, p. 9.

⁴⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 19, 1980.

⁴⁸ *Renmin ribao*, May 2, 1980; *Jingji yanjiu*, 1980, No. 8.

⁴⁹ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian*, 1981, p. 129.

⁵⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 19, 1980.

is proposed to employ 11 million people in five years (in 1980 it was 5.7 million and in 1981—5.2 million), the number of people with jobs in the collective and private sectors will be 11 and 1.5 million respectively, i. e., the rate of increase will be preserved at approximately the level of the previous years—2.2-2.5 million and 300,000 respectively.⁵¹

The tangible achievements in the sphere of employment in the preceding five years, when it was possible to find work in the cities for 37 million people, and the engagement envisaged by the sixth five-year plan of another 29 million people⁵² in the country's economy afford grounds to suppose that the problems of employment are becoming less sharp, but the solution of the entire complex of employment problems calls for the readjustment of important economic proportions which will require a long time.

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51. Ibid., 13 December 1982.

52. Ibid.

THE 'PACIFIC COMMUNITY': ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OR A MILITARY-POLITICAL BLOC?

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[Article by Yu. S. Stolyarov, candidate of economic sciences, and A. A. Shmyrev]

The integration processes which are now under way in different regions of the world capitalist economy became more pronounced in the latter half of the 1970s primarily in the Pacific countries. The objective processes of the internationalisation of economic life and the intensification of the economic ties in the region were augmented by setting forth the concepts of integration of the Pacific countries. The political ambitions, mainly of the Japanese ruling quarters who came out with the idea of establishing the so-called Pacific community, have left a heavy imprint on those concepts. An active part in these processes is played by the USA.

ECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS FOR PACIFIC INTEGRATION

The Japanese and American plans to set up a new organisation in the Pacific rest on major shifts in the economies of that region's countries, and on the enhancement of the latter's share in the world capitalist economy. At present the Pacific countries account for nearly 50 per cent of the capitalist world's industrial output, and this tendency is on the upgrade. An especially tangible contribution is made by Japan, Australia, and the so-called new industrial states (South Korea, Singapore, Hongkong, Taiwan) which now account for about fifty per cent of the industrial production increment in the capitalist world.¹

Major territorial shifts are under way in the economic development of the region. The economic potential of US West Coast States with big cities, up-to-date science-intensive branches of industry, and skilled workforce is developing at a high pace. Similar processes are afoot in Japan, Australia, and South Korea. In other words, most modern types of production are ever more inclined to the areas which have a direct outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

Countries of the region possess large mineral deposits and energy, agricultural, forestry and fishing resources. The existence of a powerful raw material base intensifies considerably the objective foundation for the integration processes. The region boasts nearly half of the known deposits of coal in the capitalist world, up to one-third of oil and natural gas, over 50 per cent of uranium, almost 90 per cent of tin, and a consi-

¹ Calculated on the basis of *Main Economic Indicators*, OECD, December 1981; *Economic Outlook*, OECD, December 1981; *World Economy and International Relations*, 1982, No. 3, pp. 60-61 (in Russian).

derable amount of other non-ferrous metals. The region produces 85 per cent of the world output of natural rubber, a substantial share of copper, nickel and other non-ferrous metals.

According to the available estimates, the entrails of the Pacific Ocean contain 30-40 per cent of all potential reserves of oil and gas of the World Ocean.² Of late intensive prospecting in the coastal waters of the Pacific is being done, and a number of discoveries have been made. There is every reason now to speak of a considerable increase of the future mining of tin, rutile, zirconium, ilmenite and other rare metals, with the coastal states ensuring a major part of the world consumption. Modern scientific and technological progress has brought mankind to the brink of involvement in the process of economic development of mineral resources of the deep-sea areas of the Pacific Ocean bed which has iron and manganese concretions, nickel, manganese, copper, cobalt and also rare earth metals.

A developed transport infrastructure functions in the region and, as a result, the Pacific Ocean has turned into an intense route with practically unlimited capacity. Japan and the USA possess the largest merchant fleets in the world. Other Pacific countries also have considerable fleets. The Pacific boasts many large ports of international importance, trans-shipping and transportation points of international trade such as Singapore and Hongkong. Air freight over the Pacific Ocean is also developing intensively. There are international monetary and financial centres in Singapore and Tokyo, as well as developed national markets of capital, including US, Japanese, Australian, etc. By and large, the existence of a developed transport and external economic infrastructure promotes intensification of the regional economic ties, and serves as a favourable prerequisite for the economic rapprochement of the Pacific countries.

First and foremost, foreign trade between the countries of the region has been stepped up greatly. In 1981, their share in Japan's exports accounted for more than 55 per cent, and for about 50 per cent of imports.³ The figures for the United States are about 40 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively. Estimates show that the share of the intra-regional trade in the overall trade of the Pacific countries is 35 to 40 per cent, this attesting to the high degree of the mutually supplementing nature of the structure of both the foreign trade and the economy of above countries.⁴

Industrial primary goods (coal, iron ore, bauxites, oil, polymetallic ores) and agricultural produce, as well as ready-made industrial goods manufactured on the basis of specialisation and cooperation of production make up a large share of the trade between the Pacific countries. The regional trade deals both with commodities of high scientific and technical level manufactured primarily in the USA and Japan (aircraft, computers, automobiles, nuclear reactors), and with lower level products manufactured in Japan and in some developing countries (ferrous and non-ferrous metals, products of engineering, chemical goods and textiles). Details and units, and spare parts also comprise a large share (over 20 per cent), especially in trade between highly developed countries of

² See Y. Primakov, "The Main Trends in the Development of the International Situation in the Asian-Pacific Region", *World Economy and International Relations*, 1979, No. 11 (in Russian).

³ Calculated on the basis of *White Book on Commerce. A Detailed Account, 1981*, Tokyo, 1982 (in Japanese).

⁴ Calculated on the basis of *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, New York, 1981.

the Pacific. As a result, foreign trade includes practically a complete nomenclature of goods, which makes it stable, mutually dependent and largely autonomous inside the region.

The vigorous exchange of direct production investments between the Pacific countries plays an important part in the internationalisation of the economic life in the region. In 1981, these countries accounted for 53 per cent of Japan's foreign investments, with the USA, ASEAN and Australia ranking first, second and fifth, respectively, in the Japanese exports of capital.⁵ The USA accounted for approximately 11 per cent of the corresponding capital investments in the Pacific (Canada excluded).⁶ The exchange of investments among the countries of Southeast Asia as well as between Australia and New Zealand is developing.

A structural and geographic analysis of investments makes it possible to single out some features of the existing and developing structure of the international division of labour in the Pacific region. For example, direct investments of US transnationals and, to a lesser extent, of Japanese monopolies are funneled to the mining industry of Australia which has become a major "raw materials storehouse" of the capitalist world. Coal, iron ore, bauxites and other minerals mined in Australia as well as food are delivered primarily to Japan in considerable quantities by modern means of transportation. Using advanced technology assigned for the manufacture of standard and large-series production Japan is number one in the output of automobiles, ships, electronic equipment, etc., in the capitalist world. Then Japanese goods are exported to other Pacific countries, above all to the USA, Australia, Canada and Southeast Asian states. As is seen from the abovementioned examples, the division of labour between countries and branches of industries in the Pacific region has developed considerably.

US and Japanese investments are also used to transfer labour-intensive and ecologically harmful productions to the Pacific countries. A developed textile and sewing industry, the manufacture of electric household appliances, radio equipment, the chemical industry of a medium technological level (oil refining, production of polyethylene, and so on) have already emerged on this basis, primarily in the countries of Southeast Asia. Non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy, as well as some branches of machine-building producing technologically simple items are making headway.

Progress has also been registered in the international division of labour on a higher level. This refers mainly to the cooperation between American and Japanese corporations in the electronic industry, fine chemistry, and so on.

All this warrants the conclusion that the economic rapprochement of the countries and territories of the Pacific has much in common with the processes which have been occurring in other integration groups, above all in the EEC, especially prior to its creation. It should also be noted that the processes under review are marked by clear-cut features lacking analogues in the world capitalist economy.

To begin with, the Pacific countries are spread out over an immense territory. There is no compact group of states bordering on one another and therefore capable of forming the territorial nucleus of the integrating

⁵ Calculated on the basis of *Japan's Foreign Economic Activities. Current Situation and Problems in Economic Cooperation*, Tokyo, 1981 (in Japanese).

⁶ See V. P. Lukin, A. B. Parkansky, "Pacific Community: Projects and Reality", *World Economy and International Relations*, 1981, No. 3, p. 78 (in Russian).

group. It is rather the case of several subgroups, for example, the USA with Canada and Mexico, Japan with the ASEAN countries, and Australia with New Zealand. Intensification of economic ties takes place both between the leaders of each subgroup and inside them, between subgroups as a whole and between their periphery areas. In some cases mutual economic ties are becoming relatively weaker as, for example, between Japan and Canada and between Canada and the ASEAN countries.

Thus, this represents a complicated and contradictory process of the internationalisation of the economic life in the region in which centrifugal and centripetal forces, as well as different levels of integration are becoming closely interlaced. The main direction of the movement, however, is determined by the economically most advanced countries of the Pacific—the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia. The present-day trends of, and prospects for, an intensified economic exchange in the region depend on the character of their interrelations.

This process is strongly influenced by the considerable gap in the levels of economic development and by different historical and political factors as well as social and cultural traditions of the countries of the region. The processes of economic rapprochement drew into their orbit, from the very outset, the developed and the developing countries, notably the ASEAN countries and the small states in the South Pacific. These countries are rather heterogeneous: each of them has its own specific economic and political conditions, its own interests, which predetermines the internally contradictory character of the Pacific integration. The success of the latter largely depends on how it will be exercised between the developed and the developing countries of the region and on whether it will prove viable within the framework of the world capitalist economy.

Integration processes in the world capitalist economy demonstrate that their dynamics, profundity and results are determined, to a considerable extent, by the political decisions of states, the creation of an interstate mechanism for regulating economic rapprochement between countries, and by the integration concepts. What is the situation in the Pacific region where the objective economic processes of an intensified economic exchange have assumed tangible dynamics and scope?

CONCEPTS AND MECHANISMS OF THE PACIFIC INTEGRATION

The emergence of plans for unifying the states in the Asian-Pacific region dates back to the latter half of the 1960s. In 1968, T. Miki, the then Foreign Minister of Japan, advanced a plan for setting up an "Asian-Pacific community" to consist of countries of East and Southeast Asia, and also of Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Canada.⁷ Thus, even at that time Japan's ruling quarters displayed an urge to achieve, together with the United States, economic and political domination in the Pacific. One could easily discern the rebirth of the old Japanese dream of leadership in Asia. Being aware that the time has not yet arrived, Japan embarked on establishing close ties with the Pacific states, primarily in the economic sphere, hoping to bolster its positions in the region. In particular, on the initiative of S. Nagano, an influential leader of the Japanese business community, a private committee of economic cooperation among countries of the Pacific was set up in 1968. It included representatives of

⁷ For details see D. V. Petrov, *Japan in World Politics*, Moscow, 1973, p. 172 (in Russian).

Japan, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The committee got down to preparing and exchanging information, and elaborated practical recommendations aimed at rapprochement between the Pacific countries.

The 1970s saw considerable changes in Asia and the Pacific. A united socialist state was formed on the territory of Vietnam, and Laos and Kampuchea opted for socialist development. As a result, first, the role of socialist and nonaligned states which rather often jointly oppose the aggressive policy of imperialism has sharply enhanced. Second, the fiasco of the US aggression in Indochina revealed Washington's inability to preserve its domination in the Asian-Pacific region and to determine singlehandedly the basic trends of the capitalist states' policy there in accordance with the US global strategy. Third, China became an important factor in the Pacific. This was promoted by the PRC's taking its legitimate seat in the UN, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and a number of Pacific states, and the invigoration of China's foreign economic and political ties after the "cultural revolution". And, finally, Japan witnessed a rapidly growing tendency toward using different means—first economic, then political and now military—to try to restore its former frontiers in the Pacific Ocean, from which it was ousted as a result of its defeat in the Second World War. This tendency is expressed in numerous statements by Japanese politicians, business and military spokesmen, as well as in the invigoration of Japanese diplomacy directed at creating a Japanese sphere of influence. By and large, by the latter half of the 1970s the ruling Liberal Democratic party and Japan's government came to a conclusion that the time had arrived to assert Japan's influence in the Pacific.

In 1977, the then Prime Minister T. Fukuda proclaimed a programme for Japanese cooperation with ASEAN countries ultimately aimed at boosting the Japanese economic infiltration of Southeast Asia. That was the origin of the "Fukuda Doctrine".⁸ Japan's support to the Pol Pot regime, the renunciation of its commitments to render economic and food assistance to Vietnam, and also its intention to isolate Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea from the other states of Southeast Asia were a further development of the doctrine.

At the end of the 1970s, Japan's ruling circles set forth a more detailed and comprehensive plan to form a "Pacific Community". Addressing parliament with a policy-making statement on November 28, 1978, Prime Minister M. Ohira declared that he would work to "create a community in the Pacific Ocean". To this end he promised to consolidate relations with the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN. Ohira saw the aim of the future community in providing stable markets for agricultural produce and industrial primary goods from the Pacific countries, and giving aid to Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia. Ohira stated that regional cooperation of the Pacific countries, which would resemble the West European Common Market, would be unsuitable because the Pacific countries were at different levels of development.⁹

In March 1979, Ohira ordered an *ad hoc* group to be set up to examine the question of a "Pacific Community". The group included scholars who were not civil servants, with nearly a third of its membership composed of high-ranking government officials. It was headed by S. Okita, who was later appointed foreign minister. The group compiled two reports for the

⁸ For details see *Modern Monopoly Capitalism. Japan*, Edited by Y. A. Pevzner, D. V. Petrov, V. B. Ramzes, Moscow, 1981, pp. 371-375 (in Russian).

⁹ See *Asahi Evening News*, Nov. 29, 1978.

Prime Minister, which set forth a "Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept". According to the report, this region "possesses as a whole great vital power potential ... and is now on the way to becoming a regional community. This may be termed as a new experiment directed toward the XXI century".¹⁰ The main goals of the future community were as follows: greater mutual understanding, cooperation in exploring the Ocean and in supply of raw materials; development of industry; improvement of economic cooperation; accelerated mutual investments; examination of monetary problems and improvement of the monetary market.

The reports proposed to further mutual understanding among states through wider exchanges in the sphere of science, education, information and culture, and through simplifying visa procedures for travelling to countries of the community, and the procedures linked with emigration and naturalisation. Plans were also made for expanding cooperation in joint development of sources of energy and raw materials and in the search for a solution to the food problem, promoting the development of the community countries by rendering aid to the developing countries by the USA and Japan. In favouring an expansion of economic cooperation and joint investments in economy of other states, the authors of the reports suggested that access to the domestic markets of each country of the community be eased. At the same time the reports contained no mention of the guiding bodies of the community and the mechanism of its functioning.

Simultaneously with a detailed elaboration of the "Pacific Community" concept, the Japanese government sought for an approval of its idea by other countries. Prime Minister Ohira made several trips to the states concerned and succeeded in getting different degrees of consent from the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the PRC. As for the ASEAN member-countries, they expressed a negative attitude toward entry into the "Pacific community".

The US ruling quarters voiced a positive response to the Japanese proposal. Nonetheless, an influential group of Congressmen led by Senator John Glenn, tabled a report containing recommendations to set up an Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTD) to channel resources for development of the region, assist private investments, supply Pacific countries with raw materials and fuel. The OPTD was also intended to coordinate the elaboration of "common policy, rules and mechanisms for trade with different Asian communist states". The authors of the report placed special emphasis on the need for working out a US concept on the Pacific integration with the aim of creating most favourable conditions for preserving US influence in the Pacific.¹¹ The report also noted that it was "apparently unreasonable to include communist countries" into the OPTD because this would run counter to the entire sphere of the strategic interests of the USA and other member-countries of the future Organisation.¹²

Thus, by the early 1980s, two plans for unifying the capitalist states in the Pacific were set forth: a more detailed and long-term Japanese plan and a less detailed US one. Minor differences notwithstanding, the main aim of both was to buttress the positions of the United States and Japan in the region. This also implied a certain interaction of the two

¹⁰ Here and after see *Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept* (Translation), May 19, 1980, Tokyo.

¹¹ See *An Asian-Pacific Regional Economic Organisation: an Exploratory Concept Paper*, 96th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1979, pp. 46-192.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

biggest imperialist powers, notwithstanding the grave economic problems between them.

The advancement of the plans and the invigoration of US and Japanese activities in the region did not result, nevertheless, in creating any developed institutional-legal forms regulating mutual trade, movement of capital, scientific and technological exchange, and so on in the Pacific, which would embrace, at least, the majority of countries and territories of the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, some countries, in particular Australia, New Zealand, the USA and also some ASEAN states apply high custom duties and foreign trade restrictions to other countries of the region. No state-monopoly mechanism for regulating economic ties has been set up in the Pacific. This is why, determining the degree of their maturity, no sufficient grounds exist, for the time being, to talk of a zone of free trade, a customs union or more developed stages of integration in that region.

The only thing the capitalist states of the Pacific basin succeeded in achieving was the setting up in 1980 of the so-called commission for Pacific cooperation, an unofficial private body. It is made up of about 25 representatives (including officials) of the developed capitalist and developing states of the region. There are within it working groups on cooperation in trade, direct investments, energy, resources of the Pacific Ocean, international ties in transportation, communication and education. These groups are obliged to submit reports and recommendation to the commission, which later passes them on to the respective governments. The groups also establish broad ties with the international organisations already existing in the Asian-Pacific region. Private commissions and study groups have been attached to the governments of Japan, the USA and Australia which deal with economic and political integration in the Pacific and publish reports and research articles.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTS AND THE RESPONSE OF PACIFIC STATES

Since the 1980s the plans for integrating the Pacific, the most important of which is the plan for creating a "Pacific community", began undergoing substantial changes. Economic, cultural and other factors of integration began to fade to the background, being replaced by political and military considerations. It was the USA, Japan and South Korea that initiated such changes.

Initially, when the "Pacific community" plan was advanced, the Japanese government camouflaged its military-political aspects. With this aim in view Japan's Foreign Ministry made it clear that there will be a possibility for the Indochinese states, including the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,¹³ to take part in the Organisation. Moreover, at the sitting of the Budget Commission of the Lower Chamber of Japanese Diet on February 5, 1980, Ohira stated that he was not opposed to not only China's, but also of the Soviet Union's participation in the community.¹⁴ All these statements were designed to create the impression that the Pacific states would be united on a truly regional basis, and to lull possible suspicions of the developing and socialist states of the region as regards the genuine aims of the grouping.

However, even then the true aims of the community could be discerned in the Japanese leaders' statements. For example, S. Sonoda, Foreign Minister in Ohira's Cabinet, favoured the strengthening of relations

¹³ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1980, No. 3.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

with the future participants in the grouping in order to simplify Japan's "diplomacy against the Soviet Union" and to gain support for such diplomacy.¹⁵ Thus, from the very outset the "Pacific community" was seen as an association of non-socialist countries, with the USA and Japan playing the leading part in it.

Later on, having discarded even the semblance that its intention was primarily to set up a community for developing economic and cultural ties in the region, the Z. Suzuki government brought out in the open the political aspects of the planned community. In June 1982 Suzuki spoke in Honolulu at an east-west study centre of a local University. His speech was widely advertised by Kyodo Tsushin Agency and the Japanese press. It was called the "setting in of the Pacific era" and was an account of the changed concept of the "Pacific community".

What the Japanese Prime Minister said was a result of his negotiations with the leaders of the ASEAN countries, President François Mitterrand of France and Premier of the State Council of PRC Zhao Ziyang, who visited Tokyo, and also of the meeting with US President Ronald Reagan in Paris, the conference of the "Seven" in Versailles, and the talks with the leaders of Brazil and Peru.

First and foremost, the Japanese Prime Minister stressed the "need for strengthening relations of solidarity between the Pacific states", claiming that using the immense potential for cooperation of the Pacific region is the key for restoring the capitalist economy. According to Suzuki, this solidarity should be based on the five principles, which he later commented on in detail.¹⁶

First, the Pacific Ocean should be a "zone of peace". It is hard to oppose this precept, but, as Suzuki interprets it, the "Pacific peace" should be based, above all, on the military and political domination of the United States in that region. "It should be borne in mind," Suzuki stated, "that the United States as a Pacific country plays an important part in political and economic affairs and also in guaranteeing the security of that region." Thus, the Japanese Prime Minister actually advertised "Pax Americana", advocating US policy in the Pacific. The principle of the "Pacific peace" was advanced obviously in conformity with the changes that occurred in the Japanese-US relations in 1981. It was then that in the joint communique on the Japanese-US summit talks the relations between the two countries were called "allied" for the first time. It was not by chance, therefore, that Suzuki devoted special attention to the "invulnerability of the Japanese-US alliance as an important stabilising factor" in the Pacific region.

In his speech the Prime Minister of Japan expressed full solidarity with the military blocs of the capitalist countries, making the point that Japan is a member of the alliance of Western countries headed by the USA and makes an active contribution to the common cause of Western countries in the Pacific Ocean. This actually stressed the anti-socialist edge of the policy pursued by the Japanese government, which has firmly bound Japan to the aggressive policy of the Reagan administration. Suzuki called for "the solidarity of the developed democratic countries in the Pacific Ocean to be consolidated, hinged on the alliance between Japan and the United States. Among these countries are Canada, Australia, New Zealand and also ASEAN states". Thus, the Japanese Prime Minister made it clear that the composition of the future "Pacific community"

¹⁵ See *Asahi shimbun*, July 4, 1979.

¹⁶ Here and after quoted from *Asahi shimbun*, June 18, 1982.

had not undergone any basic changes. Suzuki hinted, however, that some other members, in particular South Korea, could be admitted to the "community".

At the same time the speech pointed out unequivocally that Japan's ruling quarters are intent to continue a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and reaffirmed that the "Pacific community" was intended as an anti-Soviet organisation.

Second, as is seen from Suzuki's Pacific doctrine, the Pacific Ocean should become a "zone of freedom". "Each country", the Japanese Prime Minister stated, "should be free to pursue its development." However, if this statement is compared with the previous one, it becomes clear that in this context "free development" is understood only as development within the framework of the alliance headed by the USA and Japan. Moreover, Suzuki favoured free exchange of people, free trade and exchange of technology in the interests of boosting the world economy. This statement is ample evidence of the urge of Japan, being an industrialised power, to guarantee itself favourable conditions for economic expansion into other Pacific countries.

Third, according to Suzuki, it is necessary to ensure "diversity" in the development of the Pacific states. The Japanese Prime Minister backed initiatives for organising multilateral cooperation in the region. He devoted special attention to ASEAN obviously because of the negative attitude of that organisation toward the "Pacific community" plan. In response to the statements by the leaders of ASEAN countries on the undesirability of the dissolution of that regional organisation within a "Pacific community", Suzuki declared that ASEAN is an "important core of regional cooperation". This is nothing but an attempt to persuade ASEAN that there are, allegedly, advantages in a new grouping.

In accordance with the fourth principle of the Suzuki doctrine, the Pacific Ocean should become an area of mutually beneficial cooperation. Here, the Japanese Prime Minister made another attempt to refute the apprehensions of ASEAN and other countries which regard Japan's urge to set up a "Pacific community" as a persistent effort by the Japanese monopolies and ruling quarters to ensure more advantageous positions for themselves in the region.

Fifth, the Japanese Prime Minister advanced the idea of turning the Pacific Ocean into an "open zone", and emphasised the need for mutual dependence of Pacific countries as the future basis for mutual dependence of all countries. If this "mutual dependence" is based on the abovementioned principles, this means that the Japanese ruling quarters see the future of humanity as a kind of anti-socialist alliance led by the USA and Japan. Besides, the "mutual dependence" should justify unequal and subordinate status of the developing countries in the region within the system of economic and political relations with the developed capitalist states. In this connection Suzuki called the future "Pacific community" a "model for the entire world", and even declared the 21st century to be the "century of the Pacific Ocean".

It is clear that the views expounded by Suzuki in the Honolulu speech differ substantially from the formulations set forth by Ohira. According to *Yomiuri*, "Ohira was trying to avoid political problems, as he was aware that they would bring about disintegration rather than solidarity in the Pacific Ocean where there exist countries with different levels of social and economic development... As for Suzuki, he, unlike his predecessor, placed emphasis on political and security matters, rather than on deeper mutual understanding through economic and cultural cooperation,

stressing the 'ocean of peace' concept, and also the role of the United States in maintaining stability in the region".¹⁷

Actually, this represents a slightly veiled plan for a new military-political bloc, and the architects of that plan are apparently not only Japanese. US ruling quarters have long nurtured plans for setting up an association in the region that would embody the ANZUS (USA, Australia, New Zealand), Japanese-US and Japanese-South Korean military-political alliances and also ASEAN. Such Pacific variety of NATO would primarily strengthen the shattered positions of the USA in the Pacific. However, the US administration prefers that it be Japan that advances this plan for a bloc, which in particular would promote her early involvement in the military preparations in the Far East. It comes as no surprise that in the speeches of a number of the leaders of Australia, another US military ally, they talked about military cooperation within the framework of the "Pacific community". The semblance with NATO is made even more obvious by the fact that the conservative quarters in Western Europe support the plan for integration of the Pacific states.

Several days after the Japanese Prime Minister's speech, a constituent meeting was held in Tokyo that set up the "Pacific democratic union", an association of conservative forces of the developed Pacific capitalist countries.¹⁸ Included as participants in the association are the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, the Liberal Party of Australia, the National Party of New Zealand and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. A delegation of the US Republican Party, with a status of an observer in the "union", as well as representatives of the Christian Democratic Union of the FRG and the Conservative Party of Great Britain also attended the constituent conference.

The South Korean regime also supports the close political cooperation of the Pacific countries, though it does not dare speak openly of the military aspects of the community. In May 1982 President Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea suggested to Prime Minister of Australia M. Frazier that a summit conference of the Pacific countries ought to be convened that would "open up the great Pacific era of peace and prosperity".¹⁹ The conference is to be attended by the leaders of South Korea, Japan, Australia, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and the five ASEAN states. A "Pacific council", a body for holding regular consultations between the leaders of the Pacific states and possibly a leading body for the "Pacific community", is to be established.

The USA has also stepped up its policy in the Pacific with an emphasis on military aspects. The naval exercises, the "Rimpac", in which combat ships and aircraft of other probable members of the community—Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—are held regularly under the US leadership in the Pacific Ocean since 1980. In October 1981 a conference on "ensuring security in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean" took place in Tokyo. It was attended by representatives of the USA, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, and also Great Britain. The conference was convened by the Japanese Centre for Strategic Studies. A mere month later Manila played host to a "seminar of the representatives of the armies' command" of the sixteen Asian and Pacific countries.

¹⁷ *Yomiuri shimbun*, June 18, 1982.

¹⁸ *Asahi shimbun*, June 27, 1982.

¹⁹ *Asahi shimbun*, Aug. 3, 1982.

These and other facts demonstrate that practical activities at setting up a new military-political bloc in the Pacific Ocean are afoot. Its establishment meets primarily the schemes of the USA and Japan, whereas the developing countries, primarily ASEAN members, take a different stand.

The statements by the leaders of a number of ASEAN countries showed that the "Pacific community" concept evoked and continues to evoke mistrust, to say the least, above all with respect to Japan. The majority of ASEAN states fear a beefed-up Japanese economic and especially military potential and the emergence of her armed forces in the Pacific expanses. In particular, in the course of negotiations with the US President, President Marcos of the Philippines and President Suharto of Indonesia expressed concern. Reagan's assurances that the Japanese military preparations would not go further than ensuring self-defence, have now been refuted by the actions of the Japanese National Defence Agency. In succumbing to the pressure brought to bear by the USA, the National Defence Agency began elaborating actions aimed at "defending" the sea area in the radius of 1,000 miles from the Japanese coast.²⁰

In this connection Indonesian Foreign Minister M. Kusumaatmadja stated: "We prefer to defend our country ourselves."²¹ He also stressed that the "Indonesian government cannot agree to Japan taking upon herself the responsibility of defending Indonesia and other countries of Southeast Asia".²²

K. Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Philippines, actually rejected the plans for the "Pacific community". On the eve of a regular conference of Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries in July 1982 he expressed frank anxiety in connection with the strengthening of Japan's economic positions in the region which may lead to the latter's political domination and to a return of the notorious idea of a "coprosperity sphere".²³

The "Pacific community" plan has met with less resistance on the part of the ruling quarters of other ASEAN countries. Nevertheless, they all agree that the further economic strengthening and especially militarisation of Japan pose a direct threat to them. The Japanese paper *Tokyo shimbun* noted the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments in the countries of the Association. The Prime Minister of Singapore's call to hold joint military exercises of ASEAN countries was explained by the paper as apprehensions due to "Japan's possible movement southwards".²⁴

It is self-evident that the negative stand of ASEAN countries vis-à-vis the "Pacific community" will mean the failure of this idea in its present form, and may influence the stand of the island states in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean—Fiji, Papua-New Guinea and others—which have been invited into the community as junior partners. The leaders of Japan and the USA are well aware of this possibility and they are "coaxing" and pressuring ASEAN countries with every means available. The visit of C. Weinberger, US Secretary of Defence, to the ASEAN countries in November 1982, the first visit of its kind, which graphically demonstrated the military-political trend of the US approach to the problems of the region, is very typical in this respect.

²⁰ See *Yomiuri shimbun*, Oct. 26, 1982.

²¹ *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1982.

²² *Mainichi shimbun*, Oct. 21, 1982.

²³ *Straits Times*, June 16, 1982.

²⁴ *Tokyo shimbun*, Oct. 26, 1982.

Bringing to the fore the plans of setting up a new alliance in the Asian-Pacific region early in the 1980s mirrors primarily the objective processes in the development of economic exchange between the Pacific countries. Trade, the flow of direct and production investments, technology, and so on has intensified considerably among them. The same is true of mutual cultural, scientific and technological ties and other contacts.

On late the leaders of Japan, the USA and Australia—the three main architects of the “Pacific community”—stepped up their efforts for attaching political goals to the objective economic processes. Certain joint efforts of these countries at strengthening the militaristic positions of imperialism in Asia and the Pacific, which were gravely undermined as a result of the US defeat in Indochina and the consolidation of forces of socialism in Asia, can also be discerned. Such important factor as the urge to keep the developing countries of the region within the framework of capitalist relations is also in operation. After the entry into power of the Reagan administration in the USA, the urge of the imperialist circles to set up a new bloc in the Pacific Ocean for a military confrontation with the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement has become more prominent, with special emphasis being put on whipping up military confrontation. This, however, cannot equally suit all possible participants in the “Pacific community”. Many of them favour the development of mutually beneficial ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. As for the USSR, it expressed its attitude to the processes under way in the Pacific Ocean in the message of greetings to the participants of the 14th Pacific Scientific Congress held in Khabarovsk in 1979. The message read in part: “An important role in the destinies of our planet belongs to the Pacific region inhabited by more than half of the world’s population. This region has innumerable mineral and biological resources, it is an important area for international navigation and fishing, it exerts great influence on the formation of the climate on our planet and the state of the man’s natural environment. Its natural resources should serve, in full measure, the whole of mankind and the objectives of progress and creation.”²⁵

The Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward constructive proposals aimed at developing cooperation among Pacific states and achieving détente in the Pacific Ocean. In particular, of great significance to peace and security in the region is the proposal made by the 26th Congress of the CPSU to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East. Soviet proposals envisage that international economic and political relations in the Pacific Ocean should be based on a constructive and democratic approach. In this case alone the Pacific Ocean may become a zone of peace and cooperation among nations.

Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, told the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee: “From the very first days of Soviet power our state has invariably expressed readiness for open, honest cooperation with all countries which respond with reciprocity. The differences in social systems should not be in the way—and they are not in the way if there is good will from both sides.”²⁶

²⁵ *Pravda*, Aug. 20, 1979.

²⁶ *Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982.

ESCALATION OF U.S. AGGRESSION IN EAST ASIA

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[Article by V. I. Petukhov and G. I. Ragulin]

As a result of the invigoration of the imperialist aggressive forces, world developments are assuming an increasingly dangerous character. These forces are headed by the United States of America, which, in recent decade, has been led by a most bellicose administration that openly rejects the principles of peaceful coexistence and steers toward the use of force in international relations, toward an unprecedented arms race and toward preparations for a nuclear war. Pining for the past when US imperialism dominated its rivals by its might and influence, the Reagan administration stops at nothing to take revenge for the defeats suffered in the confrontation with socialism and the national liberation movement, to restore US military superiority and ensure its undivided rule in the world.

The struggle for control over different regions of the world, which US monopolies have earmarked for markets and military-strategic strong-points of their expansion, is a major trend of this policy, which is based on imperial ambitions and unbridled militarisation. Such regions, however far they might be from the American shores, are unceremoniously declared by Washington to be "zones of US national interests" which serves as a pretext for building up the US military presence in the countries of these "zones" and supporting with the help of force anti-popular regimes that meet Washington's interests. The USA is seeking in every way possible to boost its chances for intervention and find new, more efficient ways to interfere militarily and politically in the domestic affairs of other states. Said Caspar Weinberger, US Secretary of Defence: "We must strengthen our positions in the world with the help of arms."¹

US imperialism is particularly active in East Asia, a region where its military presence grows year in, year out. For a number of reasons Washington has assigned East Asia an exceptionally important role in its aggressive schemes.

First, this is a region with immense natural wealth and inexhaustible human resources, which distinguishes it from many other regions that attract the attention of foreign investors—pioneers of imperialist expansion. *Grand Strategy for the 1980s*, a book published in Washington by a group of former prominent military leaders, claims that today US prosperity is linked with the Pacific countries. The US economy, the book goes on, is the main consumer of raw materials from the East and of the commodities produced in Asian countries, and the United States is banking on Asian markets for its exports and capital investments.² These designs have never been of a peaceful nature, since expansion requires the

¹ Quoted from *Asia and Africa Today*, 1982, No. 2, p. 10 (in Russian).

² Quoted from *Pravda*, April 2, 1982.

use of force. It is not by chance that, even prior to the election which brought Ronald Reagan to power, the election platform of the US Republican Party contained an assurance that the new Republican administration would restore America's role in Asia and in the Pacific.

Second, East and Southeast Asia, which is close geographically to the latter, is a region where the national liberation movement has scored impressive successes, namely the victory of the people's revolution in China, the winning of independence and the embarking on the road of socialism by the Indochina countries (Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea), the emergence of the people's democratic system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and throwing off of the fetters of colonialism by a number of countries of Southeast Asia. The United States and other imperialist powers are going out of their way to stem the tide of the national liberation movement, to rub out the latter's gains, and to reverse the course of history so as to have the opportunity to plunder without obstacle the peoples of Asia.

Third, whatever importance Washington might attach to the economic and other abovementioned considerations in formulating its policy vis-à-vis that region, first and foremost, it proceeds from the fact that with the expanses of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, the countries of East and Southeast Asia, as the American brass hats have it, are a convenient bridgehead for delivering blows to the most important economic and political centres of the USSR and other socialist countries that are far away from Europe and America.

Fourth, the US economic and diplomatic activities, as well as its military presence in the region, are aimed at keeping within the framework of imperialism's military system all countries which it presently controls. Washington interferes unceremoniously in their internal affairs, forcing them to do what it thinks fit, and preventing undesirable democratic changes to the left in the policies of those countries.

As in other sectors of the international struggle, US imperialism is seeking to cover up its aggressive activities in the region by hue and cry about a "Soviet threat". Such subterfuges are employed to justify Reagan's policy of disrupting international cooperation, forming military alliances with local reaction, and preparing a new "crusade" against socialism. Hence, the abominable slander of socialist society spread by imperialist propaganda and the Washington-sponsored subversive activities against the peoples of the socialist countries.

US imperialism's aggressive intrigues in East Asia are spearheaded not only against the USSR, but also against the other socialist countries. Today this refers primarily to the socialist countries of Indochina opposing the onslaught of imperialism in the struggle for independence and free development. It is these countries that deserve praise for inflicting the first defeat on the American military, who unleashed the dirty war against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, but proved incapable of breaking their heroic resistance. Having recovered from the "Vietnam syndrome", Washington is nurturing fresh intrigues against these countries, hampering their peaceful development along socialist lines.

Among them is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which repulsed the armed intervention of the USA and its accomplices in the early 1950s and is now struggling against the disintegration of national unity which set in as a result of the actual occupation of South Korea by the US troops.

Washington's great-power imperial ambitions also affect the interests of China. US policy vis-à-vis China has never been selfless and genuinely friendly. It would be not out of place to cite the verdict of this policy once voiced from the UN rostrum by an official PRC spokesman: "However brazenly US imperialists would assert that they are friends of the Chinese people, history which shows who is a friend and who is an enemy cannot be changed."³

During the Second World War, the USA made a stake on China, which depended on it, as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Today Washington is trying to pursue a similar policy, courting the Chinese leaders and enticing them, under new circumstances and by new methods, into the nets of US dependency. The results of this policy are well known. The USA has been giving unlimited support to the Taiwan regime which it has nurtured. However, Washington itself admits that "Peking's concern goes far beyond the framework of the Taiwan problem: the Chinese are disappointed above all because the process of normalisation did not provide them with the aid on which they banked, in particular, in credits and the transfer of technology."⁴

Experience showed that the United States would refuse China help if the latter persisted in its programme of building socialism. As was pointed out in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, "Imperialists will never be friends of socialism."⁵

The statement made by Ronald Reagan soon after he became President is excellent evidence of the genuine attitude of Washington toward the PRC: "I think there has to be a certain degree of caution, remembering that this is a country whose government subscribes to an ideology based on a belief in destroying governments like ours."⁶ It is no accident that, while working out secret long-term military plans, the US regards China as its potential enemy. This is confirmed, in particular, by Directive 59, approved by President Jimmy Carter, which envisages the deployment of one hundred US inter-continental missiles to deliver nuclear strikes at the PRC in case of any "unforeseeable" changes in the policy of the Chinese leaders.⁷

In its relations with the USSR, the Indochinese countries and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States most frequently resorts to indirect or even direct military pressure, in other words, to intimidation, combining it with different subversive activities. Washington's policy toward the PRC is different, however. Here it makes the heaviest reliance on the gradual erosion of the socialist foundations of Chinese society, that supposedly will result from the drawing of China into the system of economic ties of the capitalist world. In any event, the policy of US imperialism is directed against the interests of the Chinese people, who are unwilling to return to the old times when imperialists and their stooges held sway in their country.

US military and political activities in that region threatens the interests of not only socialist states, but also of other Asian states striving toward consolidating their independence, and thwarting imperialist intrigues. The USA has stepped up its pressure on the ASEAN countries in

³ Wu Xiuquan, *On the US Armed Aggression Against China*, Moscow, 1950, p. 24. (in Russian).

⁴ From the interview of Alexander Haig to *Politique internationale*, No. 18 (Winter of 1982/83).

⁵ *The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1981, p. 15.

⁶ *Time*, Jan. 5, 1981.

⁷ See *Izvestia*, May 9, 1982.

a bid to form them into a military-political bloc that would act in the interests of imperialist powers, primarily bringing pressure to bear on the socialist countries of Indochina. As Sunario, an Indonesian political leader pointed out, "Washington stops at nothing in an effort to make ASEAN an accomplice in its interstate intrigues, riveting this association, among other things, by the fetters of economic and military 'aid'".⁸

Trying to realise its aggressive objectives in East Asia, the United States is seeking to use allies, local reactionaries and other accomplices of imperialism. Japan is the US's main ally and supporter of US policy in that region.

JAPAN—US ALLY IN CREATING TENSION

In recent years the character and scope of cooperation between the USA and Japan have become much more dangerous, since it has been directed increasingly into military channels. Washington is stepping up its pressures on Tokyo, trying to draw Japan more fully into its aggressive strategy and expand its military commitments and contribution to the "joint defence". Account here is taken, not only of the considerations ensuing from the confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of East Asia, but also of US interest in limiting potential of Japan whose economy is now second in the capitalist world. Impelling Japan toward greater military spending, rearmament and purchases of US weaponry, Washington hopes to reduce its tremendous trade deficit with Japan (\$20 billion in 1982) and weaken Japan as its main rival in the world market.⁹

Japan's ruling quarters take advantage of cooperation with the United States for realising their far-reaching schemes of militarising the country and winning hegemony in Asia. They do not always and completely toe the line of Washington, inasmuch as they take into account Japan's financial and economic difficulties, in particular the alignment of the class forces in the country, the resolute struggle of the democratic masses against the restoration of militarism and for a transition toward the policy of peace and friendship with all states. It should be pointed out, however, that the differences between Washington and Tokyo on this score, which are often exaggerated by foreign observers, lie in the scale and rates, rather than the essence and objectives, of militarisation. On the whole, despite sharp economic contradictions, Washington and Tokyo closely cooperate in the military and political spheres, adhering in fact to an identical policy.

At the end of 1978 the USA and Japan agreed on the "guiding principles" of bilateral cooperation in military matters and, for the first time, set about planning joint combat operations. The USA was insistently pushing Japan toward establishing multilateral military cooperation with American allies in Asia (above all, with the South Korean regime) and with NATO countries. Representatives of Japan's military leaders and the NATO Command began regularly to exchange visits and hold consultations. The latter expressed readiness to disclose military secrets to Japan and to draw the latter into combat operations in the course of military exercises conducted by the USA and its allies in the Pacific. The "self-defence force" took part for the first time in such exercises in February-

⁸ Quoted from *Asia and Africa Today*, 1982, No. 11, p. 19 (in Russian).

⁹ N. N. Nikolayev, A. N. Aleksandrov, "Japanese-American Relations: Old Problems, New Tendencies", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1983, No. 1.

March 1980 together with the armed forces of the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In March 1982, this "experiment" was repeated on a broader scale when a much greater number of ships and aircraft from different countries took part in military exercises. It is self-evident that joint military exercises, which are becoming regular, open up the road for Japan's participation in multilateral military blocs without permission from Parliament. The Japanese public notes with alarm that this situation sharply intensifies the danger of the country being automatically drawn into any hostilities that the United States and its allies may launch in Asia.

In May 1981 Washington played host to the negotiations between US President Ronald Reagan and the then Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki. At the negotiations which marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the US-Japanese relations, Japan's government openly expressed its readiness to act hand-in-glove with the USA and other imperialist powers in all spheres, including military cooperation. For the first time the joint communique formally and unequivocally described relations between the USA and Japan as an alliance. Thus, they were actually elevated to the level of relations that exist between the USA and NATO countries, i. e., the two Washington-led military blocs united, as it were, into a single system spearheaded against the USSR and other socialist countries, and agreed on certain coordination in elaborating and implementing military measures.

"NATOised" Japan pledged to patrol the Pacific at a distance of up to 1,000 miles from its shores. Thus, the United States entrusted it with part of its military missions in Northwest zone of the Pacific—from Guam to the Philippines—to have an opportunity to dispatch some ships of its 7th Fleet to other flashpoints in Asia. In violation of its Constitution, the Japanese government now extends the operational zone of its Navy into the high seas far beyond its territorial waters, having in mind to use them mainly for bringing pressure to bear on neighbouring countries. This may complicate Japan's relations with the countries of the region and destabilise the region as a whole. The blocking with American assistance of the La Perouse, Tsugaru and Korea Straits, which are international waters open to all ships of the world, can yield only negative results. It is hardly possible that the coastal countries concerned will remain indifferent to such encroachments upon their legitimate rights.

At the negotiations in Washington the Japanese government also agreed to take upon itself part of the financial burden for maintaining US armed forces in Japan (it annually earmarks \$1 billion for this purpose) and to help build depots for storing military hardware and munitions on the Japanese territory. These stockpiles could be used by the US rapid deployment force.

The Japanese Constitution, which has renounced "forever" the use of war as a means for settling international disputes, bans creation of an army and Japanese participation in combat operations outside the country. In violation of these provisions, the Japanese government has long turned the "self-defence force" into full-fledged armed forces and continues to build up its combat potential qualitatively and quantitatively. Today this "self-defence force", which maintains close operational contacts with the US armed forces, numbers 260,000 officers and men and comprises 13 well-trained and mobile infantry divisions. As to its combat ability, it ranks eighth in the world.

In the spring of 1981 the Japanese Diet passed a special resolution renouncing nuclear weapons as the basis of the country's policy in that

sphere. The resolution expressed the desire not to produce, not to possess, and not to bring nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. In reality, however, the Japanese government violates these principles, succumbing to pressure from Washington. Although it claims that there has never been nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, the statements of American leaders frequently contradict such allegations. For example, in an interview former US President James Carter admitted that ships of the US 7th Fleet equipped with nuclear weapons call at Japanese ports and that during his administration the Japanese leaders knew of this fact.¹⁰

The Tokyo ruling circles regard the Constitution, which is being upheld by the democratic masses of the Japanese people, as a serious obstacle in the way of militarising the country and keep trying to take a practical approach to the continuous debate about revising the Constitution. They spare no efforts to prove the need for rearming and equipping the "self-defence force" with nuclear weapons, and enabling it to take part in combat operations outside Japan. Washington has been consistently pushing the Japanese government toward an early implementation of these designs.

The US-Japanese summit talks during the visit of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to Washington in January 1983 dealt with the problems of military cooperation. During the talks the Japanese government declared that it was increasing allocations for rearmament by 6.5 per cent and, in defiance of the previous decisions that were within the limits of the Japanese Constitution, it agreed to transfer its ultra-modern technology to the United States. The Pentagon, long soliciting this, gained unlimited access to Japanese achievements in microelectronics, laser technology and other innovations to be used for creating new types of weapons. At the same time, the cooperation in this field is regarded as a step toward standardising the armaments of the two countries, i. e., to linking even tighter the Japanese war machine to the chariot of US imperialism.

US and Japanese cooperation is based on common foreign policy goals and purposes. The Japanese government actively supports Washington's policy on the Korean and the Taiwan issues. Simultaneously it seeks to promote the US rapprochement with the PRC. Here Washington and Tokyo are facing a single task which was once formulated by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki as follows: "We should do our best to keep China in the ranks with Western countries."¹¹ At the same time, following in the wake of the Reagan administration, the Japanese leaders are whipping up tensions in relations with the Soviet Union and ignoring the latter's goodneighbourly initiatives aimed at improving bilateral relations. Moreover, they sanction provocative actions by the American military from Japanese territory. For example, late in 1982 the Japanese government agreed with Washington to station US F-16 fighter-bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons in the North of Honshu Island.¹² It is quite transparent that these aircraft are assigned to carry out offensive operations against neighbouring countries, primarily against the USSR.

Like Washington, Tokyo is seeking to justify its dangerous military and political line, which testifies to the rebirth of Japanese militarism, by every sort of concoctions about a "Soviet threat". For instance, address-

¹⁰ Quoted from *Pravda*, Oct. 17, 1982.

¹¹ *Business Week*, March 16, 1981.

¹² See *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1983.

ing Parliament on January 4, 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone attempted to prove that the situation around Japan "causes alarm" allegedly due to a "Soviet buildup of military might in the Far East". Nakasone asserted that, given such a setting, Japan would support the system of the Japanese-US "security treaty" and strive for a "qualitative buildup of its defensive potential".

It is indicative, however, that in voicing its "alarm" and "apprehensions" allegedly caused by the Soviet Union, the Japanese government continually turns down the Soviet government's proposals to discuss mutual apprehensions and agree, on a collective or bilateral basis, to elaborate and apply corresponding measures of confidence that would promote detente in that region. Nor does Tokyo seem willing to conclude a peace treaty with the USSR, something the Soviet government has invariably favoured. It is obvious that Japanese ruling quarters do not desire genuine stability in the region. They prefer to follow in the wake of US aggressive policy.

THE SOUTH KOREAN REGIME—A STOOGUE OF US IMPERIALISM

The United States, whose bayonets support Seoul's repressive and dictatorial regime, use the latter to preserve South Korea as a major bridgehead of US military presence and the "first echelon" of its aggressive strategy in East Asia. Late in 1953 Washington concluded a "treaty on mutual defence" with the Seoul regime, which made formal the perpetual US occupation of South Korea. A total of 40,000 US officers and men equipped with nuclear weapons have been stationed there. The US Command has use of nearly forty military bases in the Southern part of the Korean Peninsula and has control of the South Korean army which, with a manpower strength of 650,000, constitutes the largest army among Asian capitalist countries.

After Ronald Reagan came to power, South Korea's role in the US East Asian policy was upgraded noticeably. It is symptomatic that the Seoul military dictator Chun Doo Hwan was the first foreign guest of the new US President. A joint communique stressed that the USA has no intention of withdrawing its forces from South Korea and that it is ready to supply it with new weapons. In the agreed programmes of military cooperation between Washington and Seoul emphasis has been placed on rearming the Seoul army, building new bases and reinforced areas, and improving military communications. During Reagan's presidency US military and financial aid to Seoul sharply increased.

Supplying additional weapons to its junior ally, Washington continues at the same time to beef up its own forces in the Korean Peninsula, equipping them with new types of arms, including medium-range missiles and neutron weapons. South Korea became a vital area for US forward nuclear basing in East Asia.

US nuclear blackmail is being increasingly used as a means for intimidating neighbouring countries. During a tour of East Asia in January 1983, US Army Chief of Staff General E. Meyer declared that the US armed forces in South Korea "in case of need" will use nuclear weapons.¹³

An immense concentration of troops in South Korea and the increased supply of different types of armaments there disrupt the stability in that area. At the same time, such a buildup is against the vital interest of

¹³ See *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1983.

the Korean people since the presence of US troops there is the main obstacle barring the latter from unifying their Motherland. Americans refused to comply with a resolution adopted on June 27, 1975, by the 30th UN General Assembly that called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the adoption of practical measures for halting the military buildup in the country, a substantial reduction in armed forces of the two parts of Korea to equal levels, and for military confrontation to be declared inadmissible.

Instead of promoting a political settlement of the Korean issue, Washington bends every effort toward perpetuating the division of Korea by maintaining tension in that area. As if on the eve of big combat operations, large-scale military exercises of all branches of the service of the USA and the Seoul regime with the participation of "observers" from the Japanese "self-defence force" are being conducted more frequently in the southern part of the country, near the demilitarised zone. Over 70,000 American and about 120,000 South Korean officers and men and a large number of aircraft and combat ships took part in such exercises, which commenced in February 1983.¹⁴ That was a provocative display of military muscle with the intent of intimidating the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other countries of the region, which look with apprehension at the encroachments of the US imperialism.

The USA is seeking to rely on its Japanese ally in the Korean matters as well. In recent years it has stepped up its efforts for forming a new military bloc, a triple alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, which the Pentagon would like to turn into a Far Eastern NATO.

Formally, Japan has not signed any military treaty with the Seoul regime but Washington has long been impelling it toward establishing permanent military contacts with South Korea, coordinating measures at rearming and training troops, and rendering financial and other aid to the Seoul regime to beef up the latter's military potential. With this aim in view a Japanese-South Korean "inter-parliamentary council on ensuring security" was set up in April 1979. It includes MPs from both sides. A regular exchange of visits between the military leaders of Tokyo and Seoul and permanent contacts between the Japanese National Defence Agency and the Military Department of South Korea have become a usual routine. While restoring the traditional ambitions of Japanese militarism, high-ranking officials in Tokyo begin claiming with mounting frequency that the security of South Korea is inseparable from Japan's own security. Under the influence of Washington, the long-standing friction between Tokyo and Seoul was somewhat reduced and the rapprochement between these two partners of US imperialism became a *fait accompli*.

In January 1983 it was reaffirmed by the first postwar official visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to South Korea, which was described by US press as a turning point in relations between Japan and its former colony. In the course of the visit, an agreement was signed on the granting to the Seoul regime of easy-term loans worth \$4 billion. A large part of this huge sum is assigned for financing military programmes of Washington's South Korean menials, and also for covering the expenses of maintaining the US troops in South Korea. Thus, Japan is increasingly being drawn into US military preparations in the Korean Peninsula, including overt joining of hands with the Seoul military dictatorship.

¹⁴ See *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1983.

US aggressive policy is fraught with the turning of the Korean Peninsula into a hotbed of permanent explosive confrontation.

TAIWAN—A GUN POINTED AT THE HEART OF CHINA

For more than thirty years now Washington has been stubbornly seeking to tear Taiwan away from the People's Republic of China, which has sovereignty over that island. Subject to the political situation, the forms and motivation of the abovementioned policy change, but its essence remains intact: the USA opposes all-out reunification of Taiwan with the PRC, trying to keep the former a major springboard for the US military-political strategy in East Asia.¹⁵

In spite of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, the United States does not recognise the latter's sovereignty over Taiwan and continues to maintain full trade, economic and other ties with it (allegedly, on an unofficial basis). Moreover, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress early in 1979, the USA undertook to arm and safeguard Taiwan from a possible attack from China. President Reagan keeps assuring that, despite the protests lodged by the PRC, the United States would observe the Act and continue deliveries of armaments to Taiwan. Washington's recent reports that it was stepping up its arms supplies to Taiwan came as a challenge to Peking. In contravention of the Chinese-US Agreement of August 17, 1982 on the gradual limitation by the United States of its arms deliveries to Taiwan, the Reagan administration plans to make deliveries worth \$1,580 million in fiscal years 1983 and 1984. This exceeds considerably the amount of deliveries in the preceding years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the USA (in 1979 the cost of deliveries amounted to \$598 million, and this figure, in conformity with the agreement between the two sides, was regarded as a point of departure).¹⁶

The advocates of Taiwan's final wresting away from the PRC predominate in US Congress. They state overtly that "a stable and prosperous Taiwan is important to stability in East Asia and to the national interests of the United States".¹⁷

In relying on US support, Taipei rejects any proposals for negotiating with Peking on peaceful reunification and consolidates Taiwan's positions as a state separated from and hostile to the PRC. Taiwan remains a gun pointed at the heart of China. US imperialism continues to use the Taiwan regime to bring pressure to bear on China and other countries. Potentially, Taiwan is a component of a Far Eastern NATO, formed by Washington. The edge of that future bloc is spearheaded against all socialist countries and national liberation movements in Asia. Let us note in passing that Taipei together with Seoul began advocating the setting up of such a bloc back in 1970.¹⁸

Following in the wake of US policy, the Taiwan regime has been purposefully building up its armaments. It has a well-trained army totalling nearly 500,000 officers and men equipped with modern weapon-

¹⁵ See also V. N. Baryshnikov, "American Policy of Arming Taiwan", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1983, No. 2, pp. 51-60.

¹⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, March 26, 1983.

¹⁷ *A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations*, United States Senate, Washington, 1980, p. 16.

¹⁸ See D. T. Kapustin, *Taiwan and South Korea in Chinese-US Relations. (1969-1979)*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 47-49 (in Russian).

ry.¹⁹ In view of the fact that the population of the island is a bit more than 18 million, this means that Taiwan has been militarised to the utmost.

US troops have been withdrawn from the territory of the island but close military cooperation between the Pentagon and the Taiwan regime continues. The waters of the Taiwan Strait are still patrolled by warships of the US 7th Fleet, which are granted free access to the ports of the island and which have bases there. Regular supply of Taiwan with armaments and military hardware on special easy terms is a major direction in the military cooperation between the USA and Taiwan. In the summer of 1978, during Chinese-US negotiations for "normalising" bilateral relations, Washington put an embargo on the deliveries of certain types of weaponry to Taiwan, but lifted it several months later. In 1982-1983 Taiwan obtained from the USA new large batches of combat aircraft, as well as different types of military hardware and spare parts. It is indicative that the latest official statement about such deliveries was made by the State Department several days after George Shultz, US Secretary of State, completed his visit to Peking.

THE FAR EASTERN TRIP OF REAGAN'S EMISSARY

US Secretary of State George Shultz's East Asian tour in late January and early February of 1983, which consisted of visits to Japan, the PRC and South Korea, was a milestone on the road toward escalating US aggressive activities in East Asia. The US Secretary of State concentrated his attention on these three countries for various reasons. The aim of his visit to Peking, coming at a time when US-Chinese relations were at a low point, was to alleviate the contradictions between the two countries and galvanise the process of rapprochement. As for Japan and South Korea, George Shultz was interested in them with the view of expanding military and political cooperation with Tokyo and Seoul and drawing them deeper into US military preparations in East Asia.

According to Japanese sources, the talks in Tokyo dealt with an entire range of problems concerning the deployment of US nuclear medium-range missiles, including cruise missiles, with which, in compliance with Reagan's decision, the ships of the US 7th Fleet are being equipped. Simultaneously measures for rearming Japan were agreed upon.²⁰ In a conversation with K. Tanikawa, Chief of the National Defence Agency, Shultz expressed US interest in an early implementation of the designs to expand and consolidate the "self-defence force", in 1983-1987. In calling on Tokyo to speed up the militarisation of the country, Reagan's emissary unequivocally expressed discontent with the Japanese government's plans to increase military allocations in the current year by only 6.5 per cent.²¹

The Japanese press noted that the content of the talks on a number of issues were kept secret. In this connection the desire displayed by Shultz to prepare conditions for setting up a triple alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul gave rise to sharp apprehensions in the Japanese public quarters. *Asahi* wrote that the Japanese leaders, for the time being, are unwilling to establish overt military contacts with the South

¹⁹ See R. G. Simonyan, *Military Blocs of Imperialism*, Moscow, 1976, p. 165 (in Russian).

²⁰ See *Mainichi*, Jan. 31, 1983.

²¹ See *Ibidem*.

Korean regime, inasmuch as they must, in one way or another, heed the demands voiced by broad masses in Japan that the peaceful policy spelt out in the Constitution be pursued.²² It is not simple either to ignore sentiments in the neighbouring countries, for which, according to the Tokyo-based *Yomiuri*, "Nakasone's hawkish foreign policy is undesirable".²³ According to the Japanese press, however, Washington's pressures are mounting, and the Japanese government is far from countering them.

Apparently, not without a hint from Washington, Nakasone and his colleagues in the talks with Shultz exhibited enhanced interest in the negotiations on reduction of strategic arms in Europe. Since the negative stand of the US at the negotiations triggered massive denunciation, including in Western Europe, where Vice-President Bush was at the moment touring US allies in a bid to secure their support for Reagan's "zero option", Washington was intensely interested in Tokyo expressing its solidarity with the USA. The Japanese leaders expressed their "concern" that a successful consummation of the negotiations in Europe may allegedly result in the Soviet missiles being lifted to the Far East to be used against Japan and China. In playing up this theory, the head of the Japanese government vigorously supported the "zero option", whose aim, as is widely known, consists in thwarting negotiations in Geneva to ensure the stationing of new batches of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Washington noted, not without satisfaction, that the strong support by Japan of the "zero option" complicated the arms control negotiations.²⁴ Thus, the Japanese government played the unseemly role of opponent to the settling of vital international problem inasmuch as it is at loggerheads with Tokyo's pro-US policy of militarisation and greater tensions.

As was provided for by the scenario agreed upon with Tokyo, George Shultz reassured Japan that the USA would not yield in its position and conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on reduction of nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe to the detriment of the security interests of Japan and of other non-European countries.²⁵ Washington hoped that by painting Nakasone as Japan's defender from the "Soviet threat", it would be possible to strengthen the positions of that leader who has been invariably oriented toward close-knit military-political cooperation with Washington. Shultz's provocative and demagogic subterfuge was meant for the public of not only Japan, but also of China. The State Department chief meant to indicate that the USA and the PRC have parallel strategic interests, and that China's security depends on US "concern".

The conducting of the abovementioned military exercises of US and Seoul troops in South Korea was timed to coincide with Shultz's trip to that country. The Chinese press noted with indignation that "the USA not only refuses to withdraw its troops from South Korea, but also, under the pretext of conducting military exercises, is sending fresh troops, the navy and the air force there, as well as modern weapons".²⁶ The US Secretary of State decided to make use of the military exercises to fan animosity between the two sides in Korea and to whip up military psychosis. He made a special trip to the demilitarised zone and inspected US and South Korean military units spearheaded against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

²² See *Asahi*, Jan. 30, 1983.

²³ *Yomiuri*, Feb. 21, 1983.

²⁴ See *New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1983.

²⁵ See *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 2, 1983.

In conversations with his Seoul stooges Shultz reiterated Washington's decision to continue the US troops presence in South Korea. He stated Reagan's intention to increase deliveries of armaments and military hardware to the Seoul regime and also to help the latter in building an arms industry of its own. As a matter of fact, the US Secretary of State ignored completely the aspirations cherished by the Korean people as regards the creation of peaceful conditions in the country and the latter's unification along democratic lines.

In Peking, which George Shultz visited after his negotiations in Japan, the local press criticised the US desire to entrench itself in Korea. Criticism of the Reagan administration was even sharper in connection with its position vis-à-vis the Taiwan issue. Though Shultz went out of his way to avoid that issue, it was brought up at the negotiations at the insistence of the Chinese side which voiced claims that the USA, according to the statement of the Chinese leaders, "is pursuing a policy of discrimination and restrictions in the economic, trade, cultural, and technical exchanges with China".²⁷ The PRC leaders concentrated attention on the problem of reducing China's huge trade deficit with the USA, which in 1982 reached \$628 million, and which during the past decade topped \$10 billion. In this connection, the Chinese side insisted on a maximum expansion of purchases of Chinese commodities by the United States, primarily of textiles, whose access to the American market had been sharply restricted.

Shultz bent every effort to replace a concrete examination of the Chinese claims by a discourse on the need for cooperation between the USA and the PRC on the basis of "parallel interests", juggling the concoctions about the "Soviet threat". He reassured the Chinese leaders that the US desired to develop "special ties" with China.

The US Secretary of State, in fact, ignored the legitimate demands of the Chinese side. It was pointed out in US political circles that at the negotiations he actually reaffirmed the "two Chinas" stand taken by the US administration. Making no secret that such a stand is chiefly predetermined by the US military and strategic interests in the Far East, influential US periodicals asserted that Shultz "acted wisely and did not succumb to the Chinese demands as regards Taiwan". For example, the *Wall Street Journal* expressed the opinion prevailing in the ruling quarters by writing that Taiwan is a reliable ally occupying strategically important positions near the sea routes leading to South Korea and Japan. It is better to have twenty million Taiwanese birds in the hand, the journal added, than a billion of mainland Chinese in the bush.²⁸ George Shultz's Far Eastern trip demonstrated anew that the Reagan administration is following a dangerous line of confrontation in the international arena, which stems from imperial ambitions and the unbridled desire to change the present alignment of forces in the world in favour of the USA.

* * *

The aggressive policy of the US is doomed, inasmuch as it is hostile to the vital interests of the peoples and is opposed by the socialist and other peaceloving states. Broad public and political quarters in East Asia and other world regions clearly see the danger in Washington's attempts to extend its control to their countries, disrupt stable relations between

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 7, 1983.

²⁸ See *Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 10, 1983.

them and whip up confrontation. This is a direct threat to the cause of peace and security. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries counter this policy with constructive initiatives which, if implemented, would improve the political climate in the region and strengthen peaceful conditions of life for the peoples.

The proposal to elaborate and apply confidence-building measures in the Far East and hold negotiations on limiting military activities in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress, meet with support in countries of the region. The topical and realistic proposals of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea on the turning of Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability and on normalising relations with ASEAN countries are permeated with the desire of goodneighbourly relations and friendship among nations. The Mongolian People's Republic came out with an initiative to conclude a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force, and this is of particular importance, given the instability in the region.

The United States openly ignores the goodwill of the socialist states and continues to whip up tensions which are fraught with fresh crisis situations in East Asia.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DISTORTION MIRROR OF JAPANESE SOVIETOLOGY

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[Article by K. Ye. Cherevko, candidate of philological sciences]

The studies by Japanese bourgeois scholars of different aspects of Soviet foreign policy are subordinated to the needs of the Japanese ruling class. The information about the Soviet Union has been conceptually reshaped in the spirit of the bourgeois world outlook and prepared for use in the ideological struggle. These studies are part and parcel of the structure of bourgeois ideology with the objective of refuting the concepts of scientific communism.¹

For a long time Japan's ruling quarters pursued an openly hostile policy vis-à-vis the USSR, and had no interest in putting out unbiased books. Sovietologist studies appeared somewhat later there than in the other leading capitalist countries. It was only in the latter half of the 1950s that Japanese bourgeoisie, having bolstered its economic position, mounted an ideological offensive against democracy and socialism, and three research organisations were set up: the Centre of Slavonic Studies at the Department of Law, Hokkaido University; the Japanese Society of International Politics; and the Society for Studying Russian History. Thus, the foundations of Japanese bourgeois Sovietology were laid down. The work of these organisations was subsidised by the Rockefeller Foundation and Japan's state budget, which testifies to their ideological objectives and the character of research conducted by scholars of liberal-objectivist and right-wing trend. This enabled Japanese Sovietologists to undertake, since the 1960s, the "fundamental" studies in which the problems of Soviet foreign policy, above all in relation to Japan, loomed large.

Studying different trends of Soviet foreign policy, Japanese Sovietologists concentrate on the problems, which, they believe, give them a chance to discredit major foreign policy principles of the USSR as a socialist state. They spare no effort to find "contradictions" in the history of Soviet foreign policy, primarily between the principle of peaceful coexistence and that of proletarian internationalism. Falsifying Soviet policy as regards Nazi Germany on the eve of the Second World War, they, like Sovietologists of other countries, brand it as "Machiavellianism of a new type" and find its continuation in the policy pursued by the Soviet Union with respect to the East European countries at the final stage of the Second World War and after its completion. Examining general principles of Soviet foreign policy, whose main content, they believe, consists in

¹ See Y. I. Igritsky, "Bourgeois Sovietology in the Contemporary Battle of Ideas", *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History), 1979, No. 11, p. 72.

"exporting" world socialist revolution to other countries, Japanese Sovietologists are seeking to prove that, after the Second World War, the Soviet Union is imposing these ideas on the developing countries because the "free world" succeeded in eradicating the revolutionary situation in Western Europe. Japanese Sovietologists are extolling the policies of Western countries, notably the USA, which are allegedly "successfully opposing" Soviet "expansionism", the USSR's military buildup in Eastern Europe, in the Far East and in the World Ocean, as well as USSR's support to the national liberation movements which they slanderously brand as "support to international terrorism".

The quest of "differences" and "contradictions" between the USSR and other socialist countries with the purpose of proving the allegedly selfish and hegemonistic character of Soviet foreign policy vis-à-vis those countries, primarily East European states, is important in Japanese Sovietology. The nationalistic provisions of "Eurocommunism" are also examined from the viewpoint of the struggle against the alleged theory of "Soviet hegemonism". Japanese Sovietologists bend every effort to distort the policy of the Soviet Union with respect to Japan, in particular Soviet-Japanese economic relations, putting to the fore territorial settlement between the two countries after the Second World War.

Scholars of conservative and bourgeois-liberal trends traditionally dominate in the studies of Soviet foreign policy because, from the very outset, these trends in Sovietology were closely connected with the interests of the Japanese ruling circles.

To get a better understanding of the conditions in which Japanese Sovietology studies Soviet foreign policy, let us analyse in brief this discipline in general and its organisational structure in particular.

Japanese scholars usually connect the beginning of studying the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe in Japan after the Second World War with the establishment of the Centre of Slavonic Studies which was set up on June 24, 1953 at the Department of Law of Hokkaido University. Originally it had five sections: history, philology, politics, economics, and international relations; in 1964 the section of law was added to them. Twice a year the Centre holds meetings of researchers who discuss budget, personnel and other practical problems, and also convene scientific conferences.

Since the mid-1950s, the Centre of Slavonic Studies dealt with "advanced training" of Sovietologists.² The number of full-time associates, of part-timers working in other divisions of Hokkaido University, and those contributing to the elaboration of certain projects, reached a total of 798 in 1977.³ The library of the Centre of Slavonic Studies has about 20,000 books and periodicals, the greater part of which was purchased with funds donated by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Since 1957 the Centre of Slavonic Studies has put out *Surabu kenkyu* Yearbook, and since 1970—bulletins which in recent years have begun to attract the attention of not only Japanese, but also of foreign specialists.

Researchers of the Centre deliver public lectures on foreign policy and history. Their political backgrounds are different but, as a rule, tendentious evaluation of the developments they deal with prevail. The topics of the lectures regularly included questions relating to Soviet domestic

² P. Berton, P. Langer, R. Swearingen, *Japanese Training and Research in the Russian Field*, Los Angeles, 1956, pp. 101-102.

³ See *List of Scholars Studying the USSR and Eastern Europe*, Sapporo, 1977 (in Japanese).

policy and economy, interpreted in the spirit of the Sovietologist concepts.

In summing up the results of the twenty-year work of the Centre of Slavonic Studies in 1975, Ts. Togawa, a leading researcher, insisted on an increase of government allocations, and in subsequent years they were increased considerably. In April 1978 this research centre at Hokkaido University was converted into an all-Japan Centre of Slavonic Studies.

The Soviet Union is also being studied in the sector of socialist studies at the Institute of Social Research at Tokyo University. Departments of Russian philology have been set up at Waseda University in Tokyo and Hokkaido University in Sapporo. Since 1965 lectures on sociology and culture of the USSR and East European countries have been delivered at the Art Section of the Pedagogical Department of Tokyo University. Here, linguistic research is also carried out, as well as seminars on history, politics, economics and the current situation in the countries of the region. Moreover, special course of lectures on politics, economics, and literature of the USSR, including the prerevolutionary period, are delivered at Chuo University in Tokyo and in Kobe University.

Soviet economy is thoroughly studied in Tokyo Universities of Hitotsubashi, Keio, Meiji, Senshu, Kokugakuin, in Kyoto Universities of Ritsumeikan and Kansai, in Osaka Municipal University, in Universities of Aoyama, Tohoku, and others.

At Hitotsubashi and Ritsumeikan Universities the proponents of the Marxist methodology take the lead, and the tone is set by progressive scholars, whereas in other higher educational institutions, beginning with the aristocratic University of Keio, representatives of bourgeois science dominate.

Much attention is also given to the studying of the history of the USSR in the Universities of Hitotsubashi, Waseda, Tenri, Meiji, Ibaraki, Zyochi, Kanazawa, Kyusyu, and in the Tokyo Teacher Training Institute. The proponents of bourgeois methodology prevail among the scholars dealing with the history of the USSR. They study a wide range of questions, from the formation of Slav tribes to the postwar history of the USSR, including the problems of Soviet foreign policy at the present stage, especially in relation to Japan and China.

The number of specialists on the Soviet Union in governmental and non-governmental agencies is growing steadily. Among them are lecturers of universities and higher educational establishments, as well as of research centres, including the Japanese Institute of International Problems, the Institute of Economics and Politics of Asia, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Research Bureau of the Cabinet of Ministers, and the State Parliamentary Library.

Specialised public organisations, such as Society on Studying the USSR and East European Countries, which is engaged in preparing, among other things, for international congresses of Slavists in collaboration with the International Committee for Studying the USSR and Countries of Eastern Europe, Society for Studying Russian History, Japanese Society of Russian Philology, and Society for Studying Socialist Economy, also deal with studying the USSR. Non-specialised organisations in Japan are also active in this field. Among them are the Japanese Association of Political Sciences, which is a member of the International Political Science Association at UNESCO, Japanese Society of International Politics, Japanese Institute of International Problems, and Europe-Asia Society, linked with the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and some others. Though Japan is behind the USA, the FRG and France in the number of

Sovietology centres and in the scope of research, Japanese Sovietology plays an essential role as the Asian wing of imperialism's ideological front in the struggle against communist ideology.

The fast growth in the number of Sovietology studies in Japan is due to the aggravation of the ideological struggle as a result of the change in the alignment of forces in the international scene in favour of real socialism and the national liberation movement. As a result, Japanese Sovietology has become even more conservative, and it resorts to an increasing degree to direct falsification of Soviet policy. The articles by bourgeois authors are used more actively in governmental publications, thus attesting to a further fusion of Sovietology and bourgeois propaganda.

JAPANESE SOVIETOLOGISTS' FALSIFICATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By and large, Japanese Sovietologists study Soviet foreign policy from the same angle as their counterparts in the USA and Western Europe. They contend slanderously that this policy is based on forcible "export of revolution". Japanese Sovietologists, specialists in international affairs, are going out of their way to substantiate the thesis that the concept of peaceful coexistence runs counter to Soviet foreign policy and is of a pragmatic character, being nothing but a tactical means in the ambitions of "Soviet communism". Due to their class narrowmindedness and preset social aims, they are unable to conceive the dialectical character of the foreign policy born by the Great October Socialist Revolution. Japanese Sovietologists distort the character of the confrontation between the two socio-economic systems in the international arena and assert that Soviet foreign policy pursues the aim of preparing for forcible victory and a military conflict, considering such important forms of class struggle as economic and ideological to be of secondary importance.

Japanese Sovietologists present non-peaceful means of struggle for establishing a new social system in the Leninist theory of socialist revolution as the main feature of Soviet foreign policy, thereby laying bare the tendentious trend of their theoretical research which is in conformity with the policy-making provisions of the ruling Liberal Democratic party of Japan.

For example, Masao Onoe, a prominent bourgeois Japanese Sovietologist, claims that Soviet foreign policy is marked by internal dualism, i. e., that the principles of peaceful coexistence are irreconcilable with its chief aim—the victory of the world communist revolution.

Japanese Sovietologists subject to particularly fierce attacks the definition of peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle. In a book slanderously titled *Global Strategy of Soviet Imperialism*, Osamu Miyoshi, Director of the Centre of Studying Japan's Security, writes that the policy of detente should be based on "mutual restraint" which he interprets as the Soviet Union's refusal to support the national liberation struggle of the peoples fighting for their independence from imperialist powers.⁴

In a bid to find a contradiction in Soviet foreign policy between the principles of peaceful coexistence and the support to national liberation movements, Professor M. Sase of the Academy of Defence of Japan main-

⁴ See O. Miyoshi, *Global Strategy of Soviet Imperialism*, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 20-21 (in Japanese); M. Sase, *International Relations in 1980. Sixth Japan-USSR Conference*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 9.

tains that the USSR's assistance to the democratic forces in Angola, Ethiopia, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Afghanistan is unlawful. He condemns the support given by Vietnam to the socialist government in Kampuchea, branding it as interference in the internal affairs of other countries.⁵

M. Sase glosses over in silence the fact that, from the viewpoint of international law, Soviet assistance to the cause of safeguarding revolutionary gains in those countries is a natural response to the unlawful attempts to export counterrevolution to the abovementioned countries. That is why, to accuse the Soviet Union of "exporting revolution" to the countries of the "Gray Zone", as some Japanese Sovietologists, following in the footsteps of their US colleagues in anti-Sovietism,⁶ contemptuously call those countries, is to be at loggerheads with common sense.

Speaking of the "indivisibility" of detente, its "global" character, ideologists of imperialism are seeking to interpret this complex socio-political concept mainly in a geographical sense. They try to prove that it has allegedly temporary, transitional character and has no long-term prospects due to the differences in the interpretation of detente. According to M. Sase, the signs that detente "finds itself in a deadlock" due to the abovementioned reason, could be found back in May 1978 when at a NATO countries conference a decision was adopted to increase their military budgets annually by 3 per cent under the pretext that the USSR was continuing to upgrade its medium-range nuclear weapons. The Japanese Professor, however, failed to mention that these measures taken by the Soviet side were nothing but a forced response to the stationing of US forward-based missiles in Western Europe.

Unlike such Sovietologists, the progressive scholars regard the vigorous Soviet policy of ensuring security and taking measures towards preventing a possible imperialist aggression as a result of the fact that Russia, throughout its entire history, was frequently attacked by other states.⁷ These scholars come to understand to an ever greater extent that in its internationalist foreign policy the Soviet Union has been consistently upholding the principles of peaceful coexistence and has been giving support to the liberation movements in a way conforming to present-day international law.

In recent years the policies of the Soviet Union and other countries of real socialism with respect to the developing states and the national liberation movement became an object of specially frenzied attacks by Japanese Sovietologists.

Making use of the negative stereotype of the USSR as a state placing chief emphasis on the use of force, a stereotype invented by bourgeois propaganda, Japanese Sovietologists are trying to describe the policy of imperialist states as humane and peace-loving, and the course of the Soviet Union as selfish and aggressive.⁸ Turning a blind eye to the repeated proposals of Soviet representatives on the reduction of arms, these bourgeois Sovietologists ignore the fact that, while rendering assistance and support to national liberation movement and the developing states, the USSR is guided not by voluntaristic intentions to "speed up" revolutions in the "Third World", which are alien to Marxism-Leninism, but by its duty stemming from the principle of proletarian internationalism to

⁵ M. Sase, *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10, 13-15.

⁷ See, for example, T. Takazawa, *Non-Armed Neutrality Now*, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 207-208 (in Japanese).

⁸ See, for example, *Usio*, 1980, No. 4, p. 118 et al.

promote the objective process of emancipation of peoples from capitalist oppression, and to repulse, in alliance with their democratic vanguard, the "export" of counterrevolution by external reactionaries.

After a limited contingent of Soviet troops was sent to Afghanistan in December 1979, in accordance with the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978 and in compliance with the request of the Afghan government, to rebuff outside interference, and especially after the developments in Poland in 1980-1981, the distortion of the aims and principles of Soviet policy has assumed an especially large scope in Japan.

To influence the Japanese man-in-the-street more efficiently, a myth was coined that the sending of Soviet troops into Afghanistan allegedly marked a new type of "hegemonistic strategy" of the Soviet Union, which is confirmed, in particular, by the "continuing occupation of the northern territories of Japan",⁹ meaning the restoration of Soviet sovereignty over the Kurile Islands after the Second World War. Japanese Sovietologists are trying to link the imperialist ideologists' campaign against the aid given by Soviet troops to the government of Afghanistan, with the anti-Soviet campaign "for the return of the northern territories".

Even some liberal Japanese experts in international relations, who are not inclined to such falsification of Soviet policy, point out that the sending of Soviet troops to Afghanistan was a natural response to the attempts by the USA and NATO countries to encircle the USSR by blocs hostile to it. It is also indicative that the abortive policy of so-called sanctions against the USSR taken by reactionary quarters of some imperialist powers was denounced even by some Japanese bourgeois Sovietologists. For example, Professor Kiichi Mochizuki of the Centre of Slavonic Studies writes that the policy of sanctions against the USSR lacks logic, that it is meaningless and dangerous to the US allies. Although the United States has been whipping up a notorious campaign of "Soviet military threat", the Japanese scholar notes that of all developed countries only the USSR is capable of providing itself completely with its own energy and raw material resources, and it has no reasons for infiltrating other countries in quest of natural resources.

In recent years Japanese Sovietologists and the mass media are going out of their way to place responsibility on the USSR for the fact that it is allegedly trying to limit the relaxation of international tension only to the field of bilateral relations, leaving its hands free in its policy towards the developing countries where the West has "vital interests". Due to their class narrowmindedness, Japanese bourgeois Sovietologists are unable to admit the objective character of the development of the struggle against imperialism in Asian, African and Latin American countries. They accuse the Soviet Union of the growing tension in relations between the abovementioned countries and the leading capitalist states. They declare that the USSR should abandon its support of the countries fighting for their national emancipation, which would allegedly enable the USA to preserve its positions in those countries, thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension. The April 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan, the June 1978 "coup d'état" in South Yemen, the victory of the democratic forces in Angola and Ethiopia, the collapse of the bloody Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea and even the Islamic revolution of February 1979 in Iran are ascribed to Moscow's "intrigues" and its urge to undermine the positions of Western countries in the "Third World".

⁹ *Hokkaido shimbun*, Oct. 4, 1982.

Neglecting the repeated statements by Western, including American, specialists about approximate military parity between NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty states, Japanese Sovietologists are trying to justify the decision of West European countries to station new US medium-range missiles in addition to the American forward-based systems claiming that the implementation of the SALT-2 Treaty would increase the share of Soviet conventional arms, in which it allegedly has superiority, and this would demand additional "defensive" measures.

Intimidating taxpayers to make easier the approval of new colossal expenditures for military purposes, Japanese Sovietologists and experts in international affairs depict Soviet defensive measures, taken in response to the arms race imposed by the US military-industrial complex, as the "primordial" striving of the USSR towards establishing, by force, a "World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" and call on the USA to give a more resolute rebuff to that policy which they brand as "one step back and two steps forward". In their opinion, the USSR makes a "step back" when the United States opposes vigorously the line aimed at "driving" it back out of Western Europe, Asia and Africa and keeping it isolated in the American continent, and "two steps forward" when the USA slackens this line, as was the case during detente.¹⁰

Distorting the essence of Soviet foreign policy, Japanese bourgeois ideologists contend that the USSR has been allegedly guided only by one pragmatic principle, that of "stick and carrot", which it uses to frustrate the ties between different countries and the USA. By the "stick" they mean the invented threat of use of force, while the "carrot" signifies the "propaganda" of the progressive and peaceloving character of socialism and of the struggle for national emancipation. These two primitively constructed varieties of the Soviet foreign policy evaluation are presented as different forms of attempts to secure military superiority over the USA, whereas American expansionist foreign policy is portrayed as purely defensive.

Japanese Sovietologists approve the US propaganda of the Western way of life through radio broadcasts aimed at Soviet Union, which call on Soviet citizens to struggle "against the existing social system", although such activities are a direct unlawful interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Japanese bourgeois scholars lament that in recent years the prestige of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union which has been giving disinterested assistance and support to the peoples fighting for national liberation and against US neocolonialism has grown immeasurably, whereas the prestige of the USA which is seeking to preserve its influence in the developing countries by supporting, among other things, shaky reactionary puppet regimes is constantly falling, despite the unprecedented swelling of the US military budget. Though bourgeois Sovietologists are trying to justify this zigzag in US policy, including economic sanctions against the USSR that were a fiasco by the intention of the US Administration to give a resolute rebuff to the "Soviet threat", they acknowledge willy-nilly that the zigzag was brought about by a desperate attempt by US "hawks" to change in their favour the existing approximate parity of the military potential of the USA and the USSR, and block the movement of the developing countries towards national independence and socialist orientation.¹¹

¹⁰ See Akira Sono, "World Strategy of the USA and the USSR and Japanese Diplomacy", *Jiu minsu*, No. 1, p. 63.

¹¹ See *Bungei shunju*, 1980, No. 3, pp. 320-323.

Ever greater attention has been given in recent years in Japan to the USSR's relations with other socialist countries, and this is seen, in particular, in the broader use of the sources printed in the languages of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The growth in the number of scholars specialising in that field resulted in the establishment in the late 1970s of the Japanese Society of Slavonic Studies and Research of Eastern Europe. As for the foreign policies of socialist countries in that region, the members of the aforementioned society, instead of analysing the new type of international relations based on fraternal cooperation, are trying to "prove" that the policy of the USSR runs counter to their national interests. They seek to use the distorted interpretation of that policy in the ideological indoctrination of the population, thus creating favourable conditions for pursuing a reactionary policy by Japan's ruling circles.

Japanese Sovietologists specialising in international affairs use most widespread means of the world, primarily American, Sovietology, accusing the USSR of "hegemonism" and "interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries", exaggerating nationalistic and anti-socialist sentiments in those countries, and interpreting them in the spirit of "polycentrism". Japanese bourgeois scholars spare no effort to interpret some provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in June 1975 as legalisation of the "export" of bourgeois views under the guise of cultural contacts and free exchange of information with the purpose of achieving ideological erosion of "Soviet-type" communism and its degeneration in the spirit of pluralistic concepts.

However, unlike US Sovietology with its immense and ramified propaganda network, Japanese Sovietology has been mainly discharging an internal political function, i. e., keeping the Japanese people within the orbit of bourgeois ideology. Today Japanese Sovietology is characterised not by the wholesale disparagement of all aspects of the Soviet Union's relations with socialist community countries, but by their more "objective" evaluation on the basis of statistics, and acknowledgement of some of the positive results of economic development of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, in particular, due to the economic integration of CMEA members. On the whole, Japanese Sovietologists continue to do all they can to create a distorted notion about these relations, by taking separate problems from the socio-economic context, exaggerating difficulties and drawbacks, absolutising them and by trying to bring Japanese readers to the conclusion that socialist international political and economic relations are "untenable".

For example, M. Onoe describes fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe as the "exploitation" of the latter by the Soviet Union, asserting that after the Second World War the USSR was allegedly trying to use the economic potential of those countries for restoring its "state might".¹²

Unlike this anti-Soviet interpretation of relations between the USSR and other socialist countries, progressive Japanese historians proceed from the fundamental provision that, as a result of Eastern Europe's liberation from nazism by Soviet armed forces during the Second World War, those countries, with active support from the Soviet Union, put an end to their

¹² See M. Onoe, *Notes on the History of Modern Soviet Diplomacy*, Tokyo, 1976, pp. 205, 216 (in Japanese).

dependence on the imperialist states, embarked on the socialist development, and became an "important component of world history".¹³

Sovietologists devote a great deal of attention to the 1951-1953 military conflict in the Korean Peninsula. For example, proceeding from an erroneous interpretation of the "theory of wars of national liberation", Harutaka Sasaki¹⁴ and Masao Okonogi¹⁵ ascribe aggressive intentions to the Soviet Union and to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Progressive Japanese scholars refute this version and lay bare the unseemly role played by the USA and the South Korean regime.¹⁶ Hiroshi Fujimoto and Kazuo Simmura¹⁷ made an attempt to distort Soviet policy as regards Vietnam, proceeding from the documents of the American and the South Vietnamese sides. Their attempts were countered by the works of Minami Yosizawa¹⁸ and Takaji Sasaki.¹⁹

Thus, the description by Japanese bourgeois Sovietology of the relations between the USSR and other socialist countries, though some positive factors in the development of those relations have been admitted, is reduced to attempts to create among the public a negative stereotype of Soviet policy as regards both developing and socialist countries. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is counterposed to the foreign policies of capitalist countries which are allegedly based on "democratic principles".

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN

The history and the current state of Soviet-Japanese relations are a sphere where the nationalistic trends and the political bias, typical of Japanese Sovietology, make themselves felt most acutely.

Japanese Sovietologists specialising in international affairs concentrate on political, military and economic issues and also (to a lesser extent) on the problems of cultural exchange and tourism. Examining Soviet policy vis-à-vis Japan, they are striving to describe it disadvantageously. Justifying Japan's aggressive policy in relation to the USSR during the Second World War, Japanese Sovietologists are seeking to accuse the Soviet Union of violating the Neutrality Pact of 1941 and to depict the 1945 Crimea (Yalta) Agreement of the Heads of Government of the ant-fascist coalition on the Far Eastern matters as a "secret conspiracy" against Japan. They criticise Soviet postwar policy, charging the USSR with toughness" and "opposition" to Japan's repeated proposals to conclude a peace treaty, provided the claims of its ruling circles on the southern part of the Kuril Islands are satisfied. They depict the Soviet draft agreement with Japan on goodneighbourly relations and cooperation as a "subterfuge" directed at "disrupting" the Japanese-US "security treaty" of 1960 and neutralising that country. Japanese Sovietologists, for example, H. Kimura, are even trying to bring pressure to bear

¹³ *Development and Present-Day State of Historical Science in Japan*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 472 (in Japanese).

¹⁴ Harutaka Sasaki, *War in Korea*, Tokyo, 1976-1977 (in Japanese).

¹⁵ Masao Okonogi, "War in Korea as a National Liberation Movement", *Hogaku kenkyu*, 1975, No. 3, pp. 19-44.

¹⁶ See T. Hora, *War in Korea*, Tokyo, 1973 (in Japanese).

¹⁷ H. Fujimoto, K. Simmura, "The Paris Accords and April 30, 1975", *Rekishigaku kenkyu*, 1976, No. 432, pp. 15-21.

¹⁸ M. Yosizawa, *The Formation of the Subject of Struggle for National Emancipation in Indochina and National Solidarity*, *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-29.

¹⁹ T. Sasaki, "Postwar Shifts in the World System of Imperialism and the War in Indochina", *A New Turn in the World History and a Revision of the Concepts of History*, Tokyo, 1976, pp. 2-14 (in Japanese).

on the Japanese government impelling it to take more "effective actions" against the USSR concerning the "northern territories" issue.

Giving a distorted interpretation of the Soviet foreign economic policy, Japanese Sovietologists support Japan's official line of refusing to conclude an agreement on the principles of economic cooperation and on holding regular meetings between the two countries' ministers, who are in charge of economic matters. They contend that such agreement would allegedly be used by the Soviet side to weaken in Japan the campaign for the "return of the northern territories". Ignoring the overall changes of conditions in the world fishing industry, Japanese Sovietologists are striving to use the establishment of new rules regulating fishing within the 200-mile coastal zone to whip up anti-Soviet sentiments and to artificially link the question of the borderline between economic zones of the USSR and Japan with the "territorial issue".

The problem of the so-called "Soviet military threat" looms large in Japanese scholarly writings. This question is used actively for fanning anti-Sovietism and revanchism in Japan, especially after the Reagan Administration took over and steered its policy towards consolidating the Japanese-US "security treaty" spearheaded against the USSR.

Analysing Soviet policy as regards Japan after the Second World War, Japanese Sovietologists claim that after Japan's surrender the USSR tried vainly, through the Allied Council on Japan, to seize leading positions in governing the country. However, not a single word is said about the consistent struggle by the Soviet representative in that Council and in the Far Eastern Commission for democratisation of Japan.

The normalisation of Soviet-Japanese relations in 1956 is portrayed only as a result of the Soviet government advancing a "peaceful coexistence diplomacy" in the mid-1950s, without mentioning that after the discontinuation of US occupation, most far-sighted Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Hatoyama, realised the need for restoring relations with the USSR proceeding from the task of strengthening Japan's political independence.

Japanese Sovietologists are making futile attempts at creating the impression that successes in the development of the Soviet-Japanese relations are mainly due to the Japanese side, while their slower development is explained by Soviet intransigence. The Sovietologists explain the negative attitude of the Japanese government towards the Soviet draft treaty with Japan on goodneighbourly relations and cooperation by the fact that this draft allegedly leaves the "territorial issue" unsolved. However, it is quite clear that this "issue" has been finally resolved by the war-time and postwar agreements signed long before the draft was tabled. Japanese Sovietologists also claim that Articles 3 and 12 of the draft treaty are directed against the Japanese-Chinese "treaty of peace and friendship", although Article 3 states that "the USSR and Japan pledge not to allow the use of their territories for actions which may cause damage to the security of the other side" and Article 12 stresses that "the USSR and Japan have no claims and do not recognise anybody's claims to any special rights or privileges in world affairs, including claims to domination in Asia and in the Far East".

Sovietologists also interpret arbitrarily Articles 3 and 4 of the draft treaty which state that the "high contracting parties undertake to refrain from any actions encouraging a third party to take aggressive actions against any of them". Japanese Sovietologists assert that, on the basis of these provisions, the USSR may bring up the issue of the existence of US military bases in Japan, thus seeking to "drive a wedge" in the

Japanese-US relations. The argument does not hold water, inasmuch as these articles deal with the generally recognised standards of international law embodied in the UN Charter, and they in no way are aimed at undermining Japanese-US relations.²⁰

In recent years the Japanese mass media and Sovietologists stepped up their ideological onslaught against the USSR. The myth about the "forcible export of revolution" and the "offensive peaceful coexistence" has discredited itself considerably, and the Japanese bourgeois propaganda moved to the forefront the myth about the "Soviet military threat", a patched up concept, elaborated and coined by US imperialist quarters.

This campaign assumed an even greater scope in early 1979 after the Japanese press carried reports under sensational titles about the increased strength of the Soviet navy in the Pacific, stressing, among other things, that in July 1980 the Soviet side included in it the anti-submarine cruiser *Minsk* and that *Backfire* bombers were stationed in the Soviet Far East. A special role in fanning this anti-Soviet campaign was played by the deliberately alarming reports by the Japanese official quarters, which contained inventions about the building of Soviet naval bases on the Kunashir and the Iturup Islands (southern part of the Big Kurils) and the Shikotan Island (the Small Kurils), and also the stationing of Soviet troops (up to one division) on other islands of the Small Kurils.

An important role in the anti-Soviet campaign is played by the studies devoted to military matters. The book *The Third World War. Occupation of Hokkaido* is a case in point. Its author is Major-General Masataka Iwano, former deputy commander-in-chief of the Japanese ground forces who underwent training in US naval and airforce academies. Such books are intended to prepare public opinion in Japan for a greater military buildup against the USSR and to justify the role of a nuclear hostage, a role assigned to Japan by its brass, in a war planned by the United States against the socialist countries, as a compensation for the "ensuring by the United States of Japanese security". The 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that of late negative factors in Japan's foreign policy, as well as playing into the hands of Washington's dangerous schemes and a trend towards militarisation are coming to the fore.²¹

The militaristic campaign is played out on two fronts—both in foreign and domestic policy. It is closely connected with the attempts, by means of attacks against the Soviet foreign policy, to discredit the ideals of socialism, of which the Soviet Union is the bearer, to secure a definite slide to the right of the political opposition parties, and to consolidate the positions of conservative forces by inculcating the "supraclass" and "national" approach to the problems of ensuring security.

Japan's progressive forces, including democratically-minded scholars and certain sober-minded Sovietologists, are trying to expose the true aims of the unbridled anti-Soviet propaganda campaign launched by the reactionary forces of the country. The opponents of the conservative regime come out for the development of friendly and goodneighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and for placing them on a solid contractual basis. Opponents of the militaristic campaign are well aware that this propaganda campaign presents an extremely grave danger to the cause of peace and security in Asia and goes against the interests of the Japanese people. A broad segment of the Japanese working people are sincerely

²⁰ See Satoshi Takayama, *History of the Japanese-Soviet Relations*, Tokyo, 1978, pp. 103-110 (in Japanese).

²¹ See *The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1981.

striving for an improvement in relations with the USSR, for the development of mutually beneficial economic cooperation and for the expansion of cultural and scientific contacts with the Soviet Union, rather than for the confrontation with the latter.

* * *

An analysis of the foreign policy concepts of Japanese Sovietology warrants the conclusion that, despite the existing differences between the studies of Soviet policy in prewar and postwar Japan, it has continuity based on anti-communism. This explains the predominance of conservative and liberal-objectivist scholars among experts on the Soviet Union in Japan, which carry out the identical function of protecting the bourgeois system, though in a different way. They are opposed by progressive scholars. Japanese Sovietology is closely connected with bourgeois Sovietology in Western countries, notably the USA. It has largely adopted the concepts of US Sovietology and obtains material and moral support from the latter. This is, among other things, a manifestation of the trend towards uniting national anti-Soviet fronts into a single global front of ideological struggle against the USSR as the leading country of the socialist community, a trend characteristic of the present-day epoch.

Sovietologists are trying to present the objective process of a transition from one socio-economic formation (capitalism) to the first stage of other formation, socialism, as a subjective attempts to impose this transition, as a result of the "Soviet military threat" and the use of force by socialist countries, and hope to diminish the class consciousness of the broad masses of Japanese working people and reduce their activity in the struggle for radical socio-economic transformations.

A critique of the foreign policy aspects by Japanese Sovietology makes it possible to demonstrate the false character of a postulate concerning the Soviet urge for world domination, which is allegedly based, on the one hand, on the doctrine of the "world socialist revolution", and, on the other, on the traditions of "Russian expansionism". The efforts of Japanese Sovietologists to find a "contradiction" between the principles of the proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence in Soviet foreign policy are also untenable.

Due to the class limitations of their ideological concepts, Japanese Sovietologists are unable to study objectively the true character of Soviet foreign policy based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. They are seeking to present fraternal solidarity and cooperation characterising the relations between the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community as advantageous for the USSR alone, inasmuch as it is allegedly guided by "selfish interests" in its policy.

Japanese Sovietologists keep falsifying the character of Soviet-Japanese political and economic relations. All aspects of Soviet policy as regards Japan are reduced to the artificial exaggeration of the "problem" concerning the allegedly unlawful possession by the Soviet Union of the southern part of the Kuril Islands, which has long been solved by wartime and postwar international agreements. A specific feature of Japanese Sovietology consists in the refusal to acknowledge the existing realities in the peaceful settlement between the USSR and Japan after the Second World War.

This meets an active counteraction of the Japanese progressive public favouring the development of goodneighbourly and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

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LI DA AND THE DISSEMINATION OF MARXIST IDEAS IN CHINA

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[Article by V. G. Burov, candidate of philosophical sciences]

In the early twentieth century the tasks of eliminating China's centuries-long economic, political, scientific and technological backwardness and of effecting the country's social regeneration evoked interest in West European and US theoretical concepts among the Chinese public, cultural figures and scientists. Quite a few of the publications discussed the applicability of these concepts to Chinese reality. Alongside bourgeois theories and concepts, Marxist ideas also penetrated into the country.

The dissemination of Marxist ideology in China was fairly complicated by nature. The peculiar socio-economic situation at the time, the difficult and controversial development of the revolutionary movement and of the Communist party,¹ naturally, could not but leave an imprint on the way theoretical problems were expounded by the first advocates of Marxism in China. Li Da (1889-1966), one of the founders of the communist movement, played an important role in propagandising and disseminating Marxist philosophy in his country. A participant in the First CPC Congress, he continued upholding the Marxist doctrine of society in his subsequent theoretical works, despite the temporal loss of contact with the party. His works, *Modern Sociology* (1926), *The Fundamentals of Sociology* (1937), etc., told the truth about the socialist ideals and criticised bourgeois sociological theories.²

Modern Sociology, written in the early period of the dissemination of scientific socialist ideas in China, when the CPC was only launching its activities, is, beyond doubt, of great interest in shedding the light on Li Da's evolution as a Marxist. It offers an insight into the creative quests of the young advocate of Marxism.

Li Da's aforementioned works show that he was well versed in the writings by the founders of Marxism. He expounded many ideas from fundamental Marxist writings, such as *The Holy Family*, *Dialectics of Nature*, *Capital*, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, and made numerous references to these books. He was also familiar with works by Soviet philosophers and with discussions held among Soviet sociologists in the late 1920s-the early 1930s.

¹ See *Modern History*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 58-61 (in Russian).

² After the victory of the people's revolution in 1949, Li Da was rector of Wuhan university and chairman of the All-China philosophical society. He died under tragic circumstances in 1966 during the "cultural revolution". See *Zhexue yanjiu*, 1978, No. 12, p. 12.

Aware of the complexity and controversy of contemporary ideological struggle, Li Da justly saw it as a manifestation of a conflict between two camps, two classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.³ According to him, bourgeois ideology rested on the concept of “liberalism”, which essentially boiled down to two principles: the private ownership of the means of production and free competition. He listed Malthus’ population theory and Social-Darwinism among the main bourgeois sociological theories, which rested on the principles of liberalism, and subjected the fundamental ideas of these theories to criticism. Their fallacy was confirmed by the fact that they were either refuted by life itself like, for example, the Malthus theory, or found inapplicable to society in general like Social-Darwinism.⁴ Li Da wrote that the bankruptcy of these theories made the exponents of bourgeois ideology look for new concepts, which resulted in the emergence of the so-called new liberalism concepts and the advocacy of the principle of the “absolute freedom of the individual” by bourgeois sociologists.⁵

The spreading of Marxist ideas in China was opposed not only by the bourgeoisie but also by many figures in the national liberation movement who were under the spell of social-reformism, anarcho-syndicalism and anarchism. It is apparently this circumstance that accounts for the fact that Li Da found it necessary to give in his works a detailed description of various socio-political and ideological trends in the West European workers’ movement. He paid much attention to criticising anarchist concepts and distinguished two streams of anarchism, which he called “utopian” and “scientific” anarchism respectively. The “utopian” anarchists, Li Da wrote, are guided by the abstract notions of happiness, duty, egotism and reason, whereas “scientific” anarchists substantiate their views by referring to the laws of social development. This classification is hardly tenable because both displayed a fundamentally similar approach to the state. It might be interesting to note that in 1921 Li Da used different concepts—“individualists” and “collectivists”—in characterising the different streams of anarchism.

The common fault of all anarchist theories, be they “utopian” (Li Da considered Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner and Tolstoi to be its representatives) or “scientific” (Bakunin and Kropotkin), consisted, in his mind, in their being severed from real social practice. He paid special attention to the intrinsic controversy in the ideas of Bakunin and Kropotkin. Rejecting the need for a state authority and preaching the principle of the absolute freedom of the individual, Bakunin proposed in his economic theory an idea of setting up an “association of producers”. However, Li Da wrote, as the means of production are owned by the association, it is impossible to manage them without some bodies of power. Consequently to put into effect the ideas of anarchism, it was necessary to reject the associated nature of property, otherwise, the very principle of anarchism should be cast away, Li Da remarked sarcastically.

According to him, Kropotkin’s model of a social system, which had an “association of producers’ communities” as its central element, and rejected the need for wages and money, was fallacious. Li Da wrote that the establishment of corresponding relations between production and consumption called for strict organisation, therefore the “free” activity of the economic units of society, defying any regulation, was practically impos-

³ See Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, Changsha, 1926, p. 210.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

sible and it was premature to abolish wages and money under socialism. The anarchists abstractly described the principles of future society as they saw them, without ever touching upon the ways of putting them into effect, and therefore their ideas were a utopia. "To put an end to capitalism and to build communism," Li Da wrote, "it is necessary, relying on the classes supporting the communists and in keeping with the principles of the class struggle, to launch a political movement to overthrow the government defending the capitalists, to seize state power, to suppress the reactionary classes, and to develop production in all seriousness. Only then will it be possible to eliminate differences between classes and to build a free society. This is the road to be followed."⁶

Another doctrine hostile to Marxism was social-reformism, which by its nature was incapable of charting out the road towards the cardinal solution of social problems. Social-reformism, Li Da pointed out, far from urging a radical transformation of the social and economic system of capitalism, advocated the principles of private property and free competition, which are the reasons behind all the social misfortunes. The exponents of social-reformism only propose to slightly restrict the operation of these principles, in order to alleviate acute social conflicts in this way. Li Da believed that similar ideas had always been in the interest of the ruling elite of the bourgeois state.

In his works Li Da started a study of the emergence of the theory of scientific socialism by turning to the ideas of utopian socialists. Similar ideas were voiced in an embryonic form in ancient China and India, and in Greece and Rome of the Antiquity. In this connection he cited Confucius' preaching of society of the "Great Unification", treatises of Lao Ji, Xu Xin's ideas about the joint tilling of land, Buddhist ideas about the elimination of classes (it was apparently the Buddhist idea of the equality of people in "suffering" that was meant here), Plato's teaching of the ideal state, and early Christian ideas of the equality of people in front of God and the just principle of equality in the property status.⁷

Passing over to the ideas set forth by Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen, Li Da emphasised that they rejected the system of capitalist production and that their advocacy of the principles of an ideal social organisation was dictated above all by their desire to put an end to social inequality. Aware that all the socialist doctrines that preceded Marxism were utopian, Li Da wrote that they were "either ethical, religious or political by nature."⁸

The authors of utopian social concepts, Li Da stressed, did not study the actual socio-historical processes, the course of class struggle in society or the system of production and distribution but drew on the principles of the so-called natural law, according to which the human rights to existence, work and social justice were viewed as those characteristic of the individuals primordially.

Analysing the development of "Marxist socialism" in the late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries, Li Da singled out five trends in it, including orthodox socialism (Kautsky and Ged), revisionist socialism (Bernstein, Millerand and the Fabian society), syndicalism, guild socialism and the Bolsheviks. It goes without saying that such a classification going back to Sun Yatsen was pseudo-scientific because it lumped together both the advocates of Marxism and its enemies. At the same time, when

⁶ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 250.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

characterising each of the aforementioned trends, Li Da on the whole drew on actual facts. For example, when pointing out that "revolutionary syndicalists" (Sorel), unlike their reformist colleagues, recognised the class struggle and spoke in favour of transforming the capitalist system, he at the same time by right indicated that there existed obvious contradictions in their concepts of the methods of revolutionary actions. Denying in word the need for political methods of organising the mass of the people, they at the same time recognised them in deed and set forth the idea of convening after the victory of the revolution a general conference of trade unions (syndicates) and of electing at it the central committee, a sort of a body of power. As is seen, Li Da wrote, life itself made the syndicalists refute their own thesis of political struggle and political organisations being unnecessary for transforming social relations. The ineffectiveness of purely economic actions made many "revolutionary syndicalists" eventually turn to the means of political struggle. Li Da also observed that syndicalism differed from Marxism in its attitude to violence: according to Marx violence is a midwife of old society when it is pregnant with new society; syndicalism, on the contrary, insists on using force under any circumstances, irrespective of the real situation in society.

Li Da sympathised with Bolshevism, which he called "pure Marxism" because its guiding principle was the teaching of the "dictatorship of the working people".⁹ Quoting works by Lenin, "the founder of Bolshevism", Li Da explained the tasks, essence, functions and forms of the dictatorship of the working people. He emphasised that Lenin's ideas of the state of the working people were based on the ideas of Marx and Engels and asserted that the bourgeois state was dictatorship of the bourgeoisie whereas the state of the working people had to commit political violence on the bourgeoisie.

The fact that in his book of 1926 Li Da used the concept of the "dictatorship of the working people" rather than that of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" shows that at that period he lacked any clear-cut idea of the nature of political power after the victory of the socialist revolution. Later on, having undertaken a more profound study of the works by the classics of Marxism, above all by Lenin, and also of writings by Soviet authors,¹⁰ Li Da adopted a consistently Marxist stand on this issue of principle (this is exemplified by the corresponding section of the 1937 book).

Li Da stressed that in Marx's teaching socialism acquired a truly scientific character because his theoretical conclusions rested on the analysis of social production, the material foundation of social phenomena. Marx should be credited with having applied the principles of materialist philosophy to the study of social phenomena, above all to economic facts. "The content of Marxist socialism", Li Da pointed out, "can be divided into three big parts—a view of history, an economic theory and a political doctrine... The view of history is based on its materialist interpretation, the teaching of surplus value underlies the economic theory, whereas the political doctrine is based on the teaching of the dictatorship of the working people; the teaching of class struggle acts as an organic link between the three great doctrines."¹¹

The chapter of *Modern Sociology* dealing with Marxist socialism out-

⁹ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 243.

¹⁰ He translated into Chinese several books on Marxist philosophy among them works by Academician I. Luppola, a noted Soviet philosopher.

¹¹ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 221.

lined in detail the fundamentals of the Marxist theory (in particular, the teaching of surplus value), with the emphasis on its principal ideas. The essence of the materialist interpretation of history, Li Da stressed, consisted in recognising material conditions, with the economy being the main of them, as the decisive factors of social development; other factors like, for example, the geographical environment, played an immeasurably less significant role. Changes in the mode of production and exchange cause shifts in the form of the social structure, political system and ideological views. In other words, Li Da concluded, according to the Marxist doctrine "the reason behind the development of society lies not in philosophy but in the economy".¹²

Speaking about "the dictatorship of the working people", Li Da characterised it as "the only political means of turning private property into public property, and at the same time pointed out that during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the state would be that of the working people, that is to say, the dictatorship of the working classes.¹³ When formulating its tasks, he named the expropriation of capital of the bourgeoisie, the transfer of the means of production into state property, and the suppression of the counterrevolution. He believed that the fundamental difference between the dictatorship of the working people and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie consisted in the fact that the former made it possible to ensure the genuine equality of the people, irrespective of their religion, race, nationality, or sex.¹⁴ Nevertheless it should be mentioned that Li Da was not very precise about the political system of the transition period or its operation mechanism. According to him, "the self-governing organisation of the working people" should become a body of power, with the bourgeoisie excluded from participation in it. The aim of this organisation formed by conscious working people was to temper and educate the mass of the people and to draw them into political life, to ensure the "unity between governing with the help of laws and governing with the help of people" and eventually "general democracy", he wrote.¹⁵ As is seen, Li Da assigned the leading role in the political system of the transition period to the "self-governing organisation of the working people" rather than to the political party of the working class, which he failed to mention at all.

In his *Fundamentals of Sociology* Li Da already held a correct stand on that issue. "The main, fundamental characteristic of the dictatorship of the proletariat," he wrote, "is the guidance by the communist party. If there is no party guidance, the proletariat is unable to accomplish the tasks it faces and the dictatorship of the proletariat itself is unable to get established and consolidated."¹⁶ At the same time Li Da stressed that the guiding role of the communist party was not equivalent to its dictatorship; the party acted as the vanguard of the working class in alliance with mass organisations.

In his works Li Da consistently advocated the Marxist idea of the social revolution being caused by the conditions of society's material life. He viewed it as a resolution of the conflict between the new productive forces and old production relations, regarding changes in society's material life as the cause and changes in ideology as their result.¹⁷ Li Da sub-

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 222.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 234-235.

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵ *Ibidem.*

¹⁶ *Li Da wenji*, Vol. 2, Peking, 1981, p. 546.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 130, 145.

stantiated his idea by citing the example of the Great French Revolution. Bourgeois historians, he said, usually saw the reasons for that revolution in the drawbacks of the system of public government, the extreme arbitrariness of officials, who robbed the population, the people's passionate striving towards freedom and equality and so on, that is to say, in subjective factors. If that was the case, however, Li Da pointed out, France could do without a revolution. All Louis XVI had to do was to reduce the taxes and to let common citizens take part in running the country, and that would strip the revolutionary classes of any chance for the success of their revolution. According to Li Da, such an approach by bourgeois historians concealed the true reasons behind the French revolution, which was bourgeois by nature and which had the class of the bourgeoisie as its leading force. Its fundamental cause was the fact that the feudal social system that existed in France hampered the development of the new productive forces and the establishment of social relations that would correspond to them. As for the demands to carry out reforms and to eliminate the officials' arbitrariness, they were nothing but a pretext for the revolution that triggered the revolutionary explosion. The slogans of freedom and equality stood for real changes in the economic basis—the emergence of capitalist relations of production and, consequently, the class of the bourgeoisie, which nevertheless occupied a subordinate position in society, contrasting with its real power.¹⁸ Such was the state of affairs not only in France, Li Da remarked. Economic factors were the fundamental reason of other bourgeois revolutions as well.¹⁹ Those who read his book could easily draw the conclusion that the social revolution that was so much talked about and urged in China was not the whim of the members of the revolutionary movement, the communists, but something with objective prerequisites in the socio-economic development of the country.

Li Da emphasised Marx's merits in discovering the law of social development, according to which it is class struggle that is responsible for changes in social structures, whereas the people's class affiliation is determined by their relationship to the means of production.²⁰ Expounding these ideas of Marx, Li Da wrote: "Distinctions in income, property or profession are not enough for social classes to form: distinctions between poverty and wealth, work and idleness, mental and manual labour are also not enough for social classes to form. In his works Marx constantly speaks about two big classes, the property owners and the proletarians; therefore the essence of class division boils down to the contrast between those who own the means of production and those who have nothing save for labour. This is the fundamental difference between the classes, which can be defined in the following way: classes come into being in the process of social production, as a result of the conditions of production and owing to a social system formed by the nature of the distribution of the means of production and also the division of the members of society in the process of production."²¹

This definition can hardly be called exhaustive, and nevertheless it constituted a correct approach to understanding the innermost reasons for the division of society into classes and the main yardstick of class

¹⁸ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, pp. 122-123.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

²⁰ *Li wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 138.

²⁰ *Li Da wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 138.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

affiliation. Li Da named two class-forming characteristics, the people's relationships to the means of production (in his terminology "the distribution of the means of production") and the people's position in social production ("the division of the members of society in the process of production"). He should be credited with succeeding in pinpointing the main specific yardsticks of class affiliation and with discarding those that were only outwardly related to the given problem. For instance, he believed that the property status of a person was not a class-forming characteristic: "A doctor is a person who lives by his labour, and no matter how luxurious his life might be, he cannot be called a capitalist."²² It might be interesting to recall in this connection that in that same year of 1926 Mao Zedong, one of the CPC leaders, published his *Analysis of the Classes of Chinese Society*, which contained an opposite point of view and asserted that the people's affiliation with certain classes had to do with their property status.²³

In his *Fundamentals of Sociology* Li Da again returned to the problem of the primary and secondary class-forming characteristics. He maintained that the "distribution theory", according to which class affiliation was determined by the people's income, was unscientific because it determined class division on the basis of a secondary, derivative characteristic, whereas in actual fact the distribution of products was determined by the distribution of the means of labour and the position in the system of production.²⁴

In the social structure of modern capitalist society Li Da singled out two big classes—the bourgeoisie, which lived at the expense of profits received from capital, and the proletariat, which sold its labour to others.²⁵ Alongside these main classes existed the so-called middle classes (*zhongdeng jieji*). These included those who made up the lowest strata of the bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the proletariat and who could be subdivided into two groups, the petty bourgeoisie and the strata "affiliated with the proletariat" (*zhong wuchangzeji*).

Li Da was quite successful in his attempt to give a socio-class characteristic of different "middle-class" groups of China of the day, and made it possible to reveal the real and potential allies of the proletariat in the struggle for its class objectives. I should say that not all of his judgments were indisputable: some were unsubstantiated, others—oversimplified. He was fairly correct in defining the social frame of the petty bourgeoisie, including into it artisans, handicraftsmen, small-scale dealers, small land-holders, but not so with the group of "those affiliated with the proletariat". According to Li Da, it comprised those who "had to use the knowledge or skills acquired to be able to engage in mental work, for example, doctors, lawyers, government officials and teachers, irrespective of whether they have capital or not, and others who live on their monthly salaries".²⁶ As is seen, he meant in fact the intelligentsia, when he used this concept of the people "affiliated with the proletariat". He pointed to the unstable economic position of the intellectuals and the wide-ranging differences in the social status of quite a few of them, from the "pure" proletariat to the "real" bourgeoisie, which finds expression in their world outlooks. The same equally applied to the petty bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding the fact, Li Da did not deem it necessary to stress these

²² Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 189.

²³ *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 6, 1969, pp. 130-136.

²⁴ *Li Da wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 431.

²⁵ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, pp. 189-190.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

aspects in defining its position in society. His classification of the different groups within the "middle classes" was therefore controversial and not consistent enough.

However, gradually Li Da came to see the real processes taking place in the social structure of capitalist society. He deemed it necessary to write a special chapter "Transition Classes of Modern Society" in his *Fundamentals of Sociology* in which he dwelt in detail on the process of stratification characteristic of both the intelligentsia and the class of small proprietors, to which he referred craftsmen and peasants, with the exception of their upper strata that formed, according to him, the peasant bourgeoisie.²⁷ In the former case this found expression in the emergence among the intelligentsia of strata whose economic position was close to that of the proletariat; in the latter, in the growing number of the poor, whom he classed with the rural semi-proletariat (as distinct from the true proletariat—seasonal workers, day-labourers and odd-job men).²⁸ Two more points discussed in that chapter also deserve mentioning here. First, the appearance of the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and proletarian strata within the intelligentsia, depending on their class orientation. And second, his sharply negative attitude towards the lumpen proletariat: Li Da pointed out that, politically, that stratum always occupied reactionary position.²⁹ Symptomatically enough, Li Da's views were opposite on that issue to those held by Mao Zedong.³⁰

Li Da devoted much space to analysis of the functions of the state. He maintained that the state acted as an organ governing exploitation and at the same time as an organ of class government. Obviously, such a distinction between the functions of the state in exploiters' society was to a certain extent conventional because the two terms in fact stood for one and the same thing. The first function consisted in the forcible "exploitation of one group of the people by another group".³¹ "The aim of this exploitative coercion was to use material wealth and spiritual culture produced by other people's labour in the interest of the ruling classes",³² in a society with class antagonisms. Though in the process of its development antagonistic class society undergoes changes so that the forms of exploitation also change accordingly, its essence remains unchanged. Defining the exploiting essence of the state with class antagonisms, Li Da wrote: "The ruling class and those who support it, live at the expense of the lower classes' labour and do not engage in labour themselves."³³ These theoretical conclusions were of great practical importance and had a considerable political effect in the context of Chinese reality of the period, revolutionising the readers.

When analysing the functions of the state as a body of class government, Li Da considered important theoretical problems of direct relevance to politics, including political relations between the antagonistic classes, the possibility of their interests "coinciding" temporarily, the aims of the ruling class policy and the means of implementing it.

When the ruling class declares its adherence to the ideas of "common welfare", Li Da wrote, this is dictated by its class interests, namely, by the desire to substantiate, maintain and strengthen its domination and to

²⁷ *Li Da wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 480.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 481.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 485.

³⁰ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1952, p. 26 (in Russian).

³¹ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 88.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

identify it with "public interests". "If the state is analysed from the point of view of its essence, the interests of the (ruling) class form the goal, whereas common welfare (declared by it) is a means", Li Da emphasized.³⁴ He went on to say that the state in antagonistic class society could retain its exploiting essence precisely because the aims of the ruling class corresponded to the means employed for their attainment. Li Da said that its own class interests are always what matters most for the ruling class and for this reason exploitation in antagonistic class society is inevitable.³⁵

Antagonism between classes in an exploiting state, Li Da pointed out, does not exclude the possibility for the interests of the ruling class and those of the ruled to "coincide" to a certain extent temporarily, when they "experience joy together and undergo grief together".³⁶ What is meant here are those periods in the life of a state when it is attacked from without or public order is seriously jeopardized (for instance, personal safety of citizens). In both cases these negative factors affect all the classes. Having mentioned the fact, however, Li Da made the following noteworthy statement: "Obviously enough, the degree of happiness or damage should be distinguished in both cases. When (public) order is not upset or when the state's territory remains intact, the ruling class as before retains its governing position and gets a lot, whereas the ruled class has to be content with peaceful life and the little it gets. When it is impossible to maintain (public) order or to ensure the inviolability of the state's territory, the losses of the ruling class are not so great, even though it may lose its governing position, while the ruled class suffers great losses in destroyed housing or war casualties. That is why when the ruling class is in word concerned with the common wealth, it is nothing but a means of forwarding its own class interests in deed."³⁷ The fallacy of the bourgeois theories of the state, Li Da concluded, consisted in their ignoring the class nature of the state. Meanwhile the state is an organisation of "the ruling class, dominant in the economic respect".³⁸

Analysis of the relationship between the objective and subjective factors in the historical process enabled Li Da to draw an important materialist conclusion, namely, social transformations are doomed to failure, despite the efforts made by outstanding personalities and the scale of the mass movement, if objective material prerequisites are absent; the result will be the same if the mass of the people is not involved in the movement, despite all the necessary prerequisites.³⁹

Li Da maintained that social requirements were in full met by the activities of outstanding personalities, such as Rousseau, who is credited with the creation of the "natural law" theory which served as the keynote of the bourgeois revolution, and Marx, the founder of the theory of scientific socialism, which was destined to become the weapon of the social revolution in the arms of the oppressed working people. The emergence of both theories was not a result of exclusively Rousseau's and Marx's abilities, the main thing was that they "managed to discover the laws of social development, to grasp the idea of freedom existing in the minds of tens of thousands of people and to lead the masses on".⁴⁰

³⁴ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 90.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

The activities of Proudhon and Bakunin, according to Li Da, supplied an opposite example. The doctrine of anarchism they propagandised failed to meet with broad support by the people because the theoreticians of anarchism were unable to understand the laws of social development and their programmes were utopian.⁴¹

The problem of the social revolution was one of the key topics studied by Li Da, whose attention always centred on its different aspects, including the reasons for the revolutions, their stages, typology, nature, motive forces and methods of carrying through a socialist revolution. His arguments about the ways and forms of seizing power by the advanced social class and about the future proletarian revolutions were characterised by a sober-minded and realistic approach.

He recognised the possibility for different forms of the revolutionary process; revolutions, he wrote, can "take place slowly and quietly or quickly and vigorously." In his opinion, the British revolutions of 1688 and 1832 belonged to the first type, while the second type was exemplified by the French bourgeois revolution of 1789 and the October Revolution in Russia, "in which the proletariat underwent the suffering of fighting and managed to establish alliance with the working peasantry and to use political power to carry out the economic revolution. It was a swift and stormy socialist revolution."⁴² What Li Da said next about the future proletarian revolutions deserves to be quoted here: "I cannot say for sure whether the subsequent or future socialist revolutions will be carried out in a peaceful and not explosive way. Speaking about the main thing, the means of carrying out a social revolution is a purely tactical question, determined by different conditions, such as, for example, the alignment of forces on the world scene, the power of the fighting spirit of its initiator and the nature of class struggle. All this greatly affects the nature of the revolution but it is most necessary to take into account the economic might of the ruling class. As for whether blood should be spilt to ensure the success of a revolution or it can do without it, this question cannot be considered abstractly."⁴³ Hence, the conclusion that it is impossible to engage in sheer theorising, build abstract speculative models nor offer precepts beforehand for all the possible forms of future proletarian revolutions. It is necessary to adopt a concrete historical approach to the practice of revolutionary actions.

Eleven years later he pressed the need for such an approach in his *Fundamentals of Sociology*. In particular this referred to his analysis of the forms of the proletariat's political struggle. Li Da had no doubts about the class essence of bourgeois democracy, the limited nature of its attributes, such as universal suffrage and the parliamentary system, because the latter was "the expression of popular will" merely in form, while real power was increasingly transferred from parliaments to administrative bureaucratic bodies. Perfectly aware of all these peculiarities of the political regime of the bourgeois state, Li Da at the same time emphasised the role of parliament as an important factor in the proletariat's political, class struggle. Fierce class struggle in the course of decades resulted in a certain "democratisation" of the parliamentary system, which found its expression in the working people gaining access to the representative bodies. Parliamentarism, Li Da wrote, is a means of political education of the proletariat, helping it realise the need for

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

setting up a political party of its own in order to be able to take part in elections and parliamentary infighting, "parliamentarism can become a means of political struggle of the proletariat for its liberation".⁴⁴

Emphasising the role of parliamentarism in awakening class consciousness among the proletariat and in developing the workers' movement, Li Da, naturally, cherished no illusions about the possibility to attain the ideals of socialism merely through participation in parliamentary elections and voting. As early as 1926 he wrote that universal suffrage could only mitigate sharp class conflicts but was unable to put an end to them altogether.⁴⁵ He was convinced that the emancipation of the proletariat was only possible if all methods of class struggle were used, whereas the parliamentary actions of its representatives constituted but one method of political struggle; it should be kept in mind that participation in parliament in itself is a means rather than an aim: the aim was to use elections to parliament and work in it in order to raise the level of political consciousness of the mass of the people. That is why to view parliament as the main means is tantamount to opportunism, and to deny the need to take part in it was the "infantile" disorder of the "left-wing" communism.⁴⁶

His ideas about the destinies of the world proletarian revolution evince profound understanding of the internationalist essence of Marxism. While singling out two trends in the world revolutionary movement—the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and that of the colonial peoples—he stressed the importance of establishing close unity both within each of these trends and between them. According to him, the growing internationalisation of the world economic life enhanced the urgency of joint actions by the proletariat of different countries, and by "weak nations" against their common enemy—imperialism.⁴⁷ Describing the state of affairs in the world revolutionary movement, Li Da pointed to such phenomena, as the rallying of the working class, the development of the liberation movement of the colonial peoples, strengthening the alliance between the proletariat of the capitalist states and the "weak nations", the setting up of communist parties in the colonial countries and their participation in the work of the Third International, and the establishment of special bodies for work in the colonies in Western communist parties.⁴⁸

Speaking about the need for united actions in class and national struggle, that is to say, the international working-class and national liberation movements, Li Da wrote: "The capitalists of imperialist states are like big-time robbers: they rob the proletariat to fill their chests, and the weak nations have riches but no power to resist plunder... At present those who have riches but no power to resist plunder have realised that big-time robbery leads to impoverishment and, haunted by recollections of (independence), they put on armour, take spears into their hands and build fortresses for self-defence. If those being robbed and those who start to put up resistance act jointly, this will apparently put an end to robbery. It is for this reason that the liberation of the weak nations and the emancipation of the proletariat should support each other and it is only then that the success would be ensured."⁴⁹

⁴⁴ *Li Da wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 536.

⁴⁵ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 157.

⁴⁶ *Li Da wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 536.

⁴⁷ Li Da, *Xiandai shehuixue*, p. 282.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 288-289.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

Li Da knew that the ideas of internationalism and close unity between the two streams of the world revolutionary process failed to reach the minds of the proletariat in the capitalist countries right away. He cited in this respect the actions of leaders of the Second International during the First World War and the attitude of the West European, American and Japanese proletariat to the wars waged by the imperialist powers against China in the nineteenth century and to their suppression of the Yihetuan uprising. He mentioned, however, that the situation began changing of late. After the Shanghai events on May 30, 1925, when the British used fire against a peaceful demonstration of the working people, the international proletariat forcefully demonstrated its solidarity with the Chinese people, to say nothing of support rendered by Soviet Russia.⁵⁰

Li Da resolutely criticised all sorts of nationalistic deviations in the national liberation movement: "Perhaps hoping for success, some people will avoid making alliance with the international proletariat and try, by using mutual suspicion or a conflict in relations between imperialists, to raise the banner of independence, expecting to be liberated from oppression by imperialism. Such opportunism is inadmissible in theory and difficult to be carried through in practice. A similar movement for independence can use some rare chance to score a success but will eventually liberate itself from the dominion by one imperialist only to land itself under that of another." Such an opportunistic liberation movement is worse than "abstaining from revolution", Li Da concluded.⁵¹

Discussing the noble ideals of future socialist morality, Li Da said that these would include the time-honoured principles of freedom, equality and brotherhood, filled, however, with a new content. "Freedom", would mean free access to cultural values, "equality"—equal right to take part in productive labour, and "brotherhood"—the opportunity to use the products of the one's own labour and society's care for the old and the sick.⁵²

It goes without saying that both of his books bear an imprint of the time he worked in, contain direct definitions and sometimes in analysing theoretical problems do not go beyond vulgar sociology, for instance, in describing the social nature of religion, art and philosophical doctrines. His inflated emphasis on the socio-economic conditions of the emergence of different philosophical ideas at times resulted in crude pictures of the development of pre-Marxist philosophy.

His works in the 1930s attested that he succeeded in overcoming many shortcomings and delusions characteristic of his views in the preceding period and that his vision of Marxism expanded, as he now turned not only to the works by Marx and Engels, but also to those by Lenin.

When assessing his contribution to the dissemination of Marxist ideas in China, it should be borne in mind that in his books he managed to give a fairly systematic outline of the fundamentals of Marxist philosophy and to familiarise the Chinese reader with classic Marxist views of the problems of social development.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 169.

A VARIETY OF CHINESE BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM

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[Article by S. R. Belousov]

The emergence of nationalism in China is usually dated back to the second half of the nineteenth-early twentieth centuries when the national bourgeoisie and the Chinese nation were taking shape. At the turn of the century the country saw vigorous transformation of feudal Sino-centrism into a form of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalism, the process which noticeably affected the world outlook of the Chinese intellectuals. Discontent with the country's dependent position united all those who took part in the ideological life of the period, and by the time the socialist doctrine spread to China all strata of Chinese society had been under the influence of nationalistic ideas in one degree or another.

Every stage of the evolution of Chinese nationalism was associated with its own ideologists. The early stages of its development had to do with the activities of both the liberal-reformist wing of the Chinese bourgeoisie (Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and others) and its revolutionary-democratic wing (Sun Yatsen, Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, and so on). In this way different stages in the development of the Chinese bourgeoisie determined the stages of the evolution of the ideology of that class, culminating in the so-called late Chinese nationalism, which emerged as a separate trend of socio-political thought after 1921.

At the late stages of its development bourgeois nationalism in China was far from homogeneous: there were several trends within it. A concrete manifestation of nationalism of the conservative, right-wing political forces was the Sinified form of "state socialism" and the theoretical and practical activity of the leaders of the party under the same name.

The State Socialist Party (SSP) together with the Youth China Party¹ formed the right wing of the vanguard of China's "third force"—the Democratic League—and wielded noticeable ideological and political influence until they withdrew from that organisation.

The evolution of the SSP ended in its coming to terms with Chiang Kaishek's Guomindang and leaving the Democratic League in late 1946, joining forces with reaction. That was the natural outcome of its activities because, as far as its social composition and political objectives were

¹ The formation of the SSP was officially made public in the autumn of 1934 at the "national meeting", which was organised by the party's future leader Zhang Junmai and his associates in Tianjing (and in fact played the role of the First Party Congress). At the Shanghai meeting in August 1946 the SSP merged with the Democratic Constitutionalist Party (a political group set up in North America on the initiative of Wu Xianji and Li Daming) and was renamed into the Democratic Socialist Party.—See *Political Parties and Groups in the Movement for New Democracy in China*, Shanghai, 1946, pp. 48-50 (in Chinese).

The Youth China Party was founded in December 1923 on the basis of the Union of the Chinese Nationalistic Youth.—See Ch'ien Tuan-Sheng, *The Government and Politics of China*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1961, pp. 351-353.

concerned, it was closer to the Guomindang than to the Democratic League, which on the whole represented progressive sections of the national bourgeoisie, intellectuals and students.

No error, above all political error, can be fully explained, "...unless you dig down to its theoretical roots among the basic premises of the one who makes it".² The SSP's teaming up with the Guomindang was based primarily on the nationalistic orientation of its programme and policy and correspondingly the negative attitude of the party leaders—Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun³—to Marxism-Leninism and the communist movement in China.

The SSP leaders and ideologists started their socio-political activities as Liang Qichao's associates. Zhang Junmai, a student of Waseda University in Japan in the period from 1905 to 1909, joined the Constitutionalist Party founded in Tokyo by Liang Qichao's followers and participated in his debate with the Tongmenghui society on the Chinese state system. At the time, just as in subsequent years, Zhang Junmai corresponded with Liang Qichao and shared his ideas about the need for political reforms in China. During the first years of the republic Zhang Junmai maintained close contacts with the leader of the reformers and influenced his fundamental decisions on problems of political strategy. Zhang Dongsun collaborated with the Progressive Party and was member of the "Research Clique" organised on the initiative of Liang Qichao.⁴

Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun combined political activity with theoretical studies and an interest in "pure" philosophy. Both were widely known in academic circles as lecturers and in the press as editors and constant contributors to periodicals. Though they had modern education alongside traditional one, they belonged to the older generation of philosophers rather than to the younger one and their way of thinking was, indisputably, largely influenced by syncretic reformism.

From the outset of their activity they showed heightened interest in studying bourgeois philosophical and political doctrines of the West (this was in general characteristic of most of the Chinese intellectuals in the early decades of the twentieth century). Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Rickert, Spencer, Bergson, Berkeley and Lewis were among those theoreticians, whose doctrines were popularised in China by them and whose views noticeably affected the world outlook of the future SSP leaders. Zhang Dongsun's efforts to spread Western theories in China culminated in his work, *The Principles of Ethics and Morality as Seen by European Philosophers*, which described most diverse theoretical systems from hedonism to asceticism. According to the author, the work aimed at "translating into Chinese and expounding in a popular way the most

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 90.

³ Zhang Junmai (Karsong Zhang, 1886-1968), a lawyer by education, studied in Japan and Germany, was member of the Guomindang People's Political Council from 1938 to 1948 and wrote works on philosophical and socio-political problems, including *The Tomorrow of Chinese Culture, National Democracy and State Socialism and The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*. He fled from China in April 1949 and emigrated to the US in 1952.

Zhang Dongsun (Zhang Dongsheng, 1886-?), philosopher and politician, received education at Tokyo Imperial University and was editor of the *Jiefang yu gaizao* journal and the *Shishi xin bao* newspaper and professor at Yanjing University since 1929. He is known for his interpretation of Western philosophy in China and his works on this and other problems.

⁴ See H. L. Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, New York, 1967, pp. 30, 130.

widespread doctrines by European thinkers ... united by the general task of facilitating the understanding of the material".⁵

In 1919 Zhang Dongsun together with Liang Qichao initiated a "debate on socialism" and more than once used in his arguments "imported means" of influencing the minds of his compatriots. His attitude to socialism was largely affected by views of the British philosopher Bertrand Russell, the founder of British neorealism and neopositivism who came to China with a series of lectures in 1920. In word Zhang Dongsun agreed that "socialism would eventually have the upper hand over capitalism without fail". But these declarations were sheer social demagoguery, as they were refuted by his own assertions that China could come to socialism only after covering a long stage of capitalist development. He regarded socialism as "an ideal unattainable in the foreseeable future" and capitalism as "present-day practice". Expounding his bourgeois-reformist, pseudosocialist ideas, Zhang claimed there was no capitalist exploitation in China, was critical of the propaganda of Marxist ideas in the country and called for the renunciation of class struggle and for postponing indefinitely the formation of the Communist Party. By way of compensation he suggested that the bourgeoisie should be educated in the spirit of "humanism" and the workers in the spirit of "cooperation" in the interests of entire society.⁶

As distinct from Zhang Dongsun who, after his studies in Japan (1905-1911), never left China, Zhang Junmai comparatively often went abroad, attended lectures at European university centres and himself delivered lectures on Chinese philosophy there. In this way he could get first-hand knowledge of the views of different Western scholars. In late 1918 he went to Europe, to the Paris peace conference, as a member of the Chinese delegation headed by Liang Qichao. Zhang Junmai met the French intuitionist philosopher H. Bergson and later on became his active follower. In this capacity he "fulfilled the social order of Chinese reaction"⁷ by trying to distract the country's intelligentsia from getting scientific knowledge of the laws of social development.

He spent the postwar years (1919-1922) in Germany, devoting most of his time to the study of philosophy at Jena under the guidance of R. Eucken, German philosopher who was an advocate of Fichte. In collaboration with him Zhang Junmai wrote a thesis dealing with some aspects of the "philosophy of life". The irrationalistic ideas of Eucken, who authored the concept of the metaphysics of the spirit, were extremely popular in China in the early twentieth century. Liang Qichao, too, propagated them and in 1920 invited Eucken to visit China with a series of lectures. The latter failed to make that visit and was replaced by H. Driesch who belonged to the same philosophical school. It was none other than Zhang Junmai who arranged his lecturing tour.

On coming back to China, Zhang Junmai for a while expounded Driesch's theory at Qinghua university in Peking but then soon composed a series of lectures of his own, calling to turn back to the unknowable aspects of life that could be studied and understood only on the basis of

⁵ Zhang Dongsun, *The Principles of Ethics and Morality as Seen by European Philosophers*, Shanghai, 1930, pp. 1-2 (in Chinese).
He also translated into Chinese two books by H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (1918) and *Memory and Matter* (1922).

⁶ See L. P. Delyusin, *The Debate on Socialism in China*, Moscow, 1980, pp. 55-66, 84-93 (in Russian).

⁷ A. G. Krymov, *Social Thought and Ideological Struggle in China (1900-1917)*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 282-283 (in Russian).

intuition. He produced as a result his "View of Life" ("Rensheng guan"), which was published by the *Qinghua Weekly* in February 1923. It triggered a broad theoretical discussion on the problems of the "philosophy of life" and the relationship between metaphysics and science, the discussion which became a notable event in China's philosophical activities at the period.⁸

The difference in the philosophical positions of the proponents of "metaphysics" and those of "science" was formal rather than that of principle: the argument was in fact about the effectiveness of one weapon or another in the struggle against scientific socialism. Zhang Dongsun sided with his associates, Liang Qichao and Zhang Junmai, and published in the then influential Shanghai journal, *Shishi xin bao*, a critical analysis of the discussion under the title "Science and Philosophy", drawing on the arguments of bourgeois philosophers and scholars to show the inadequacy of scientific categories and human experience. As is seen, both Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun adopted an idealist approach to the nature of scientific knowledge. Marxists (including Qu Qiubo) had the task of subjecting the views of Zhang Junmai and his associates to scientific criticism and emphasised that the propaganda of the mystical ability of intuition to cognise the world around rejected a scientific approach to studying objective laws of social development. They also pointed to the reactionary political essence of the "metaphysical" concept, which in fact aimed at preserving the exploiting system as allegedly ordained by fate.

The two Zhangs made use of certain components of different European philosophical doctrines, striving to adapt them to traditional Chinese reality. The theoretical system developed by Zhang Junmai and mirrored in a series of the 1923 lectures laid the groundwork for the emergence of new Chinese metaphysics, which was a blend of the theories of Bergson, Eucken and Wang Shouren (Wang Yangming).⁹ Zhang Dongsun openly recognised his eclecticism and defined it as "epistemological pluralism", which incorporated elements of the doctrines of Kant, Lewis, Eddington and Whitehead. On the other hand, Zhang Dongsun stressed that, even though he preferred to call himself an eclectic, his thesis was no less original, as far as the organisation of various elements of other people's theories into one integral system was concerned.¹⁰

Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun sought to "rejuvenate" Chinese philosophy with the help of latest foreign doctrines. They belonged to those theoreticians who "propagandised the ideas of a synthesis of Western (bourgeois) philosophy and traditional Chinese ideology",¹¹ using their eclectic and nationalistic blend to combat revolutionary socio-political thought.

A trend that aspired to fuse traditionalism with modernism became quite marked in Chinese nationalism in the early decades of the twentieth century. Its representatives claimed that an alternative to the rigid adherence to traditions (Liang Shuming) was in no way the wholesale rejection of traditional structures and values (Hu Shi), and sought to revise the relationship between the traditional and the national, recognising the

⁸ See W. Bauer, *China and the Search for Happiness*, New York, 1976, p. 364. The discussion was reflected in two philosophical collections, *The Struggle for the View of Life* (with a foreword by Zhang Junmai) and *Science and the View of Life* (with a foreword by Hu Shi).

⁹ W. Bauer, *Op. cit.*, p. 364.

¹⁰ H. L. Boorman, *Op. cit.*, p. 134.

¹¹ See V. G. Burov, *Modern Chinese Philosophy*, Moscow, 1980, p. 40.

possibility and need to interpret traditions in a new way with the aim of overcoming backwardness, that is to say, of "modernising" nationalism.

When analysing the world outlook of Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dong-sun, who sought to combine what they thought to be advantageous aspects of Chinese and Western civilisations, it is necessary to avoid chance comparisons and to form an integral picture of their concept, which is bound to reveal its historical, ideological and functional link both with purely Chinese traditional theories and with certain aspects of some Western doctrines.

In his book, *The Tomorrow of Chinese Culture*, Zhang Junmai developed ideas set forth earlier by Liang Qichao and his associates in 1918-1919, and asserted that reforms in China should begin in the field of human relations with the aim of building new culture which would serve as the basis for political and economic systems. "The essence and spirit of modern governments," he wrote, "is democracy, no trace of which can be found in classic Chinese teachings... Rather than continue worshipping the graves of the ancients it is better to frankly admit the fact that our culture should be created anew." In his opinion, to "create anew" meant to grasp everything of the best in Western culture and to use it to consolidate China's position in the world. Despite the fact that borrowing to the point of imitation is unavoidable at the initial stage, Zhang emphasised, that what was fundamentally important to China was not mechanical "plagiarism" but a "creative interpretation" of the positive aspects of Western civilisation. China was not to copy the façade of European culture but to perceive its essence and its spirit and to adapt them to traditional Chinese values, without rejecting its own cultural heritage indiscriminately. Only in this case would the country have a yardstick for selection and a basis for evolving a synthetic teaching. Zhang Dong-sun approached the issue from similar positions: he tended to turn to the synthesis problem not by studying the outward aspects of Oriental and Western social institutions but by analysing the content of the main concepts produced by the two civilisations.¹²

Though the ideas of synthesis proposed by Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dong-sun had to do above all with the formation of national culture, in general the meaning of their concepts was much wider and their content was characterised by greater profundity. This synthesis encompassed the realm of political and social philosophy, ethics and culture as a whole and the entire sum total of private and public life. They hoped to work out a universal system of views, including economic, political and enlightenment ideas. This merger of Chinese and Western cultures, of traditionalism and modernism mirrored the mood of that part of the Chinese bourgeoisie which would like to see certain social, economic and political reforms it deemed necessary to make China an independent and "strong" national state. The stand of the bourgeois theorists of this school of thought was determined, on the one hand, by their narrow class interests and, on the other, by nationalism, which exploited the patriotic mood of the mass of the people. The latter provided the emotional background for certain political slogans proclaimed by the SSP ideologists.

The bourgeois-reformist nature of Zhang Junmai's and Zhang Dong-sun's theories was also reflected in that, though "rejecting" capitalism in its European-American form, they were looking for ways to "restrict" capitalist activity by "precluding" the existence of the big monopoly

¹² See Ch. C. Tan, *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1971, pp. 263-264, 275-276.

bourgeoisie. It was this naive desire to avoid the more odious features of capitalism in China that was the hallmark of the two Zhangs' synthesis theory. They sought to combine through the so-called second-level synthesis the advantages of socialism (as they interpreted it) with the positive sides (again in their view) of capitalist society. In this way Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun acted as the theorists of that trend of the synthesis concept, whose representatives tried to wed together incompatible ideologies and social systems, the socialist and bourgeois systems, and to map out the "third road" of development as exemplified by the concepts of "national socialisms" or "national etatism" and in the case of Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun by their Sinified form of "state socialism".

In its initial, "classic" form "state socialism" was a European bourgeois-reformist, idealist concept, in which the essence of socialism boiled down to the state's interference in the economy and social relations to the point of establishing a world government (Bertrand Russell). Marx and Engels showed the opportunist essence of similar attempts to combine these ideas with Marxism made by German social-democracy as one of the *infantile diseases* of proletarian socialism.¹³

The eclectic nature of the philosophic systems of Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun and their idealism are responsible for the fact that they remained eclectics and idealists in the realm of political philosophy as well, while their Sinified theory of "state socialism" was a hodgepodge. Alongside elements of traditional Chinese ideology, primarily Neo-Confucian philosophy, it featured prominently considerable borrowings from different Western doctrines. Its nationalistic keynote reflected the general ideological atmosphere, in which the aforementioned theory took shape, just as the fact that nationalism and traditional Sino-centrism were its main ideological sources.

China learned about the appearance of a new political concept in 1930. It was at that time that Zhang Dongsun expounded its basic ideas in the *Shishi xin bao* weekly he edited. Subsequently he modified his theory, which he developed in some sections of his works, including *Is Democracy Compatible with Dictatorship?* (1932), *Intellect and Democracy* (1946) and *Democracy and Socialism* (1948). Zhang Junmai dealt with the concept of "state socialism" in his impressive *Principles of Laying the Foundations of the State (State Socialism)* (1938) and other works.

In the realm of political philosophy the two philosophers focussed their attention above all on the problem of the state. In traditional China the cultural factor served as a yardstick in determining one's nationality: a nation which accepted Chinese culture was considered Chinese. For this reason the ideologists of that period did not develop the concept of a nation-state organisation. The new epoch, however, and attempts to oppose it from the positions of bourgeois nationalism led the SSP ideologists to the idea that within the context of the imperialist aggression and the growing communist movement the only means that would guarantee the survival of "their" China was to establish a state on the basis of a "spiritual unification" of all the Chinese with the aim of a "social reconstruction" of society.¹⁴

To sum up, Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun focussed their attention on the ideal of "nation-state", in which everyone would work for the sake of common weal, inspired by common supra-class ideas. Inflating the importance of the spiritual factor, the SSP theorists attacked Marx-

¹³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, p. 184 (in Russian).

¹⁴ See *Political Parties and Groups*..., pp. 49-50.

ism from idealist positions, alleging that the Marxists "exaggerated the meaning of the material mechanism, which they viewed in isolation and that their mistake was in their ignoring the role of man's will".¹⁵ While emphasising that "the interests of the majority of the population" or "the social nature of man" acted as the rational foundation of the state, the SSP ideologists declared that, though the form and functions of the state changed, its essence of an instrument of "public rule" remained unchanged at all the times. Disregard for this principle, according to the two philosophers, allegedly led the proponents of scientific socialism to the erroneous conclusion about the withering away of the state in the future with the disappearance of the classes.

In word, the theorists of "state socialism" recognised the existence of both the material and ideal factors in the nature of the state. Their philosophical and political eclecticism and speculativeness led them to the absurd conclusion about the existence of "authoritarian rule" and "freedom" (the way the bourgeoisie interpreted these concepts). According to them, the material elements are embodied in the state apparatus and other institutions serving as the motive force of the entire social mechanism. The ideal, in their view, found expression in the phenomenon of "freedom", which is the "motive force" of human progress and a function of the consciousness and, consequently, exists only in the mind. In this way they claimed that the state institutions express man's will and in so far as the state machine translates into life man's ideas it is a product of the mind and is conditioned by the spiritual.¹⁶ The two philosophers completely disregarded the origin of ideas and idealistically interpreted their influence back on the life of society. From the point of view of the SSP theorists, the economic structure of society was constantly under the control of politics and for this reason could not be recognised as entirely material by nature. On this issue, too, they openly opposed the materialist understanding of history. Refuting the Marxist thesis about the primacy of economics over politics, Zhang Junmai said that that was what prevented Marx from recognising the allegedly decisive role of the "national spirit" in the life of society.¹⁷

In the economic field the syncretism of the Sinified theory of "state socialism" was manifest in the attempts made by Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun to substantiate the absurd idea of combining the advantages of the socialist economy with what they thought to be positive sides of the capitalist mode of production. There is no doubt that the economic aspect of the two philosophers' theory was largely influenced by the "mixed economy" doctrine preached by the reactionary leaders of German social-democracy, for example, by F. Scheideman, whom Zhang Junmai met in Berlin in 1919.

Adopting on the whole an anti-Marxist stand, the SSP leaders nevertheless declared their adherence to "social justice" and their negative attitude to social inequality reigning under capitalism. According to them, the problem was how to attain social justice for all and everyone without "encroaching upon personal freedom" of the individual. The ans-

¹⁵ Zhang Junmai, *The Principles of Laying the Foundations of the State*, n. p., 1938, pp. 385-387 (in Chinese).

¹⁶ See Ch. C. Tan, *Op. cit.*, pp. 256, 258. This, among other things, accounts for the decisive importance the SSP leaders attached to the spiritual education of the people and to the laying of a "moral basis" (§§ 32-38 of the 1946 Programme). See *Materials on the Criticism of the Middle Road of the Chinese Bourgeoisie*, Vol. 4, Peking, 1958, p. 111 (in Chinese).

¹⁷ See Zhang Junmai, *Op. cit.*, p. 382.

wer to this abstract problem was univocal because, as representatives of the bourgeoisie, the SSP leaders, naturally, expressed the interests of their class, which wanted power and favourable conditions for its enterprising activities. The two philosophers believed that the optimum way of solving the problem they faced was to translate into life "state socialism".

The intrinsic contradictoriness of the possibility to "combine" socialism and capitalism on the basis of a "national idea" prompted the bourgeois theorists a paradoxical thesis—on the one hand, they recommended to build a planned economy (traditionally inflating the role of the nation-state in regulating economic processes) and, on the other, spoke about the need to preserve private property. In his letter to Chiang Kaishek, Zhang Junmai, expounding one of the key items of his party's programme, wrote that the advocates of "state socialism" insisted on retaining private property but also recognised public property and state planning, which should promote "general prosperity and progress of the national economy".¹⁸

The primary postulate of "state socialism" invariably present in works of the European architects of this bourgeois reformist concept (Louis Blanc, Karl Rodbertus-Jagetzow and Ferdinand Lassalle) envisions state control over heavy industry and the key branches of the economy. Private property in other economic fields, where it "would not threaten" the interests of the state, should be encouraged. The theorists of the Sinified form of "state socialism" were hardly original in this respect. They promised in this way social equality without socialising the means of production, indispensable from the point of view of Marxism, which maintains that the introduction of state property is not equivalent to the establishment of socialist social relations and does not eliminate class antagonisms and social inequality. The economic aspect of Zhang Junmai's and Zhang Dongsun's theories is graphically illustrated by the Marxist-Leninist maxim that the phenomenon of "state socialism" appeared as a result of the bourgeois falsification, which called any attempt of the state to limit free competition to be "socialism".¹⁹

While they were evolving their theory of the political organisation of society on a nationalistic basis, the SSP ideologists, despite the fact that their views were close to those of Liang Qichao, rejected his idea of "enlightened absolutism" already in the early years of republican rule in China. In their opinion, a rational society was "social democracy" within a framework of a nation-state. Democracy for them was "a certain level of the development of civilisation" rather than merely a "system of government".²⁰ They emphasised that democracy was merely a certain stand in life (a way of thinking) and, as a spiritual stand of the whole nation, it could only be realised in a national state.

The SSP ideologists untiringly repeated that "rationality" presupposed the establishment of "social democracy" by evolutionary methods. They believed unreservedly that any change in China's government structure would be carried out "in accordance with the due process of law and not by means of violence"²¹ because a revolution violating "harmony" and "balance" in rational society made social progress problematic.²² Disput-

¹⁸ *China Handbook, 1937-1943*, New York, 1943, p. 53.

¹⁹ See Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 346.

²⁰ Zhang Dongsun, *Intellect and Democracy*, Shanghai, 1946, p. 1 (in Chinese).

²¹ C. Chang, *The Third Force in China*, New York, 1952, p. 24.

²² See Zhang Dongsun, *Thought and Society*, Shanghai, 1946, pp. 79-80 (in Chinese).

ing Zhang Dongsun's reformist, anti-Marxist point of view, Qu Qiubo wrote in the *Xin Qingnian* journal: "One should rely on one's own forces in fighting for independence, freedom and equality. Hence a national revolution is downright indispensable to overthrow imperialism."²³

Zhang Junmai's and Zhang Dongsun's rejection of the revolutionary methods of transforming an old society conditioned their hostile attitude to the Marxist doctrine of class struggle, which they thought obstructed the development of "freedom and democracy" after a "peaceful revolution": "As long as [class.—S. B.] struggle continues, no peace is possible; construction work is impossible without peace and in turn neither freedom nor democracy can exist without construction work."²⁴ Arguing with Zhang Dongsun, Qu Qiubo wrote: "On the basis of outward manifestation revolution is identified with destruction, while in actual fact it gradually and completely purifies old society and opens the doors for the building of a new society."²⁵

In view of their class affiliation and heightened interest in Western bourgeois values, the theorists of "state socialism" urged to adapt European parliamentary forms to Chinese reality. Insisting that a strong central authority could coexist with "spiritual freedom" in society, they suggested, as a concrete measure for implementing their idea of "democracy", that a modified form of a Western bourgeois democratic government should be established, which would retain the advantages of both "democracy" and "dictatorship". For them the problem was how and to what extent democracy should be "Sinified" to make it possible to combine it with the "positive aspects of dictatorship", with both democracy and dictatorship being, in their view, supra-class phenomena.

The idea of modified democracy proposed by the SSP ideologists was embodied in the form of a "national government", which envisioned the representation of different political parties. "The reformed variety of the constitutional government we advocate is as follows: being democratic in principle and in essence, it presupposes the possibility for any political party to become established in the seat of power". Zhang Junmai wrote to Chiang Kaishek in 1938.²⁶ Symptomatically enough, the two philosophers worked out their draft national government on the model of the First World War French and British coalition governments, which they believed were in the final analysis "the most acceptable models for China". "Constitution government under a two-party system," Zhang Junmai wrote, "has always appeared to me to be the best way to ensure progress without bloodshed."²⁷ This viewpoint can be disproved by a quotation from Lenin, who said that "...as long as property remains in the hands of the capitalists... democracy is nothing but a thoroughly hypocritical cover for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie".²⁸

The SSP theorists displayed their reactionary stance on this issue not only in their negative attitude to the mass revolutionary movement but also in their claim that the mass of the people were incapable of "wise" rule and that an elite government formed of political leaders was indispensable. This idea echoed those of Liang Qichao, who explicitly stated that "the people were incapable of governing themselves". In the early 1920s these views were further developed in the "platform of 14 profes-

²³ Qu Qiubo, *Articles of Different Years*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 218-219.

²⁴ Zhang Dongsun, *Intellect and Democracy*, pp. 143, 146.

²⁵ Qu Qiubo, *Op. cit.*, p. 221.

²⁶ In *China Handbook, 1937-1943*, p. 53.

²⁷ C. Chang, *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

²⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 414.

sors" (Hu Shi, Liang Shuming, Ding Wenjiang, Cai Yuanpei, and others), who called for the formation of "a government of kind people" from among the bourgeois leaders instead of the "bad people" of a militarist government. Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun at the time supported the "platform of 14 professors" and remained true to their stance later on when they pondered on the problem of a political system within the framework of the "state socialism" concept.

In general the "perception of the spirit" of Western democracy and its interpretation in keeping with the concepts evolved in China were for the SSP ideologists a key to the official modernisation of Chinese society "from above".

As is seen, the main flaw of the SSP ideology and activities was a hostile attitude to the social revolution, which brought the party to a political compromise with right-wing forces (the Guomindang). A necessary prerequisite of such an alliance was the renunciation of radical transformations along socialist lines.

Zhang Junmai's and Zhang Dongsun's desire to form a constitutional government on the model of "Western democracies" was caused by their nationalistic, bourgeois-reformist views of socialism and their anti-Marxist interpretation of class contradictions within Chinese society, in which they observed the parallel existence of two factors—social antagonisms (stemming from the division of society into classes and strata) and social community (based on the spiritual, "national" interdependence of different classes and groups). The two philosophers asserted that, as socialism sought to give the peoples spiritual emancipation and to radically restructure the world, it was not a teaching of one class, that is, of the proletariat, but rather it was a theory that focussed the interests of all classes and social groups in their joint effort to "reconstruct" society. This was the thesis they advocated as early as 1919 during the "debate on socialism".

The ideology of nationalism, beyond doubt, nurtures similar views of socialism as a new civilisation, in which different classes and social strata coexist "peacefully" and "to a mutual advantage".

Throughout their activity the "state socialism" theorists believed in the primacy of national consciousness as compared with class consciousness. "Only the force of national interests can break class barriers," Zhang Junmai stressed in a letter to Chiang Kaishek, "but no class interests are capable of breaking the unifying power of a nation."²⁹ Zhang Dongsun claimed that the mentality of the individual was determined by his social standing and made a point that man's social standing was of equivalent to his belonging to one class or another: the socio-cultural milieu was the decisive factor, the social environment which was made up of not so much class-forming factors as of different social institutions, traditions and norms, the language and some general "spirit of the epoch". He said that, though class interests were usually present in the people's minds "as a reflex", the direct social environment influences their mentality and behaviour to a greater extent. This fallacious reasoning prompted Zhang Dongsun a conclusion hostile to the principle of proletarian internationalism, namely, that the Chinese proletariat was not bound to think the way, say, the Indian workers did.³⁰ Similar assertions can be refuted by the following argument offered by Engels: "Because the condition of the workers of all countries is the same, because their interests

²⁹ In *China Handbook, 1937-1943*, pp. 52-53.

³⁰ See Zhang Dongsun, *Knowledge and Culture*, Shanghai, 1947, pp. 83-84 (in Chinese).

are the same, their enemies the same, they must also fight together..."³¹
The SSP leaders' nationalism inevitably evolved into great-Han social chauvinism, as is attested by § 42 of their party's last programme adopted on August 18, 1946, which spoke of the need to propagandise China's national superiority.³² The two philosophers focussed attention on the great assimilatory role of Chinese civilisation, attaching paramount importance to the task of the country's national revival by "relying on its own forces".³³

Thinkers or politicians emerge as representatives of one class or another when they directly serve its interests and goals and also when their thoughts are incapable of going beyond the bounds shaping the "life" of the given class, its experience and being. That is why "...they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive" the representatives of that class "in practice".³⁴

China's ideological life of our time demonstrates that traditional Chinese and Western bourgeois ideologies often helped to combat progressive trends of socio-political thought and above all Marxism. This found expression in the attempts made by the SSP ideologists to find in Western bourgeois philosophy and political thought such ideas that would "complement" Sino-centrist tradition so that their own, "newest" nationalistic concept could be evolved on the basis of that synthesis.

Another characteristic of Chinese bourgeois nationalism consisted in that its motley theories contained a trend connected with the ideology of unscientific socialism. Chinese traditionalist intellectuals, after familiarising themselves with Western socialist doctrines, divided them into "communism" (that is, Marxism) and "national socialism" which they ostensibly preferred.

The theoretical and practical activity of the SSP ideologists was a graphic example of such "socialist ideas" being often used for purposes that were not always progressive. Zhang Junmai's and Zhang Dongsun's "state socialism" was a form of bourgeois nationalism that "masked" itself as a socialist theory when socialist ideas spread in the country. For the same reason they sought to "overcome" both capitalism and socialism in the idea of "Chinese state socialism", the idea of the "third road". The idea of a harmony between "labour and capital", Marx emphasised, was characteristic precisely of "bourgeois socialism".³⁵

The SSP ideologists denied the existence of class antagonisms and asserted the primacy of the national as compared with the social, to substantiate their thesis of "class cooperation in national interests". They declared the state a supra-class "national" institute, all members of which should observe the "national discipline" and whose major function should be to defend the interests of "all social strata". At the same time they believed that capitalism would inevitably develop in China but it would be capitalism "improved" by national peculiarities. Socialist phraseology about state regulation and planning was exploited by them with the sole aim of cloaking the bourgeois content of their nationalistic concept.

³¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 390.

³² See *Materials on the Criticism of the Middle Road of the Chinese Bourgeoisie*, p. 112.

³³ See *Political Parties and Groups...*, p. 50; *Materials on the Criticism of the Middle Road of the Chinese Bourgeoisie*, p. 109.

³⁴ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 130-131.

³⁵ See K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 363 (in Russian).

Rejection of Marxism-Leninism, pronounced nationalism and, as a result, the negation of the principle of proletarian internationalism—all this led the SSP ideologists to anti-Sovietism.³⁶ This was inevitable because the implicit meaning of the slogan of class peace for the sake of a "national idea" was patent hostility towards those social forces and countries that adopted clearcut class positions. In their capacity of trivial bourgeois ideologists, Zhang Junmai and Zhang Dongsun opposed the experience of the October Revolution and cooperation with the USSR, resorting to threadbare anti-Soviet demagoguery, for example, on left-wing "totalitarianism" of "the type of Soviet communism".³⁷

A retrospective analysis of one of the manifestations of bourgeois nationalism will obviously be very helpful in understanding the processes of China's ideological development in the twentieth century.

³⁶ See *Political Parties and Groups...*, p. 48.

³⁷ C. Chang, *Op. cit.*, pp. 6, 24-25, 114.

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COMINTERN'S ROLE IN ELABORATING CCP POLICY IN WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

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[Article by T. N. Akatova, doctor of historical sciences]

The 6th Congress of the CPC (June-July 1928), convened on the initiative and with direct assistance of the Comintern, was of paramount importance in the history of the Chinese revolution, the working-class and communist movement in China.¹ The congress faced a whole complex of intricate problems of the revolution, of the country's life and the CPC activity under Guomindang domination. Its task was to stop leftist errors that swept the party after the 1927 split of the united anti-imperialist front, in conditions of the grave defeat of the democratic forces. The leftist, adventurous attempts at staging an immediate armed uprising of workers and peasants against the Guomindang stemmed from an erroneous evaluation of the situation as revolutionary, from an unjustified expectation that the revolution would develop into a socialist one. The leadership of the party underestimated the forces of counterrevolution, the objective problems that confronted the CPC after the Guomindang's rise to power, and overestimated the class and political consciousness of the masses and their readiness to win power. Lenin characterised such signs of adventurism and impatience as resulting from the inability at major turns of history to evaluate objectively the correlation of forces and, having changed the form of struggle, to organise with minimum losses a retreat of revolutionary forces.²

In fact, overestimation of the political maturity of the working class resulted from its heroic struggle in the 1925-1927 revolution. It was overlooked that in those years the workers were fighting the sworn enemy of the whole people of China—foreign imperialism, whereas the struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie was not only devoid of political character but was still in the first phase of defence by workers of their elementary economic demands. There was no ground whatsoever under calculations that as much mettle as had been displayed in anti-imperialist struggle would be shown by the workers in the fight against the national bourgeoisie—their recent ally, against the Guomindang that for many years had been heading the liberation struggle and still in one way or another came up with anti-imperialist slogans. Underestimation of the extent of

¹ Events connected with the convocation and holding of the 6th Congress of the CPC, the assistance rendered by the Comintern to the CPC, have been written on by Soviet historians (see A. Grigoryev, "Important milestone in the history of the CPC", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1973, No. 3). The present article focuses attention on the significance of the elaboration by the congress of the working-class problems and on the Comintern's cooperation in the fulfilment of decisions adopted by the congress on strengthening the CPC's ties with the working masses.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 28.

the defeat of the revolutionary forces mostly stemmed from overrating the leading position of the CPC within the working-class movement, from the conviction that the Guomindang would be unable to bring the working masses under its influence. However, the reaction succeeded in inflicting tremendous losses to the party cadres in cities and towns and to the most active part of the working class connected with the CPC. The Guomindang's bloody terror after the rupture of the united front is indeed a black chapter in the history of the Chinese people. Affiliation with the CPC or with the leadership of the revolutionary trade unions was reason enough for a death sentence. The Chinese press was full of reports of extermination of communists in the cities and towns of China. According to Qu Qiubo, by the middle of 1928 not less than 80 per cent of revolutionary trade union activists in the country's industrial centres were killed, arrested or fired.³ The activity of many party organisations was paralysed. In these extremely difficult conditions the communist party continued to seek ways of reviving revolution, without taking into account, however, the real balance of forces. The August and November 1927 conferences of the CPC CC, instead of manoeuvring a retreat and sheltering the revolutionary forces, adopted a course toward an armed uprising of the proletariat and peasantry aimed at a socialist revolution.

The CPC leaders' hopes for a proletarian revolt against the Guomindang were groundless in those conditions not only because of an absolute preponderance of reactionary forces that unleashed white terror, but also because of other reasons. Central among them were a post-revolutionary depression in the working-class movement that affected most deeply the industrial proletariat; the weak ties of the CPC with the working masses; the flexibility of the Guomindang's policy toward the working class. In the most severe conditions of underground and depression in the working-class and general national-revolutionary movement after 1927, all the weak points of the party's activity in organising the proletarian masses in the preceding revolutionary years became apparent. At the 6th CPC Congress a Comintern representative stated that the party had failed during the years of revolutionary upsurge to organically link up with the working masses, to instill in them the conviction that it was their vanguard and defended their own interests.⁴ Delegates from localities pointed out that during the revolution the workers had not been given a clear idea about the difference between the CPC and the Guomindang and therefore did not perceive the counterrevolutionary essence of the 1927 coup.⁵

Guomindang terror depleted to a great extent the thin layer of proletarian activists that connected the CPC with the working masses. Only few trade unions, led by the CPC, managed to survive, having gone deep underground. As has already been said, the peculiarity of the Chinese trade union movement from its very inception was its organic connection with the anti-imperialist struggle. Now the CPC leadership regarded the few and weak red trade unions exclusively as an instrument of class struggle in its highest form—that of proletarian uprising. Indicative in this connection was also the disregard of the leadership of the party and red trade unions for the day-to-day economic struggle which was of much

³ See Strakhov (Qu Qiubo), "Questions of Chinese Trade Union Movement", *Problems of China*, 1930, No. 2, p. 43 (in Russian).

⁴ See *The 6th Congress of the CPC. Minutes*, book 1, Moscow, 1930, pp. 46-47.

⁵ *Ibid.*, book 2, pp. 100-101, 106, 128-129; book 3, pp. 9, 19, 62.

importance for the workers in the lean years of mass layoffs after the revolution.

As for Guomindang, it viewed its measures of "pacifying" the working class as an important part of its reformist social policy whose success was helped by close connection with nationalism. It was just the objectives of national liberation and revival of China's might, so close and understandable to the politically immature masses, that dictated, according to the Guomindang, the necessity of achieving "class reconciliation", cooperation between labour and capital, as well as thorough control by the Guomindang state over all aspects of the working-class movement. Destroying "communist" trade unions and exterminating their leaders, the Guomindang at the same time created new, legal trade unions which were called upon to ensure cooperation between labour and capital, as well as the authorities' control over all activities of the workers.

Right from the beginning of legal trade unions the Guomindang displayed some characteristic features of its labour policy: immediate and severe suppression of any political anti-government action and at the same time a show of attention for the vital interests of the working masses so as to calm them down and win them over. Of course, the Guomindang defended the interests of employers, but did so in a rather subtle way, declaring the super-class nature of its regime, that allegedly worked for the good of the whole nation, and making certain concessions to the working class. The obligatory mediation of Guomindang organisations in the arbitration of labour conflicts sometimes did result in satisfaction of the workers' elementary demands. Even though it happened in critical situations, fraught with serious labour trouble, such cases, widely publicised by Guomindang propaganda, to a certain extent dampened the militancy of the workers. It is noteworthy that calling sometimes on the employers to make concessions to the workers for the sake of "class reconciliation", the authorities usually pointed to the danger of communist activity aimed at "fanning up the class struggle". Small concessions to the workers were accompanied by much clamour about the government preparing new labour legislation, about measures in studying labour and living conditions of the working people. The Guomindang's pragmatic and flexible labour policy proved an extremely detrimental factor for the CPC activity among the workers.

The assertion by the CPC leadership that the revolution was on the upswing, its course for an armed uprising put an overtaxing burden on the decimated urban cadres of the CPC working in difficult underground conditions. An extreme exaggeration of the subjective factor, always typical of leftist delusions, led to a situation wherein, trying to fire the masses with feats of personal courage and scorn for the enemy, underground communists violated elementary rules of secrecy. The party's force in cities and towns was withering daily.

Worsening labour conditions and layoffs provoked a spontaneous everyday struggle of the workers striving to defend and retain their positions. An ever greater part in this struggle was played by legal trade unions which were becoming a necessary instrument of settling labour conflicts. The working masses were not heeding the CPC political slogans. The course for an armed uprising did not correlate with the level of the workers' struggle. This only increased impatience in the party ranks, pushed communists to unprepared actions in which the working masses did not take part. The CPC attempted formally to organise proletarian revolts, counting on the development of economic actions into a general political uprising. The slogan was advanced "Turn every little fight into

a big one!"⁶ In the course of everyday economic struggle the communists, without due preparation, even without ties with workers and contrary to their moods, attempted to "fix up" the dates of political strikes and armed uprisings. For example, in Wuhan a political strike, which never took place, was "fixed" for August 2 and intended to support the Nanchang uprising that began on August 1, 1927. Wuhan communists believed that it was enough to proclaim anti-Guomindang slogans to raise workers up in arms.⁷ Despite the failure, another adventurous attempt was made to "fix" the date of an armed uprising of Wuhan workers for October 13, 1927, at a time of struggle for power in Wuhan among warlords. Because of complete unpreparedness the uprising was "called off" and instead a general strike "fixed" for the same day, but it was also unfeasible and did not take place. The actions of Wuhan communists were cited at the 6th Congress as examples of putschism and "playing with the uprising".⁸

In Shanghai the communists tried in vain to provoke a general uprising proceeding from an economic strike by textile factory workers in the Pudong district. Since peasant disturbances were afoot at the time near Shanghai, the communists hoped that on their call a workers' and peasants' uprising would start, embracing the Jiangsu province with Shanghai as its centre.⁹ The strike in Pudong was defeated, the action by peasants was immediately suppressed. The masses did not follow the slogans for an uprising. These slogans only put the authorities on their guard and resulted in raids and roundups which inflicted heavy losses to the CPC forces in Shanghai.¹⁰

Trying to organise in Shanghai a general strike of the English tram company workers in December 1927, the communists even threatened reluctant workers with reprisals usually meted out to strike-breakers. Several workers were killed and wounded by the pickets of strikers.¹¹ Though it was an isolated episode, and while the strike was still on the underground General Committee of Shanghai trade unions called a halt to "red terror" against those who stood aside, this event discredited the CPC policy in the eyes of the workers. Analysing these events the Comintern representative at the 6th Congress of the CPC characterised them as the most dangerous attempts "to make revolution" to the detriment of the party's links with the masses, instead of winning the trust of the masses by methods of persuasion.¹²

At the end of 1927 the CPC collected its forces to organise an armed uprising in Canton. The communists hoped to set up there a territorial base of the revolution and turn it into the centre of a general armed uprising in China. The situation in Canton was more favourable for the CPC than in other cities. However the ingredients of the "revolutionary situation" here too were much exaggerated in the minds of the CPC leadership. By heroic efforts the CPC managed to raise to rebellion 20,000 members of the underground red trade unions who showed wonders of valour and self-sacrifice. But that was only a small part of the Canton working class, numbering about 300,000.

⁶ Qu Jinbo (compiler), *Collection of Materials on the Working-Class Movement in China, 1927-1928*, Moscow, 1931, pp. 41-42 (in Chinese).

⁷ *The 6th Congress of the CPC...*, book 5, p. 90.

⁸ *Ibid.*, book 2, pp. 70-71; book 5, p. 41.

⁹ See Buersaiweike, 1927, No. 7, pp. 178-187; Qu Jinbo (compiler), *Op. cit.*, pp. 41-43.

¹⁰ See *Materials on the Chinese Question*, 1928, No. 10, p. 201.

¹¹ See Buersaiweike, 1927, No. 10, p. 286; Qu Jinbo (compiler), *Op. cit.*, pp. 56-58.

¹² See *The 6th Congress of the CPC...*, book 1, p. 42.

An absolute preponderance of the forces of Guomindang reaction sealed the fate of the Canton commune that was suppressed with unprecedented ferocity. Its defeat entailed even a greater severity of white terror in towns and cities and put the CPC in tough conditions indeed.

The crisis of the CPC leftist directives and the weakness of its links with the working masses became especially evident in the spring of 1928, during an upsurge of the working-class struggle against the Japanese. (It was caused by a new act of Japanese aggression—the shooting down of civilians in the city of Jinan on May 3, 1928.) Decimated by terror, the CPC underground failed to use this upsurge to forge its links with the workers. The tragedy was compounded by the fact that legal trade unions, branded by communists as unrepresentative and treacherous, had become very active and moved to the forefront of the anti-Japanese movement, while the CPC, that had always stood in the vanguard of anti-imperialist struggle, found itself in isolation.¹³ The party's links with the working masses were in a muddle. In the summer of 1928 in a report at the 6th CPC Congress on organisational work Zhou Enlai, stating the demise of almost all party cells in the main industrial centres and in the chief branches of industry, said that the party had lost workers as its base, that it was hardly possible to say that the illegal trade unions really existed.¹⁴

In these circumstances the assistance rendered by the Comintern to the CPC proved to be of tremendous importance. The 9th Plenary Meeting of the Comintern's Executive Committee in February 1928 emphasised with all seriousness the pressing necessity for the CPC to revise its strategic directives and revolutionary practice. The whole resolution on the Chinese question adopted by the plenary meeting was permeated with deep concern over the fate of the Chinese revolution and the CPC itself. This document, which played an historic role, provides graphic proof that the Comintern had thoroughly analysed the situation in China, trying to use the experience of international revolutionary struggle to help the CPC find a way out of its plight, resulting from a rupture of the united front and defeats in rear-guard battles.

The Comintern's Executive Committee resolutely rejected the view that the Chinese revolution was on the ascent, stating the characteristic feature of the general "gravest" defeat of the democratic forces: "...while in a number of provinces the *peasant* movement is further developing, in a number of industrial centres the *workers'* movement, bled white and gripped in the vice of unprecedented white terror, is undergoing a certain phase of depression"¹⁵ The resolution pointed out that in China the non-completed stage of a bourgeois-democratic national revolution still continued and that directives aimed at a socialist revolution were deeply erroneous and led in practice to such intolerable events as coercion of workers to make them strike, putschism, playing with the uprising. As a result a real danger emerged of a divorce of the CPC from the masses.¹⁶ The Executive Committee of the Comintern stressed that "the centre of gravity of all party work at the moment lies in winning over the million-strong masses of workers and peasants, in their political education,

¹³ At the 6th Congress of the CPC it was noted that all the anti-Japanese working-class organisations turned out to be under the leadership of Guomindang trade unions. — See *The 6th Congress of the CPC...*, book 2, p. 122; book 3, p. 115; book 6, p. 11.

¹⁴ *The 6th Congress of the CPC...*, book 4, pp. 5-11.

¹⁵ *The 9th Plenum of the EC of the Comintern (February 1928). Resolution on the Chinese Question and Comintern Tactic in a National-Colonial Revolution as Exemplified by China. Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1934, p. 208.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209.

in their rallying around the party..."¹⁷ The task of the CPC regarding the working-class movement was formulated as "winning back the workers from the class enemy".¹⁸ The formula paid attention to special difficulties faced by the underground party organisations in towns and cities in connection with the increasing influence of the Guomindang over the working masses and the growth of legal trade unions.

The Comintern underscored the objective difficulties in the development of the Chinese revolution and the activity of the CPC under the Guomindang regime, the pressing necessity of allround assistance to the CPC from the international proletariat: "The EC of the Comintern declares it a duty of all our sections to give all possible support to the Chinese revolution... The EC of the Comintern calls upon all workers, and communists in the first place, to fulfill their international proletarian duty of solidarity with and assistance to the heroic proletariat of China."¹⁹

The preparations of the CPC for its 6th Congress that got under way after the 9th Plenum of the EC of the Comintern were marked by international proletarian solidarity. The holding of the congress in China swept by Guomindang terror was impossible. Its convocation in Moscow was an act of international assistance to the CPC which was placed in extremely difficult underground conditions. The 6th CPC Congress went down in the history of the international working-class and communist movement as an example of proletarian internationalism. The assistance offered to the Chinese communists by the Comintern, the Trade Union International (the Profintern), the RCP(B) before the congress, the organisation and holding of the congress in Moscow, the speeches by representatives of the Comintern and the Trade Union International touching on the most crucial issues, the warm sympathy of the international proletariat for the Chinese revolution, the account taken of the experience of the international working-class movement—all of this was a graphic manifestation of revolutionary solidarity. At the congress a spirit of lofty and courageous self-criticism, a desire by the Chinese communists to find sure ways of turning the CPC into a real vanguard of the workers' and peasant masses and spare no effort for the sake of the Chinese revolution reigned supreme.

First, the congress analysed the specifics of the contemporary state of the Chinese revolution and appraised the political situation. On these cardinal issues representatives of the Comintern and the Trade Union International carried out a lot of explanatory work. The congress adopted the definition of the character of the revolution and the contemporary situation that was worked out by the 9th Plenary Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.²⁰ It was specially stressed that in a period of grave defeat of the revolutionary forces, of a sharp weakening of the CPC and its ties with the masses, calls for an immediate armed uprising were groundless. The party's general policy line was declared by the congress to be the "struggle for the masses".²¹ That represented the great achievement of the congress. The line of struggle for the masses was not only the only answer at that critical period but also the only correct course for the future.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

²¹ See *Political Resolution of the 6th Congress of the CPC. Programme Documents of the Communist Parties of the East*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 15-16.

The general directives and all concrete decisions of the congress were aimed at strengthening the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, at coordinating the revolutionary struggle in cities and rural areas. This was stressed by a representative of the Trade Union International in a speech before the congress when he said that the Chinese revolution can successfully develop and win, of course, only relying on workers and peasants.²²

The congress' big and fruitful work on the problems of guidance of the working-class movement by the CPC was of serious practical and theoretical consequence. Subjected to analysis was the experience of guiding the workers' movement during the 1925-1927 revolution and during Guomindang terror. The congress approached the general problems of the labour movement in China in a creative way. First of all, it posed the problem of "the party and the working class". Speaking sternly and fearlessly, the delegates related the bitter experiences of defeats and failures of underground work in the cities. Their speeches recreated a dismal picture of erroneous, leftist actions by communists regarding the working masses. Issuing orders and resorting to direct coercion up to threats of physical reprisals against inactive workers, the party kept on losing touch with the masses. Delegates from Shanghai, Wuhan, Nanchang, Anyuan and other cities spoke about vain attempts by communists to organise armed uprisings that turned into putschism, about the useless loss of lives, about adventurism of such actions and disregard for the economic needs of the workers that ever more alienated the party cells that were still extant in the cities from the masses.²³ In the report by Zhou Enlai, in the speech by Su Zhaozheng and in speeches by many other delegates it was noted that red trade unions in practice were not of a mass nature and represented underground cells of the CPC at enterprises. They did not conduct any specific trade union work, did not collect trade union dues from members, did not hold meetings or other rallies. There were as many red trade unions in a city as there were party cells. Besides, the communists had in the main links not with the industrial proletariat but with some backward layers of workers.²⁴

The congress discussed possibilities of strengthening the CPC's proletarian basis and its ties with the working masses, primarily with the industrial proletariat. The recommendations of the Comintern and the Trade Union International were of great importance. The representative of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, having paid tribute to the self-sacrifice and heroism of the party cadres working in the cities gripped by white terror, stressed the necessity of correctly estimating the enemy forces. He pointed out that the experience of the international working-class movement showed that revolutionary militancy called not for striving for battle every minute but for making correct evaluations and, when necessary, postponing battle. Attempts to make the depressed working masses strike and even rebel against their will and under slogans that were not understood by them were condemned as most dangerous for the revolution and the party itself.²⁵ It was just the absence of profound links with the working masses that engendered, as an act of despair, "red terror", as well as adventurism, putschism and methods of coercion. The

²² *The 6th Congress of the CPC...*, book 1, p. 64.

²³ *Ibid.*, book 2, pp. 41-45, 49-58, 69-71; book 3, pp. 21, 56, 59; book 5, pp. 41-42, 126-127.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, book 3, p. 18; book 4, pp. 10, 11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, book 1, pp. 37-42.

EC representative concluded that the most essential task of the CPC regarding the labour movement was routine everyday work, concentrating attention on the economic needs of the masses and intensifying their anti-imperialist struggle.²⁶ The representative of the Trade Union International in turn pointed out the possibility of overcoming the isolation in which the working class found itself after the rupture of the united front, the possibility lying only in anti-imperialist struggle, and advised that the proletariat be surrounded by a "layer of urban petty-bourgeoisie".²⁷

Proceeding from the recommendations by the Comintern and the Trade Union International, from the whole experience of struggle, the congress worked out a resolution, *The Immediate Tasks of the CPC in the Working-Class Movement*. Its main points were: stopping methods of coercion regarding the working masses, consolidation of red trade unions and simultaneous penetration into all legal workers' organisations, allround strengthening of the guidance of economic struggle, freeing the masses from the influence of Guomindang's reformist ideology, establishment of links of Soviet regions with the workers' movement in towns and cities, development of anti-imperialist, anti-militarist struggle of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie.²⁸

The congress emphasised the difficulties of achieving these objectives in conditions of terror and of growing legal reformist trade-unionism. It was pointed out that the task of mobilising the working masses around the CPC and its trade unions had not been solved during the 1925-1927 revolution and now it had to be solved in immensely more difficult conditions.²⁹ The allround strengthening of ties of the CPC with its own working class had to be organically combined, in the unanimous opinion of the congress participants, with a course of union with the USSR and the world proletarian movement.³⁰

The line of struggle for the masses proclaimed by the 6th Congress had a positive effect on the work of the CPC in the country's industrial centres. No longer setting itself tasks that were unfeasible at a given stage, the party began to adapt its tactic to the objective conditions of the labour movement. Overcoming great difficulties, the CPC began groping for ways of rapprochement with the workers. The role of the subjective factor, in this case, of the party's policy and methods of guiding the working-class movement, became manifest at that time. As pointed out by the Comintern, the role of the subjective factor, the success of the CPC's guidance depended directly upon the understanding by the communists of the objective conditions and laws.

On February 8, 1929 the Executive Committee of the Comintern examined the results of a half year of activity of the CPC after the congress and sent a letter to the CC of the CPC. It noted that some members of the CPC were making mistakes of both rightist and leftist nature. Rightist vacillations led to a tendency towards liquidating red trade unions and the CPC itself. Leftist moods resulted in disregard for "petty" economic struggle, in negation of activity in legal organisations as being "unrevolutionary". Again and again the Comintern explained the importance of the task of "liquidating the divorce of the party from

²⁶ *Ibid.*, book 1, pp. 24, 46, 47.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, book 1, p. 64.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, book 6, pp. 14-16.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, book 6, p. 4.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, book 6, p. 3.

the broad strata of the working people" and offered concrete advice.³¹

In the summer of 1929, a year after the 6th Congress, the Executive Committee of the Comintern worked out a resolution on the work of the Chinese Communist Party in trade unions. Having noted that the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 6th Convocation (June-July 1929) correctly adopted a line of simultaneous work in red and legal trade unions, the Comintern pointed out the necessity of differentiated approach in every concrete situation. On penetration by communists of a legal trade union it was necessary to take account of its numbers—only those trade unions had to be joined which embraced a considerable number of workers. A principally new recommendation, concretising the decisions of the 6th Congress, concerned red trade unions. They had to be set up not on the principle "the more the better" but only in cases where objective conditions existed for turning them into mass organisations; in places where legal trade unions reigned supreme, there was not only no point in setting up red trade unions but those that were created from "above" and existed only on paper, had to be dissolved.³² The Executive Committee again advised that under the secret guidance of red trade unions factory committees be set up uniting all workers of an enterprise and that various associations of fellow-countrymen, brotherhoods and other archaic organisations that existed legally be used as covers for underground trade unions. Simultaneously the resolution contained concrete pieces of advice on how to conduct trade union work. The Executive Committee stressed the necessity of renouncing the customary methods of "commands" and setting up unions from "above", advised that party members be sent to enterprises, that they work there and, being among the masses, organise factory-floor cells of trade unions.³³

Many of the Comintern's recommendations formed the agenda of party and trade union conferences by the CPC devoted to putting into practice the decisions of the 6th Congress. On February 7, 1929 the All-China Federation of Trade Unions held a second, enlarged session in Shanghai whose decisions concretised the meaning of the "line of masses" in the working-class movement. Upon the insistent advice of the Comintern, the CPC tried to correct the organisational mistakes of trade-unionism that had taken root from the time of the 1925-1927 revolution, when trade unions were set up from "above". It was decided to create, starting in Shanghai, "a real foundation of mass trade unions" on the principle "from grass-roots upward" under the slogan "Go to works and factories!"³⁴ The difficulty of that work can be judged from the fact that all subsequent decisions by party and trade union conferences noted again and again the organisational weakness of red trade unions, their insufficient penetration of the masses of the industrial proletariat. This was also stated by the Comintern. It is characteristic that preparation of a mere 30 trade union organisers at underground instruction courses in Shanghai was rated a great success.³⁵

³¹ See "Letter of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to the CC of the Chinese Communist Party (February 1929)", *Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern...*, pp. 229, 230.

³² See "Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the Work of the Chinese Communist Party in Trade Unions (1929)", *Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern...*, pp. 248-250.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

³⁴ *Documents of the All-China Congresses of Trade Unions*, Peking, 1957, p. 258 (in Chinese).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

Much attention was devoted to the problems of labour movement by the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 6th Convocation that worked out a broad resolution on the trade-union movement. Having summed up the results of work for a year following the 6th Congress, the plenary meeting confirmed the main decisions of the second enlarged conference of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. The resolution underlined the necessity of doing away with such shortcomings in trade-union work as "bureaucratism, appointments from "above" instead of by election, commanding instead of persuading the masses".³⁶ The plenary meeting's concrete decisions went a long way in improving the practical activity of the CPC. Publication of periodicals for the workers was begun. *Zhongguo gongren* (Chinese worker), with a circulation of 3,000 became the mouthpiece of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. In Shanghai illustrated *Shanghaibao* won popularity, and local periodicals were also launched in other cities.³⁷ The communists streamlined the activities of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its local branches. The number of its functionaries was cut down to the minimum and many communists were sent off to enterprises. In Shanghai workers' schools and reading circles were organised so as to "instill gradually class consciousness".³⁸ All of these were, of course, just the first steps but even they were not easily made in those conditions.

As for concrete measures by the CPC after the 6th Congress, of much interest is the CPC Instruction on the development of labour movement in the Henan province that was intercepted in the Autumn of 1929 and kept in a Guomindang archive.³⁹ The main body of workers here was represented by 20,000 railwaymen of the Peking-Hankou and Longhai railways. It was among them that the CPC intended to start its work. The communists' plan was concrete and well thought out. In keeping with the decisions of the 6th Congress, it was pointed out that the main task of the time was not an uprising but attaining guidance of the working class. The party cells received the following instructions: "Start with economic struggle, focus on the most essential and urgent demands of the workers and make them the chief slogan of the struggle. The demands must necessarily be feasible, it is vital to win at least small victories: this will inspire the workers, shake off their depression and fear." Along with economic struggle it was recommended to conduct anti-Japanese propaganda, stressing the idea that Japanese were connived at by the Chinese rich. Instructions envisaged various ways of rapprochement with the masses and of winning their trust: "talks in the street", issue of colourful posters, patriotic anti-Japanese theatricals, etc.

That document is typical of that period. It was just such direction of work that ensured first successes of the CPC in different regions of the country as the party gradually restored its positions in the trade-union movement and in the guidance of strikes.

On November 7, 1929, the 5th All-China Congress of Trade Unions was convened in the Shanghai underground. The forces of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions were still modest. Actually it was not an all-China body. But in the period following the 6th Congress of the CPC, which noted the almost complete collapse of red trade unions, the communists had managed to improve the situation. In Shanghai, which was the centre

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

³⁹ *Collection of Materials on Contemporary Political History of China*, issue 2, vol. 43, 1958, doc. 5413-1 (in Chinese).

of the CPC's work, the underground trade unions embraced about 27,000 workers.⁴⁰ In other cities, where work had just begun, their membership numbered no more than 3,000.⁴¹ The decisions of the congress once again concretised the "line of the masses" policy. The necessity of establishing direct ties with the Soviet movement, of strengthening the alliance between workers and peasants was specially emphasised.⁴²

That congress, the first in underground conditions, was a major achievement by the CPC. It was characterised by a spirit of international proletarian solidarity. The report by Xiang Ying, who succeeded Su Zhaozheng as chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, had a special section on the international ties of the Federation which was member of the Profintern and the Pacific Secretariat of Trade Unions. The congress stated that the Chinese working class, which happened to be in a very difficult situation, was not alone. By decision of the Executive Bureau of the Profintern a commission was set up of representatives of the Comintern, the Profintern, the Peasant International, the International Workers' Aid, International Organisation for Aid to Revolutionaries, the "Hands off China!" Society and other organisations. The commission organised in July 1928 a two-week campaign for assistance to China in the USSR, England, the USA, Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland. As usual, most funds were supplied by the working people of the USSR. The All-Union Council of Trade Unions transferred 100,000 roubles to help the Chinese workers.⁴³ The Soviet press of those days carried a great many articles on the labour movement in China. No other country of the world covered the Chinese events so truthfully and in detail. The Trade Unions International helped organise in the underground in Shanghai in February and October of 1928 regular sessions of the Pacific Secretariat of Trade Unions, attended by delegates of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions and the revolutionary trade unions of the US, England, France, Japan, Australia, Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia.⁴⁴ In August 1929 a representative II Pacific Conference of Trade Unions was held in Vladivostok.⁴⁵ These international gatherings focused on the problems of the working-class and communist movement in China and the assistance to it by the international proletariat.

The All-China Federation of Trade Unions also strove to educate the Chinese workers in the spirit of international proletarian solidarity. During railway provocations in 1929 by the Guomindang military, the Federation called on the workers to stage a movement in defence of the USSR against the intrigues of imperialists and their Guomindang henchmen.⁴⁶ On the International anti-militarist day of August 1, 1929, Chinese communists staged meetings and demonstrations in many cities under corresponding slogans.⁴⁷

The communists were stepping up their activity among the workers under very dire conditions. The CPC aimed to win leadership over the main bodies of the industrial proletariat. However objective conditions

⁴⁰ See *Documents of the All-China Congresses of Trade Unions*, p. 263.

⁴¹ In underground conditions there was no registration of the CPC members or those of trade unions. All figures are very approximate and possibly, overstated.

⁴² See *Documents of the All-China Congresses of Trade Unions*, pp. 309-312, 339-344.

⁴³ See *Red International of Trade Unions*, 1928, No. 10, p. 304.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1928, No. 3, pp. 7-8; No. 7, pp. 43-45.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 1929, No. 8, pp. 659-676.

⁴⁶ See *Documents of the All-China Congresses of Trade Unions*, pp. 261-262.

⁴⁷ See Qu Vito (Qu Qiubo), "Under the Banner of Chinese Soviets", *Communist International*, 1929, No. 52, pp. 13-16.

hindered this main path of strengthening the CPC's proletarian base. The Guomindang also intensified its work among this vanguard body of workers. Guomindang efforts at "peaceful settlement" of labour conflicts led to only a few of the latter resulting in strikes.⁴⁸ This made even more significant the staging by underground communist organisers of a number of major strikes officially headed by legal trade unions. The participation of communists added decisiveness to the workers' struggle. Very persistent was, for example, a general strike by post-office workers in October 1928 in Shanghai. Only by special efforts did the Guomindang succeed in preventing the strike from spreading to all major cities of the country. (Chiang Kaishek himself "talked" the strikers into sacrificing "particular" interests for the sake of the national.) The CPC in its underground publications—the organ of the CPC CC *Buersaiweike*, *Lenin Qingnian*, journals and newspapers for the workers, as well as in a special issue of *Gongren baojian* (Precious experience of workers) minutely analysed the course of that strike, exposed the reformist leadership of the legal trade union that led the strike to a defeat.⁴⁹

Illegal communist publications also covered in much detail a strike at the French tram and water supply company in Shanghai in December 1928. The legal strike committee included communists from the underground All-China Federation of Trade Unions.⁵⁰

The CPC stepped up its work in other cities as well. In the Autumn of 1928 it organised a large strike, participated in by many thousands of workers, at the Jingdezhen china works (Jiangxi province). The workers here engaged in fights with the police, firmly stood their ground and won a victory.⁵¹ Of a similar militant character was a strike by miners in Anyuan in the autumn of 1928 that was suppressed by force.⁵²

In 1929, as a result of the worsening economic situation and growing anti-Japanese movement, an awakening of the workers' movement was registered in the country. The communists managed to find their way to the head of many major actions by the workers. In January 1929 a general anti-Japanese strike broke out in Hankou. It was touched off by the murder of a Chinese ricksha by a Japanese sailor. The strike committees at enterprises included communists who acted illegally. In many Chinese cities anti-Japanese meetings were held and donations collected for the strikers.⁵³ It is noteworthy that the CPC and the Communist Party of Japan came up with a joint appeal to the workers and peasants of both countries to fight Japanese imperialism and the venal Guomindang government.⁵⁴ The strikers succeeded in having the murderer punished and a regular payment of indemnity granted to the family of the victim.

The Guomindang archives contain reports to the effect that communists showed much activity in the anti-Japanese struggle of Qingdao workers in 1929-1930. Here an illegal CPC organisation created strong red trade unions among the workers of Japanese enterprises. The Guomindang authorities resorted to repressions to stamp out the CPC influence. In 1930, an order by the Guomindang Executive Committee,

⁴⁸ See, for example, *Second Chinese Yearbook on Labour*, Part 2, Peking, 1932, pp. 107-114, 125-126 (in Chinese).

⁴⁹ See *Buersaiweike*, 1928, No. 1, pp. 46-49; *Lenin qingnian*, 1928, No. 1, pp. 29-31; *Gongren baojian*, issue 1, pp. 5-41.

⁵⁰ See *Gongren baojian*, special issue No. 2; *Lenin qingnian*, 1928, No. 1, pp. 1-3.

⁵¹ See *Documents of the All-China Congresses of Trade Unions*, p. 254.

⁵² See *Red International of Trade Unions*, 1929, No. 4, p. 312.

⁵³ See *Second Chinese Yearbook on Labour*, Part 2, p. 141; *Buersaiweike*, 1929, No. 5, pp. 46-48.

⁵⁴ See *Buersaiweike*, 1929, No. 5, pp. 1-8.

signed by Chiang Kaishek himself, went so far as banning all trade unions in Qingdao.⁵⁵ Of interest is the story of woman communist, Chen Shaomin, member of a CPC city committee, who in 1930 set up a militant red trade union of women workers at the British tobacco factories in Qingdao. She had taken a job at a factory as a simple worker and it took her a long time to win the trust of her co-workers.⁵⁶ In Shanghai, despite all persecutions, the communists continued to be active in 1929 and in the beginning of 1930. In January 1929 the communists themselves led a strike at the American Edison electrical bulb factory for better working conditions and recognition of a workers' club (a cover for a red trade union). The police opened fire on the strikers, two workers were killed and several wounded. The CPC spread leaflets calling for support of the strike and organised a demonstration of solidarity. The American company had to give in and treat the wounded at its own expense.⁵⁷ In April-May 1930, under the guidance of communists, 1,500 workers of the British tram company in Shanghai struck for 22 days. Here a red trade union had been set up and a legal workers' club functioned as a cover. The result of the strike was that the strikers won a pay raise.⁵⁸ A major success of the CPC in Shanghai was a 57-day strike (from June 20 to August 14, 1930) at the enterprises of the French electrical and water supply company. A CPC underground cell headed by worker Xu Amei had taken time for a thorough preparation of the strike the aim of which was higher wages. The strikers stood firm despite the orders of the Guomindang authorities, arrests, shootings and actions of white-guard strike-breakers. The workers' stubborn struggle called forth solidarity from 15 legal trade unions which set up a committee of assistance that collected considerable donations. For the first time the communists established a direct link between striking workers and Soviet regions. About a thousand yuan were secretly dispatched to the strikers' fund from a Soviet region in Western Hubei.⁵⁹ The strike was successful. The workers got a pay increase, the arrested strikers were freed and wages were paid for the days of the strike.⁶⁰

Also worth mentioning is the CPC's activity in Tianjin, where in the spring of 1929 the communists penetrated a legal trade union of the Belgian tram company. A communist, Zhen Zuoming, won leadership of the trade union which became very active in defending the workers' interests. The sacking of Zhen Zuoming resulted in a protest strike in June 1929 which also put forward ten economic demands. The strikers organised a detachment of anti-imperialist propaganda exposing the Belgian company which oppressed the workers. The city dwellers raised 20,000 yuan for the strikers' fund. In 12 days all the demands of the strikers were satisfied.⁶¹

⁵⁵ See *Collection of Materials on Political History of China*, issue 2, vol. 43, documents 5405, 5503-1-4, 5545, 5547, 5548-5549.

⁵⁶ See *Selected Histories of Factories in Shandong Province*, Jinan, 1959, pp. 1-30 (in Chinese).

⁵⁷ See *Shanghaibao*, Jan. 3, 1930; *Fifth Congress of Comintern. August 15-30, 1930. Resolutions and Decisions*, Moscow, 1930, pp. 121-122.

⁵⁸ Jin Yingzi, "Working-Class Movement in China in the Period from April 1927 to September 18, 1931. *Zhongshan daxue xuebao shehui kexue*", 1957, No. 2, pp. 74-94.

⁵⁹ See *Bulletin of Scientific Research Institute on China*, 1930, No. 3, p. 21.

⁶⁰ See Liu Changsheng et al, *The CPC and the Workers of Shanghai*, Shanghai, 1953, pp. 14-16 (in Chinese).

⁶¹ The history of the strike is given in accordance with the materials made available to the author at the chair of contemporary history in Nankai University in the city of Tianjing.

In 1928 the All-China Federation of Trade Unions sent its communist representatives to the British coal mines in Kailuan. In the spring of 1929, as a result of extensive work carried out by the communists, 18,000 miners demanded that the British administration improve labour conditions. They also came out against the treacherous policy of the reformist trade-union leaders. At a number of mines the leadership of legal trade unions was actually in the hands of underground communists. Despite the strike's defeat, the communist underground continued its activity among Kailuan miners.⁶² In Hong Kong, where in 1929 eleven red trade unions and a Delegates' Assembly that united them were set up, communists staged several strikes.⁶³ In 1929 the CPC also managed to start work in Manchuria, where many Japanese enterprises were located. Success was scored by a strike at a Japanese shipyards in Fushun, and miners, railwaymen and textile workers began to organise.⁶⁴ Red trade unions at Sichuan salt-mines organised a strike in 1929 against layoffs.⁶⁵ In Wuhan, Changsha and many other cities red trade unions that had been created in that period were smashed by the authorities. The CPC's activity was most successful in Shanghai where in 1930 red trade unions were set up at 36 textile factories, as well as among workers of power stations, telegraph, tram and bus companies, coolies and rickshas.⁶⁶

By the beginning of 1930, the CPC had somewhat consolidated its positions in the leadership of the working-class movement as against the situation on the eve of the 6th Congress. However, these achievements, testifying to the correctness of "the line of the masses", had not become significant on the scale of the whole country. In other regions and cities the CPC activity among workers lagged far behind the situation in Shanghai, in a number of industrial centres it had not been reactivated or was again suppressed by the authorities. The general strengthening of the Guomindang regime was accompanied by a growth of legal trade-unionism.⁶⁷ With mediation of Guomindang organisations, most labour conflicts, as before, did not develop into strikes and were settled in a "peaceful way". A reactivation of the workers' movement in 1929 touched only Shanghai and northern areas of the country and did not mean an end to the workers' mood of depression. The workers' struggle was still of a defensive nature, its main slogans being protests against layoffs and demands for so-called rice pay increases in connection with spiraling prices. All told it was just a dramatic, day-to-day struggle for existence.

The attention paid by the CPC to the vital interests of workers made it possible for the party to come closer to the masses and in a number of cases to head and activate their struggle. However the organisational shaping of the party's positions, the creation of solid and mass trade unions ran into paramount problems. The work of the party in the cities, that was carried on at the cost of great sacrifice, had not yet produced any tangible change in the party's composition. At the end of 1929 workers were reported to make up only about 2 per cent of the CPC.⁶⁸ Consequently, the CPC's achievements in guiding the working-class movement main-

⁶² *Documents of the All-China Congresses of Trade Unions*, pp. 254, 258, 265.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 259, 264-265.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 265; *Hongqi*, July 3, 1929.

⁶⁶ *Communist International*, 1930, No. 13-14, p. 91.

⁶⁷ The Guomindang archives contain data that by 1930 legal trade unions had embraced over 576,000 workers. See *Collection of Materials on Political History of China*, issue 2, vol. 43, doc. 5290, 5291.

⁶⁸ See *Buersaiwei*, 1931, No. 3, p. 20.

ly boiled down to the first results of a correctly chosen course. They testified that the heavy sacrifices were not in vain and that by following that course the party was achieving rapprochement with the working masses.

In December 1929 the Executive Committee of the Comintern in a "Letter to the CC of the Chinese Communist Party" once again underlined the great importance of the issues still unresolved by the party, the inadmissibility of "repeating the outlived in the main putschist mistakes...".⁶⁹ The EC of the Comintern paid most serious attention to the workers' movement, warning against overrating the achievements of the CPC and insisting on improving the "line of the masses" in the cities.

Thus, the collapse of the united anti-imperialist front, the severe defeat of the CPC and the revolutionary forces under its guidance, the take-over by the Guomindang—all of that confronted the CPC and the Comintern with most complex problems which were being resolved in the course of revolutionary practice of the Chinese people.

The decision by the 6th Congress of the CPC that the "general line of the party is struggle for the masses" resulted from the joint searches by the Comintern and the CPC for ways of furthering the revolutionary struggle under the severe conditions of Guomindang domination.

⁶⁹ *Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern...*, p. 257.

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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE IN CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 83 (signed to press 31 May 83) pp 151-162

[Article by M. V. Sofronov, doctor of philological sciences]

[Text] Article 19 of the constitution adopted by the National People's Congress on 4 December 1982 says that the PRC Government will promote the putonghua national language. This article on the national language has been inserted in the Chinese constitution for the first time in order to raise its social status.

The constitutional affirmation of the national language was preceded by the lengthy development of an oral national language based on northern Chinese dialects, the creation of literature in this language and a lengthy struggle for the assignment of the national language status to it--a struggle involving government agencies, public organizations, public spokesmen and scholars, both famous ones and ones known to few outside their own circle of specialists.

The institution of a single spoken national language--a natural requirement of any contemporary state and one of the characteristics of the contemporary nation--has been a difficult problem for China. The geographic scales of the country, the linguistic situation which took shape over three millenia, the long tradition of different written and oral means of communication and the actual legal equality of all forms of oral speech have made the creation of a single spoken language in China an extremely complicated process.

Throughout the long history of the movement for a national language, which began not long before the Xinhai Revolution, numerous views were expressed on the ways of creating and promoting a spoken national language. The experience accumulated over almost eight decades allows us to draw some conclusions about the present state and future prospects of the national language in China.

Dialects and the National Language

One of the main features of the linguistic situation in China is the existence of many dialects. Different researchers have categorized the Chinese dialects in seven or nine groups.¹ The differences between these groups are generally compared in linguistic literature to differences between related languages. Members of different groups cannot understand one another without special training or experience in communication.

The geographic areas occupied by these dialect groups are of varied dimensions. The northern dialects, or the *guanhua* dialects, are spread throughout northern China, in the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou in the west and in the north of Guangxi Province in southern China. These dialects are used by around three-fourths of the Chinese population.² None of the other groups are comparable to *guanhua* in terms of the number of people speaking them and in terms of the area of their use. The other dialects occupy around one-fourth of China's territory and are spoken by one-fourth of the population. In absolute terms, however, the number of people speaking the dialects of each group is equivalent to the population of a large European state, and the economic and strategic position of these regions, concentrated on the eastern and southern seashores, is exceptionally important.

China has been a single centralized state since the 3d century B.C. This was when the tendency to promote a single medium of oral communication arose. Since the time when the centralized government was formed, China's territory has increased tenfold. Linguistic integration has not kept up with this growth. In the linguistic sense, the most highly integrated region is northern China.

Except for brief intervals, Beijing has been the capital of China since the end of the 13th century. The Beijing dialect, which took shape under the influence of local and alien linguistic components, differed in many respects from other northern Chinese dialects. This gave unique properties to the dialect of the capital, which was supposed to be used by officials.

In the centralized Chinese empire, all officials had some connection with Beijing. They were the first to carry the Beijing dialect out of the capital. After the Manchurian conquest the Beijing dialect became even more important because Manchurian military and civilian officials could not speak any other Chinese dialects. All of these linguistic and historical factors gave the Beijing dialect definite statewide prestige. Fluency in *guanhua*, the language of officialdom, was profitable and convenient for people of other occupations whose work kept them on the move--merchants, actors, transport workers, etc. *Guanhua* was not the same as Beijing popular speech. The pronunciation of *guanhua* was taught in Beijing schools. It was close to the Beijing vernacular, but it had some distinctive features which made it easy to distinguish between the educated and uneducated. The grammar and vocabulary of *guanhua* differed even more from the Beijing vernacular. The pronunciation of *guanhua* was recorded in phonetic dictionaries, but neither the grammar nor the vocabulary had been specifically circumscribed. For this reason, the use of the dialect allowed for individual variations and even combined forms; for example, the so-called *lanqing guanhua*, or blue *guanhua*, was actually a mixture of linguistic components from the Beijing dialect and others in various proportions. In other words, *guanhua* was a social dialect, used in medieval China primarily by educated people and officials.

The first experiment with an oral *guanhua* national language was undertaken at the beginning of the 18th century on the orders of Emperor Yongzheng. So that officials in southern China would speak *guanhua* as well as their colleagues in the north, he ordered the establishment of special schools of correct

pronunciation in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, where the dialects were quite different from the Beijing one.³ Emperor Yongzheng and his advisers believed that instruction in the Beijing pronunciation of written characters would teach students how to speak guanhua. This belief was based on the naive assumption that all dialects had the same grammar and vocabulary: the assumption that a sentence in any dialect, delivered with the Beijing pronunciation, would sound like a correct guanhua sentence.

Yongzheng's plan could not be carried out. The Beijing pronunciation, which was taught in special schools in the southern provinces, did not result in the ability to speak the language of officialdom. The idea of disseminating guanhua by teaching the Beijing pronunciation or any other single pronunciation of characters in all Chinese schools, however, turned out to be quite long-lived. With only a few modifications, it still exists in our day.

During the era of reform at the end of the 19th century and at the time of the petition movement just before the overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty, there were repeated demands that guanhua be declared the national language of China and that it be disseminated throughout the country. In 1907 the Chinese Ministry of Education adopted the first secondary school guanhua instruction plan in the country's history. When the plan was discussed by an advisory council, Jiang Qian proposed that the name of the language be changed to guoyu--meaning "national language" and thereby underscoring its universal nature.

The first official step toward the creation of a guoyu national language was a conference convened by the Chinese Ministry of Education on 15 February 1913 to work out a single system of pronunciation. The result was a system of national pronunciation and the first Chinese alphabet, zhuyin zimu, compiled on a national graphic basis. Therefore, the Ministry of Education's plan for the dissemination of guoyu was similar in many respects to Yongzheng's plan: the creation of a national language by means of the correct pronunciation of characters by literate and educated people throughout the country. It was a more sweeping plan because it envisaged the teaching of the nationwide pronunciation throughout China, and it had a better linguistic basis because it gave students a convenient means of inscribing the national pronunciation of characters. It was assumed that the national language would eventually become the common language of all the people in China when education had become universal.

The institution of a national language was one of the main demands of the liberal democrats at the time of the May 4th Movement. For them, the national language was a territorial dialect, and not a social one. They regarded all the dialects of the guanhua group as the national language. Theoretically, as Hu Shi wrote at that time, any dialect of the Chinese language could become national if it had two important properties: It had to be the most widely used dialect and it had to have the most highly developed literary tradition.⁴ Of course, these requirements were best met by the dialects of the guanhua group, which were spoken by the majority of the Chinese population and which had a long literary tradition.

In contrast to the Ministry of Education, which had no interest in changing the linguistic situation in China, Hu Shi felt that the national language's

sphere of use would gradually expand and the sphere of dialects would gradually contract. "Even China's southwestern corner from Shanghai to the Pearl River, a region of older and more conservative dialects, is rapidly being conquered by the force of commerce, education and modern means of transportation and communications."⁵ In other words, he believed that the linguistic unity of China had almost been achieved, and that existing differences in dialects were a regrettable exception to the rule.

Although Hu Shi supported a national language based on the dialects of the guanhua group, he acknowledged the value of other dialects. In particular, he believed that literature in different dialects could be useful as a source of means of expression and vital force for literature in the guoyu national language.⁶

The most radical approach to the issue of the national language was taken by the Chinese progressive public of the 1930's and 1940's. Prominent CCP leader Qu Qiubo, along with Lu Xing and other revolutionary writers united in the Leftist League, put forth a theory about the "language of the masses." Their chief demand was worded as the "unity of the literary language and the vernacular."⁷ They wanted the kind of literary language that would be a direct reproduction of the vernacular. Of course, literature in dialects could have been the most practical solution to this problem.

Realizing that dialects could not be written in characters, the supporters of the "language of the masses" stated that the main condition for the transition to a new literary language would be the substitution of an alphabet for pictographic writing. This would create the possibility of writing literary works in any Chinese dialect and of the free exchange of words and grammatical structures between dialects and the national language.

Qu Qiubo and Lu Xing realized the importance of a common Chinese literature. But they felt that the language for this literature should not be the written baihua, but the conversational putonghua--an accessible language formed in areas of active linguistic contact between different dialects. They believed that the best of the putonghuas in China at that time was the northern Chinese variety, or guanhua. In their opinion, however, it could be used as a literary language for the masses only after it had been coordinated much more closely with the spoken language.

The complete and consistent implementation of the "language of the masses" project presupposed a profound change in social and cultural life--the abandonment of written characters. The plan was never carried out because a reform this radical would have been impossible.

Each of these three approaches to the problem of the national language is distinguished by its own attitude toward the linguistic situation. The Ministry of Education believed that human strength was not enough to change the linguistic situation; the national language is a social dialect, to be used by literate and educated people; when China reaches a level of universal literacy, the entire population will be fluent in the national language. The liberal democrats felt that modern industry, transportation and communications were sufficiently strong means of changing the linguistic situation; the

dialects of the guanhua group were constantly being used more widely, and the transition to a single national language could therefore occur in the foreseeable future; the intensive popularization of this language would be one of the main conditions for this transition. The revolutionary democrats believed that modern industry, transportation and communications could help to unite the dialects in a single national language, but in contrast to the liberal democrats they felt that all Chinese dialects were equal and that the future national language of China would differ significantly from the baihua of that time.

Professor Li Jinxi from the Beijing Pedagogical Institute, who knew more than the politicians about the linguistic situation in China, proposed a more complex system of communication, commensurate with the complexity of this situation. It envisaged a national language based on the Beijing dialect and written characters in combination with local media of communication--dialects with an alphabet. This system could have brought about rapid progress in public education and have made China a country of universal literacy within a short period of time.⁸

The strategy of the PRC Government with regard to the national language was put forth in a speech by Zhou Enlai at a conference of linguists and educators on 10 January 1958. Zhou Enlai called the putonghua national language the future common language of China and said that putonghua would have to be disseminated throughout the country according to plan for this purpose and that the dialects of the 600 million Chinese people would gradually be standardized. He listed instruction in elementary and secondary schools, radio lectures and movies as some of the means of this dissemination. In reference to the desirable degree of fluency, he stressed the fact that these requirements should not be too high; putonghua was the ideal common language to which China should strive, but its mastery to perfection would not be necessary; only a certain segment of the population would have to be fluent in putonghua--members of social professions who come into constant contact with people from various locations; youth would represent the main contingent of people studying and mastering putonghua, and education would be the most effective medium of its dissemination. He explained, however, that this dissemination would mean the study of putonghua as a separate subject, and would not mean that all classes would be taught in this language.⁹

Zhou Enlai's proposed strategy for the dissemination of the national language was therefore traditional as a whole: a national language for literate and educated people. For all the rest, a knowledge of putonghua would not be compulsory, and fluency would certainly not be required.

Standardization of the National Language

Chinese traditional philology was geared primarily to the painstaking study of ancient Chinese phonetics, the interpretation of ancient texts and lexicography. The idea of grammar as a linguistic system was an absolutely alien concept. Chinese philologists of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries obviously knew the difference between "full" and "empty" (link) words, but treated the "empty" words in traditional lexicographic ways. There were some dictionaries of

link-words, but no attempt was made to move from the definition of link-words to the creation of a system of grammar. Chinese philologists did have a fairly good knowledge of the ancient Indian science of grammar, however, and it is not clear why the ancient Indian theories about linguistic sounds had such a significant effect on Chinese philology while the grammatical rules of ancient India were not reflected in this field of science at all.

The first grammar of the Chinese language was written after Chinese philologists were familiar with the European science of grammar. In 1898 renowned political and public spokesman Ma Jianzhong published the first grammar of the Chinese language. It was a grammar of the wenyan written language in its older classical forms prior to the 7th century B.C.¹⁰ The grammatical system established by Ma Jianzhong, however, was later used as a basis for the grammar of the national language.

The May 4th Movement led to the publication of at least 10 grammars. Some of them pertained to the ancient Chinese language as the first one had, but most of them were concerned with the guoyu national language. They were not distinguished by a particularly high theoretical level, but this was completely due to the novelty of grammatical descriptions for Chinese science and to the attempt to compile a practical aid as quickly as possible for the study and correct use of the national language. The authors of those grammars included professional philologists and writers. The national language still did not have an official name. The titles of those grammars are indicative in this respect: Dai Weiqing--"The Use of Link-Words in the National Language," Zhang Tinghua--"The Fundamentals of Baihua Grammar," Xu Dishan--"The Grammatical Bases of the Vernacular Style" and Li Jinxi--"A Grammar of the National Language."

The differences in these definitions of the object of grammatical description were not coincidental. None of the authors of those grammars saw any significant difference between the grammar of classic novels in baihua and the contemporary spoken language. This is why the source of grammatical standards for Xu Dishan and Zhang Tinghua was the contemporary spoken language, from which they took their examples, while Dai Weiqing and Li Jinxi primarily used examples from novels in baihua but also composed some of their own examples.

There was no agreement in the variety of grammatical phenomena either. The past tense prefix form of -ceng, which was used frequently in classical works in baihua and still exists in some southern dialects of the guanhua group, was mentioned in Xu Dishan's grammar.¹¹ All of the grammars of the national language of that time distinguished between the modal articles "ni" and "li" with their similar meanings.¹² Only "ni" remains in the contemporary putonghua national language.

The knowledge of the national language was also disseminated through national language courses organized by the preparatory committee for the standardization of the national language in Beijing and Shanghai. Lectures on the national language presented in Shanghai contain interesting advice on the ways of studying this language. The main recommendation is the comparison of the native language to the national language and the subsequent determination of

the characteristics common to the grammar and vocabulary of the dialect and national language.¹³ This is precisely the method used by those who must write in the national language for various reasons. This method of mastering the national language certainly influences the author's individual style and gives rise to a great variety of grammatical and lexicological forms. This is why there was already an urgent need to standardize the grammar of the national language by the end of the 1930's.

At the end of the 1930's the study of grammar was revitalized. In contrast to the early 1920's, this was a time of work on specific topics. Shanghai literary journals reflected a brief but extremely important debate on grammar. Under the influence of ideas expressed during the debate, three lengthy grammars were written in the 1940's by Wang Li, Lu Shuxiang and Gao Mingkai. They made their authors famous in China and abroad and their theoretical level was incomparably higher than the grammars of the early 1920's. The titles of these publications contained the term "hanyu"--"Chinese language." In this way, the authors wanted to say that their research topic was not the national language, but the workings of the Chinese language as a whole. All of these grammars were written with a view to the achievements of world linguistics in the 1930's, but not one could be used as a standard because each author proposed his own grammatical system for the Chinese language.

A new stage in the development of Chinese linguistics, distinguished by the rapid development of all fields of this science, began when the PRC was founded. The discussion and resolution of national language problems took place on a much higher level than in the 1920's and 1930's: The lessons of the development of national language and literature over the 30 years since the time of the May 4th Movement were not wasted. Guoyu, the old name of the national language, disappeared from use and was replaced by descriptive terms. The name "guoyu" ("national language") was officially changed to "putonghua" ("common language") by the first congress of the Chinese written language reform committee in 1955.

The PRC Government and Chinese linguists began to standardize the language in 1951. In connection with I. V. Stalin's works on linguistics, Hu Qiaomu and Ye Shengtao organized the publication of "Lectures on Grammar and Stylistics" by Lu Shuxiang and Zhu Dexi in RENMIN RIBAO from June through December 1951.¹⁴ The committee on publishing affairs of the central people's government instructed the workers of publishing houses to use the "Lectures" as the basic reference work in professional training.

In 1951 the Linguistics Institute formed a grammar group made up of prominent scientists for the further development of research on the grammar of the contemporary Chinese language. From July through October 1952 ZHONGGUO YUWEN magazine published the collective work of this group--"Lectures on Grammar," an updated version of the standard grammar "Lectures on Grammar and Stylistics," which largely reflected the views of institute Director Lu Shuxiang. Eight authors were credited with the final draft of this grammar.¹⁵

Another center for the standardization of national grammar was the Chinese-language editorial board of the "Public Education" Publishing House. It

started this work in 1954. In fall of that year the first draft of a grammar was distributed to a group of teachers in the Beijing schools for experimental instruction. The experiment was a success. The next year, in 1955, the projected grammar was distributed to many linguists and educators. This standard grammar of the national language was influenced considerably by the linguistic views of Professor Zhang Zhigong, the head of the grammar group of the "Public Education" Publishing House. His views were more traditional and were directly related to the grammatical theories put forth by Ma Jianzhong.

Therefore, by the middle of 1955 Chinese linguistics had two rival standard grammars of the national language. The need to compile a permanent textbook on the national grammar for teachers in elementary and secondary schools was pointed out by Ye Shengtao in the beginning of 1955.¹⁶ This was also the topic of discussion at the conference on the standardization of the contemporary Chinese language in October 1955.¹⁷ The conference accelerated the adoption of decisions regarding a grammar for use in the schools. Professor Zhang Zhigong's draft was chosen as the simplest and most traditional. After the 1955 conference, the professor's draft was discussed in detail and was given the title "A Provisional System of Grammar of the Chinese Language for Instruction" at the beginning of the next year, in 1956. It was referred to by this title at the All-China Conference on the Grammar of the Chinese Language in Qingdao, where it was discussed by a special commission. In fall 1956 the provisional system was adopted by the Ministry of Education as the basis for secondary and elementary school courses in grammar.

The "Provisional System" suffered a number of reversals between the time of its publication and 1977. Nevertheless, important experience was accumulated in the teaching of this grammar, and certain shortcomings were discovered in the system and in the method of its exposition.¹⁸

A decision to rework the "Provisional System" in accordance with the latest achievements of linguistics and with a view to teaching experience was made at the all-China conference of linguists in October 1980. In March 1981 the Ministry of Education convened a conference in Harbin for its discussion. The conference was held from 2 through 12 July 1981. The "Provisional System" was discussed simultaneously by several commissions, after which the results of these discussions were summarized in a single document which then served as the basis of the "Revised Explanatory Report."

The "Revised Explanatory Report" contains a list of changes in the "Provisional System." It rejects the theory of the nominalization of verbs and adjectives. It recommends that teachers explain that verbs and adjectives can sometimes perform the functions of both predicates and objects. Complex sentences are no longer divided dichotomously into main and subordinate clauses, but are divided directly into parallel, consecutive, alternative, causative, conditional and other clauses.¹⁹ The "Explanatory Report" will be published along with the "Provisional System." By order of the Harbin conference, the document as a whole will be called the "Experimental Project."

The corrections added to the "Provisional System" testify to significant changes in the interpretation of the Chinese grammar. At the same time, the

"Experimental Project" is only an extremely concise review of grammar, whose purpose is to familiarize readers with the most general grammatical categories, and not with the details and subtleties of their native grammar. The new version of the putonghua grammar seems most like an aid for instructors who have special training and can supplement certain sections of the grammar with additional information. It cannot serve as a source of knowledge for students or, in general, for those who need a reference work on the grammar of the national language.

These significant changes in the "Provisional System" testify that the theoretical elaboration of the national grammar is far from complete. Linguists are still debating the most general problems of the grammatical structure of the language. The resolution of these problems will require many more years of research and discussion by representatives of various schools of linguistic thought.

A short grammar like the "Experimental Project" is not the ultimate goal of the Chinese science of grammar. The successful development of the national language will require a lengthy grammar, covering all grammatical phenomena and describing the shades of meaning conveyed by grammatical means. The compilation of this kind of grammar will be a difficult task because it will certainly necessitate the separation of grammatical phenomena characteristic of the putonghua national language from the grammatical features of the guanhua group of dialects. The successful completion of this task will necessitate work by writers rather than linguists. In their works, they must approximate the spoken language in such a way as to meet the standards of a genuine national language. This will require literary development and writers with linguistic "perfect pitch." If all of these conditions are satisfied, a standard grammar of the Chinese language could be compiled within the lifetime of a single generation.

The 6 February 1956 State Council ukase on the dissemination of putonghua reported that an orthoepic dictionary of putonghua would be compiled in 1956 for the purpose of standardizing its phonetics, and a dictionary of the contemporary Chinese language would be compiled by 1958 to standardize the vocabulary.

The orthoepic standards of putonghua were made the responsibility of an orthoepic commission formed at the beginning of 1956. In October 1957 it published the first list of words and geographic names with recommended pronunciations, in July 1959 it published a second list, and in January 1963 it published a third, summary list. There have been no reports of subsequent work by this commission. In linguistic and pedagogical circles, however, there is already a fairly precise understanding of the orthoepic standards of putonghua.

At the beginning of the 1930's the preparatory committee for national linguistic unity began to compile a dictionary of the national language. It was not intended to be a standard dictionary. According to its editor-in-chief, Professor Li Jinxi, it was supposed to be a thesaurus, containing all of the words in the Chinese language which appeared during various stages of its

history and are present in all contemporary dialects. This was the purpose of the seven-volume dictionary "Guoyu cidian," published in the early 1940's.²⁰

Sun Chunyi announced his plans for a Chinese national language dictionary of medium length at a conference on the standardization of the contemporary Chinese language. He stressed that this dictionary would concentrate on the vernacular and its basis would consist of the most widely used terms in the Beijing dialect, contemporary literature and the press.²¹ In September 1958 the introduction and an outline of the dictionary were published.²² At the beginning of the 1960's the dictionary was completed, a sample edition was published, but it was not put on sale. In August 1978 the dictionary was published after several revisions.²³ It is not called a standard dictionary, but there is no doubt that this is its function. The terms it contains convey a broad understanding of the putonghua vocabulary.

The Promotion of the National Language

The main topic of discussion at conferences on the reform of the written language and the standardization of the Chinese language in October 1955 was the promotion of putonghua. The report by PRC Minister of Education Zhang Xiruo at the conference on the reform of the written language was wholly devoted to the promotion of putonghua within the public education system.

Instruction in the national language in secondary schools has a long history, which began even before the May 4th Movement.

One of the traditional features of Chinese public education is that the wenyan written language was taught in Chinese schools and there were no special courses in the national language. The grammar of the written language was mastered by writing compositions. These were essential in the mastery of national philology by the method of trial and error. For this reason, in 1917 the Associated Education Workers Unions published a decree on the substitution of national language courses for language arts courses in elementary schools. In 1920 the Beijing government Ministry of Education ordered the substitution of philology textbooks in the vernacular for textbooks in wenyan in the first two grades of elementary school. The ministry ordered the substitution of national language courses for language arts courses in elementary and secondary schools in 1923.²⁴ But this order was not carried out in full everywhere. This was due to the conservative attitudes of teachers and to the absence of standard textbooks on the grammar of the Chinese language. Furthermore, the complete substitution of national language courses for philology left no room for the study of literature. Under these conditions, the reform naturally consisted only in a change of course titles. At the beginning of the 1930's national language courses were excluded from school curricula and replaced with composition courses, which remained part of the curriculum until 1955.

After the conference on the standardization of the contemporary Chinese language, lengthy preparations began for a statewide campaign to promote putonghua. On 17 November 1955 the PRC Ministry of Education ordered that putonghua be taught in elementary and secondary schools and pedagogical

institutes. The PRC State Council published an ukase on the broad adoption of putonghua on 6 February 1956, and on 10 February a central coordinating committee was formed for the promotion of putonghua. Large meetings of workers in education, culture, radio and publishing were held throughout 1956 to discuss the promotion of putonghua in each of these areas.

Within a short period of time, many putonghua teaching aids, adapted for the needs of different provinces and dialects, were compiled and published. The campaign to promote putonghua had reached its height by the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward"--in 1958. The general goals of the campaign were put forth in the abovementioned speech by Zhou Enlai, in which he officially announced that the Chinese dialects should gradually be replaced by putonghua. Furthermore, youth should be the main contingent of people fluent in putonghua after mastering it in school. Between 1956 and 1958 the campaign to promote putonghua involved not only the schools, but also a huge network for the eradication of illiteracy, where classes were reorganized so that a knowledge of the national language could be taught in conjunction with the rudiments of literacy.

The campaign had only a moderate impact. Predictably, the greatest success in the broader use of putonghua was achieved in schools where there were enough qualified instructors, teaching time and students for whom the national language was a part of the curriculum. Naturally, sufficiently qualified instructors could not be found in some areas and there were corresponding differences in the level of instruction and the performance level of students. On the whole, it was easier to secure instruction in this language in cities than in rural areas. For this reason, urban students had a more solid background in putonghua.

The teaching of putonghua in the network for the eradication of illiteracy was quite difficult. The students here were workers and peasants who spoke their native dialects. They were willing to learn the Chinese written language because even the most superficial literacy would give them certain advantages in life, but fluency in the national language was of no practical value to people bound to their native communities. This is why the promotion of putonghua through the network for the eradication of illiteracy was not successful. The experience in teaching putonghua in this network was summarized at the beginning of the 1960's. The best results were attained in big cities like Shanghai, where it was useful for clerks, waiters, streetcar conductors, ticket-collectors and people in similar occupations to know the national language so that they could communicate with people speaking other dialects. It is indicative that the most effective method of teaching putonghua was its instruction according to foreign-language teaching methods: Students were first taught words and phrases in this language and later, after they had gained a conversational knowledge of the language, they could be taught the Beijing pronunciation of written characters.²⁵

In spite of the importance of the widespread mastery and use of the national language, far from all members of the Chinese society believed that the time had come for its broad use. Many saw it only as an excuse for another loud and costly public campaign. These views were even expressed by some Chinese

leaders. During the period of the criticism of Liu Shaoqi, he was said to have alleged that putonghua was useless, and Chen Boda was supposed to have exclaimed: "Why teach Chinese to the Chinese?"²⁶ This is why the division of language arts courses into literature and language was abandoned in 1958 and the study of composition was resumed. Some schools and some pedagogical academies and institutes continued to teach the grammar of the Chinese language according to the "Provisional System." At present, Chinese language courses have been reinstated. Classes will be taught in accordance with the "Experimental Project."

The experience of the campaign to promote putonghua in the late 1950's testifies that the promotion of a national language entails considerable difficulties. Dialects are still an important element of the linguistic situation in China. Dialects are spoken by hundreds of millions of people and their social prestige has never been shaken. There is no question that the knowledge of putonghua is of great value to secondary school graduates who wish to continue their studies and then choose a career in any part of the country. But a knowledge of the national language is of no value to those who will remain in their native community, city or province. For these people, putonghua is virtually unnecessary because the local dialect satisfies all of their communication needs. For this reason, even after they have mastered the national language in secondary school, these people will be confined to the passive reception of central radio and television programs.

It appears, therefore, that the present linguistic situation with strong dialects and the putonghua national language, which does not coincide completely with any dialect, will continue to exist in China during the lifetime of the next few generations. The study of putonghua in the schools will unavoidably lead to a constant increase in the number of people speaking the national language. But the number of people for whom putonghua will be their only form of speech will increase slowly. Bilingualism or biglossolism--that is, the mastery of two versions of the native language--is likely to be much more common. Naturally, it will be prevalent in cities, the army and modern industry. Outside these areas and spheres, it will be a rarity for many generations, and the principle of "one people--one language" will probably be implemented only in the distant future. The inclusion of a special point obligating the government to promote putonghua in the constitution reflects the hope of attaining this goal as soon as possible.

FOOTNOTES

1. Yuan Jiahua, "Dialects of the Chinese Language," Moscow, 1965, pp 9-10.
2. Yuan Jiahua, "Essay on the Dialects of the Chinese Language," Beijing, 1960, p 22.
3. Li Jinxi, "Essay on the History of the Movement for a National Language," Shanghai, 1934, pp 26-27.
4. Hu Shi, "Essay on the Grammar of the Chinese Language," in "Collected Works," vol 3, Shanghai, 1925, p 1.

5. Hu Shi, "The Literary Renaissance," in "Symposium on Chinese Culture," Shanghai, 1931, p 134.
6. Hu Shi, "A Response to Huang Jiueseng's Article 'On Compromise in the Literary Renaissance,'" in "Collected Works," vol 1, Shanghai, 1925, pp 153-154; Hu Shi, "Preface to the First Anthology of Songs in the Wu Dialect," *ibid.*, vol 4, Shanghai, 1930, pp 1048-1049.
7. Qu Qiubo, "Complete Collected Works," vol 2, Beijing, 1954, p 889.
8. Li Jinxi, "Declaration of the All-China Congress of the Movement for a National Language," in "A Historical Overview of the Written Language and Its Reform," Beijing, 1931, pp 347-372.
9. Zhou Enlai, "The Current Objectives of Written Language Reform (Collected Papers)," Beijing, 1958, pp 9-12 (in Russian).
10. Ma Jianzhong, "Grammar of the Chinese Language," Beijing, 1956, p 3.
11. Xu Dishan, "Fundamentals of Grammar of the Vernacular Style," Shanghai, 1921, pp 26, 32.
12. Zhang Tinghua, "Fundamentals of the Baihua Grammar," Shanghai, 1922, p 23; Dai Weiqing, "The Use of Link-Works in the National Language," Shanghai, 1920, pp 98-100.
13. Ma Guoying, "Initial Accounts of the National Language. The National Language and Literature," Shanghai, 1923, pp 21-23.
14. Lu Shuxiang and Zhu Dexi, "Lectures on Grammar and Stylistics," Beijing, 1954, p X.
15. Ding Shengshu, Lu Shuxiang, Li Rong, Sun Dexuan, Guan Sechu, Fu Qing, Huang Shengzhang and Chen Zhiwen, "Lectures on the Grammar of the Contemporary Chinese Language," Beijing, 1963.
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FRIENDSHIP MOVEMENT AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR OF SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS
(COMMEMORATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF USSR-JAPAN SOCIETY)

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[Article by I. I. Kovalenko, vice-chairman of the USSR-Japan Society Board,
and Yu. I. Smirnov, member of the board]

The Soviet public has always attached great significance to the development and consolidation of goodneighbourly relations with our Far-Eastern neighbour. Ties and contacts between public organisations of the USSR and Japan have always played an important part in maintaining friendly relations and creating an atmosphere of trust between our two nations. Even during the worst of times, when Soviet-Japanese relations were at their lowest, Soviet people and Japanese progressives managed to find ways of making and keeping various cultural, scientific and socio-political contacts.

In this article the authors do not dwell on the whole history of the movement for Soviet-Japanese friendship but limit themselves to a statement of its essentials over the last 25 years, i. e., since the founding in the Soviet Union of a broadly representative public organisation which set itself the task of furthering friendship and mutual understanding between the Soviet and the Japanese peoples, and assisting their rapprochement and cooperation.

On June 5, 1958, at the Moscow House of Friendship with Peoples of Foreign Countries a meeting was held of representatives of the Soviet public which resolved to found the USSR-Japan Society (UJS). This society became an important channel for developing and strengthening Soviet-Japanese friendship and cooperation.

The founding of the Society, along with similar organisations for friendship with other countries, matched the great changes that were taking place after the Second World War in the international arena and in the Soviet Union's relations with foreign countries.

It was a time of active emergence of popular masses in the political arena of all countries, a time of formation of various public movements and organisations coming out for peace, democracy and allround international cooperation on the principles of peaceful coexistence. It was just this factor that substantially affected the policies of foreign countries and contributed to a positive political climate on our planet.

In this respect the postwar history of the USSR and Japan was no exception. When societies and associations for friendship with different foreign countries were created in the USSR, many prominent representatives of Japan's political, economic and public communities advanced the initiative of promoting friendship and mutual understanding with the Soviet people and setting up corresponding public organisations.

The development of Soviet-Japanese state relations in the 1950s also contributed to furthering public ties. A major milestone in Soviet-Japanese postwar relations was the signing in 1956 of a Joint USSR-Japan Declaration which opened up broad opportunities for promoting bilateral relations in political, economic, cultural and scientific spheres and laid down a good foundation for developing friendship and mutual understanding between our nations and broadening contacts and ties between representatives of various strata of the public of the two countries.

Normalisation of relations with Japan was welcomed by the Soviet public, for it opened up prospects of wider contacts with the Japanese people. Representatives of diverse Soviet organisations, creative associations, research and educational institutions, factories and agricultural enterprises from different republics and cities, having united in the USSR-Japan Society, started large-scale activity in order to acquaint the Soviet people with Japanese reality and bring to the mass of the Japanese people true information about the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the Charter, the Society is a voluntary public organisation whose membership is comprised of "Soviet citizens who strive toward allround development of friendly relations between the peoples of the USSR and Japan, toward strengthening peace throughout the world". The Society conducts work on its own, coordinating it with the activities of other Soviet organisations, and is "a voluntary member of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries".

Over a short period the Society had turned into an authoritative and prestigious organisation, a participant in many important Soviet-Japanese undertakings. At present it includes over 600 local organisations embracing over half a million members. There are 17 affiliations of the USSR-Japan Society in the Soviet Union. They carry out various work in arranging cultural, scientific and sports exchanges, in hosting numerous Japanese delegations that come with the purpose of getting to know Soviet reality and achievements in all spheres of communist construction.

Commissions on science, culture, tourism, women, youth, etc., have been set up and are actively working within the UJS. Their main purpose is to satisfy Soviet people's interest in the life, history, and culture of the Japanese people.

The major partner of the UJS is its counterpart—the Japan-USSR Society (JUS), which succeeded the Society for Japanese-Soviet Friendship that existed before the normalisation of relations between the two countries. The new society unites representatives of a cross-section of the Japanese people. Its leadership includes, along with members of the Communist and Socialist parties, representatives of the ruling LDP, big business and outstanding personalities in science and culture. Former Premier I. Hatoyama, who made a prominent personal contribution to normalisation of Soviet-Japanese relations marked by the signing of the Joint Declaration, was elected president of the society. For many years actively participating in the work of the Japan-USSR Society are its Vice-President M. Horie, heads of local departments—M. Akizuki, S. Mori, R. Hirota, H. Tsurumori and others.

The JUS initiated the emergence of a wide complex of public contacts which is known today as the movement for Soviet-Japanese friendship. This movement has always played an important role in the system of Soviet-Japanese relations. Developing as a significant factor of these relations, it has been affected by them, and, in turn, influenced various aspects of these relations.

The first two decades after the signing of the Joint Declaration were the most fruitful and dominated by positive tendencies in Soviet-Japanese relations.

As historical experience shows, the position of the official circles of Japan regarding the development of relations with the USSR can often be subject to expediency which sometimes hinders progress in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. Japan's foreign policy at one time counted on using ties with the USSR for strengthening Japan's positions in the international arena. The Soviet Union was viewed in Japan as a promising trading partner. At the same time the ruling circles of Japan took into account the Soviet Union's increased potential and authority in the world community.

That period witnessed special development of trade and economic ties that provided a material basis for the whole complex of Soviet-Japanese relations. Concluded were a convention on fishing (1956), an agreement on trade turnover and payments (1957), an agreement on opening a regular shipping line between Japan and the USSR (1958), and an agreement on air communications (1966).

The growing interest in economic cooperation with our country of Japan's business community that sought diversification of foreign trade ties was evidenced by visits to the USSR of a number of influential business delegations in the first half of the 1960s. As a result, Soviet-Japanese trade and economic ties were further developed, as reflected, for example, in the establishment of joint committees on economic cooperation called upon to tackle long-term problems. Since 1966, trade between the two countries has been conducted on the basis of five-year agreements. As a result, the volume of trade since 1966 has been doubling every five years. A number of general agreements were concluded on the opening up of natural resources of Siberia and the Far East.

Such a rapid development of trade and economic ties exerted a positive influence on interstate relations as well. As the positions of Japanese monopolies on the world market were growing stronger, the ruling circles faced the task of enhancing the country's political influence in international affairs. The Japanese statesmen and LDP leaders could not ignore the stand of the business community and the moods of the public demanding the pursuit of a more independent foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan's main ally—the US.

The development of relations with the USSR played an important role in the settlement of this problem. Regular political consultations were started between the two countries. In 1966 foreign ministers of the USSR and Japan exchanged first visits and a Consular Convention was signed. At subsequent meetings the foreign ministers discussed both questions of bilateral relations and various international problems pertaining to reduction of tensions in Asia. At the same time contacts were made between the USSR Supreme Soviet and Japan's parliament.

The active development of Soviet-Japanese relations culminated in a summit conference in Moscow in October 1973. Both heads of state expressed satisfaction with the course of bilateral relations between our countries as it was recorded in a joint Soviet-Japanese declaration of Oc-

tober 1973, which said the following: "The parties have agreed that the strengthening of goodneighbourly, friendly relations between the USSR and Japan on the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, mutual benefit and equality corresponds not only to the common interests of both countries but also constitutes a common contribution to the cause of peace and stability in the Far East and in the whole world."¹

Naturally, such a climate in bilateral relations had a positive effect on the widening of public contacts. Many Soviet public organisations were actively developing ties with their Japanese partners. The USSR-Japan Society began to play a prominent role in the promotion of Soviet-Japanese exchanges, seeing not only to cultural contacts but also providing opportunities for a greater number of Japanese citizens to get to know Soviet reality and the history and achievements of the multinational family of Soviet peoples in the economy and in culture.

In Japan an increasing number of people began to take part in the work of the organisations keeping in touch with the Soviet Union through the USSR-Japan Society, while the activities of Japanese organisations friendly toward the USSR were acquiring the character of a broad movement.

As Soviet-Japanese relations were developing, an ever greater number of Japanese citizens from different walks of life and of different political views became direct participants in the movement for friendship with the USSR. Moreover, an interest in the neighbouring country was growing among broad strata of the Japanese people. This provided a solid foundation for geographical and social expansion of the friendship movement.

In 1961 an official agreement was signed on cultural cooperation with our first Japanese partner—the Japan-USSR Society. On the basis of this agreement, annual plans of cultural exchanges began to be concluded that envisaged concrete activities.

A growing interest in the USSR prompted an ever greater numbers of Japanese to visit our country and see for themselves the life of the world's first socialist state. Taking this into account, the JUS founded in 1961 a special tourist firm—Japanese-Soviet Tourist Bureau. The JSTB made it possible for about 80,000 Japanese—workers, farmers, students, scientific and cultural figures, businessmen and politicians—to visit the USSR. Most of them met with members of our Society who were eager to make the stay of Japanese guests in our country interesting and useful. The USSR-Japan Society included in the tourist programme many such items which are difficult to organise within the framework of usual tourism. This concerns above all meetings with UJS members and specialists in different fields. This explains, to a large extent, the popularity of tourist trips by way of friendship exchanges that have been taken up in recent years by other Japanese societies and associations for friendship with the USSR. Thanks to friendship tourism and exchanges of delegations, the USSR-Japan Society, its aims and principles have become widely known in Japan. Every year thousands of Japanese tourists visiting the USSR, both delegations and individuals, apply not only to the main office but also to local departments of the Society asking for assistance in arranging their contacts with Soviet professional colleagues, in organising their visits to Soviet organisations and enterprises that interest them.

¹ *Pravda*, Oct. 11, 1975.

The social structure of Japanese society is made up of different classes and a great number of social groups. This is reflected in the motley political forces that are active in the country. The process of normalisation and development of Soviet-Japanese relations involved representatives of many political forces and organisations, often from the opposite ends of the political spectrum. These forces could not stand aside from the movement for friendship with the USSR. There appeared organisations of different political orientations whose members approached the development of ties with the USSR from their own class and policy positions. However, they were united by the common desire for trust, good will and goodneighbourly relations between our countries.

Thus, in 1965 the Society of Japanese-Soviet Friendship was set up in Japan with the active participation of representatives of the SPJ, LDP, the Komeito Party, the DSP, as well as separate prominent figures in culture and science.

At the same time a Society of Japanese-Soviet Ties was founded, representing mainly business, scientific, and university circles as well as creative intelligentsia. Both societies began active cooperation with the USSR-Japan Society.

A year later, on the initiative of the Socialist Party of Japan, the Japanese Association of Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (JACT) was set up.

Despite repeated suggestions by the USSR that an intergovernment agreement be concluded on cultural ties which would provide them with a broad long-term basis, the Japanese government has not yet agreed with these suggestions.

Under these circumstances, the matter of cultural exchanges with the USSR was shouldered by the Japanese public organisations that made contacts through a number of channels, including the USSR-Japan Society, with corresponding Soviet organisations and creative unions. Cultural and scientific exchanges have been conducted on an especially large scale thanks to the activity of the JACT headed by Professor S. Matsu-mae, an outstanding scientist, political and public figure and president of Tokai University. Apart from exchanges of delegations, the association organises the following mass events: exhibitions, scientific symposiums, tours of artistic collectives, etc.

In 1971, an institute to study the science and culture of the USSR was founded within the association. It collects and disseminates in Japan information on Soviet achievements.

At the same time, small and medium firms, especially in the cities of Hokkaido and on the coast of the Japanese sea, began actively to join Soviet-Japanese trade and economic ties. Many directors of these firms came to the conclusion that an atmosphere of trust and goodneighbourly relations between the two countries is the best guarantee of stable economic relations. Therefore, they began to combine trade with a direct participation in the activities of friendship societies, giving them assistance in carrying out their programmes.

Such merging of trade and friendly ties prompted the birth of a new type of link—the twin cities movement, pioneered in 1961 by Nakhodka and Maizuru. The USSR-Japan Society was very instrumental in this respect. Soon this movement was joined by other cities not only from the Western coast, but also from Central and Northern Japan and the island of Hokkaido. Today the movement includes 18 Soviet and 20 Japanese cities and Prefecture Hyogo which maintains friendly ties with the Khabarovsk Territory.

Along with the growth of coast-to-coast trade and the twin cities movement, an upward trend was registered in the UJS's contacts with Japanese organisations that represent institutions of local government. In 1968 cooperation started with Japan's National Council of Governors and regular meetings began to be held between the chairmen of the territorial executive committees of Soviets in Siberia and the Far East and governors of Japan.

In 1970 the UJS and the Association for Ties between Soviet and Foreign Cities, which is a member of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies (USFS), established contacts with the All-Japan League of Twin Cities which unites mayors of almost 240 Japanese cities.

The same year the Association of Mayors of the Western Coast of Japan was created for strengthening friendship and economic cooperation with Soviet cities, which was joined by mayors of 15 cities. Since 1971 regular meetings have been held between mayors of Soviet and Japanese cities that maintain friendly contacts. Thus in that period the friendship movement was actively expanding its geography and consolidating its local positions.

Political ties were also widening, coordinated in many cases by the USSR-Japan Society.

In 1973 the Parliamentary Association for Japanese-Soviet Friendship was founded in Japan and, simultaneously a Soviet-Japanese section headed by the USSR Minister of Education M. A. Prokofyev began functioning under the Parliamentary Group of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USFS and the UJS established contacts with public figures of the trade-union association Sohyo and the Socialist Party. Through the services of our Society the USSR has been repeatedly visited by representatives of the LDP, the PDS, the Komeito Party, and delegations of the public and religious organisation Soka Gakkai.

By agreement of the above organisations and on the invitation of the USFS and the UJS the Soviet Union was visited by I. Takeiri, Chairman of the Komeito Central Executive Committee, J. Yano, General Secretary of that party, D. Ikeda, President of Soka Gakkai, R. Sasaki, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the DSP, I. Kono, head of the New Liberal Club, H. Ishida and I. Hatoyama, prominent figures of the LDP, and others.

The USFS and the UJS proceed from the understanding that political relationships among different participants in the movement for friendship with the USSR is a strictly internal Japanese matter, and the question whether they should participate in this movement collectively or separately is for them to decide. We are ready to cooperate with all those who sincerely strive for friendship with the USSR irrespective of their party affiliation. This is the principle of our course which is based on the idea that the best guarantee of peaceful coexistence and goodneighbour relations between the USSR and Japan—the countries with different social systems—is the broadest possible movement for friendship which embraces all the strata of Japanese society. At the same time we have always welcomed collective steps taken by friendly organisations.

The diversity of contacts and the many-sided role of the USSR-Japan Society determined the character of events we organised together with our Japanese partners in the USSR and Japan. They include Friendship Months, tours of artistic collectives, Days and Weeks of twin cities, major exhibitions, such as "Soviet Socialist Siberia" and "60 Years of the So-

viet State", film festivals, scientific symposiums and conferences, bilateral professional meetings, exchanges of delegations, specialised tourism, contacts of political figures and functions devoted to jubilee and memorial dates. This list is far from complete.

Speaking of the progress in Soviet-Japanese relations in that period, it would be wrong to pass over in silence many snags and overt intentions of certain forces to spoil goodneighbourly relations. The movement for friendship with the USSR has had to put up a constant and determined fight against those rather influential forces in Japan that seek to obstruct the rapprochement of our countries, to preserve and exploit the vestiges of anti-Soviet sentiments. In its anti-Soviet propaganda stunts Japanese reaction makes a special point of fanning up passions over the spurious "territorial problem". Many of the initiators of these campaigns know full well that the USSR will never agree to revise the results of the Second World War and the realities that came about after it. Yet they do not want to discard the invented "territorial question" using it as a catalyst of anti-Soviet campaigns and nationalist feelings in order to unite different, sometimes opposing, political forces and direct their activity into a channel chosen by reaction.

Another major factor influencing Japan's policy toward the USSR is pressure by the US. Being Japan's partner in a military-political alliance ("the security treaty") the US keeps under strict control all foreign policy steps by Japan, especially those pertaining to relations with the USSR. During the initial period of normalisation of Soviet-Japanese relations American diplomacy took numerous steps aimed at maximum curtailment of this process under the pretext that "normalisation" could upset the "balance of forces" in the Far East. On the other hand, the end of the cold war and improvement of US-Soviet relations at the end of the 1960s and first half of the 1970s had a positive influence on Soviet-Japanese relations.

However, from the mid-1970s the progress in Soviet-Japanese relations began to slow down, while at the turn of the 1980s the development of interstate relations not only ceased, but a process of freezing set in resulting in a noticeable decline in relations. The course toward freezing Soviet-Japanese ties, compounded by overt anti-Soviet propaganda, had acquired by 1980 the character of Tokyo's official policy.

The main reason for this was the turn of the US ruling circles from detente to open confrontation with the USSR in all areas. The US demanded that its allies show unity of action in implementing the "new course". The readiness of Japan's ruling circles to join this course is explained by a number of reasons which are closely linked. On the one hand, the perennial economic, political and military dependence on the US has accustomed the Japanese leaders to conducting their foreign policy in keeping with Washington's strategy and tactics. On the other, during the rapid development of the 1960s and the 1970s the Japanese monopolies have won firm positions on the world market. Having become a runner-up of the capitalist world, Japan acquired the status of the chief trade and economic rival of the US, so that relations between them are at times called "trade wars". Therefore, complying with US demands of curtailment and freezing relations with the USSR and agreeing to an arms buildup under the false pretext of "Soviet threat", Japan's ruling circles count on concessions from the US in their mutual trade and economic conflicts, believing that at this stage the sacrifice of economic and political relations with the USSR is the lesser of the two evils. Nor can the imperialist aspirations of Japanese monopolies be ignored.

Detente in the 1970s created favourable conditions for the development of the world revolutionary process and the national liberation movement. The threat of losing the existing or potential markets and sources of raw materials could not but affect the actions of Japanese monopolies. Their frequent falling in line with anti-Soviet actions by the US ruling circles is explained by the profound similarity of their class positions in the struggle against world socialism.

Due to all these factors, in the 1980s Japan openly declared her turn from the "diplomacy in all directions", that implied a balanced development of relations with the US, the PRC, and the USSR, toward a diplomacy of "strengthening the solidarity of the Western camp", membership in which Japan allegedly must prove by deeds.

It was the Japanese side that announced limitation of political contacts, slowed down talks on mutually profitable economic and trade deals and declined the signing of a new agreement on cultural ties. After the boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, there followed attempts to cut down on transportation links with our country, on tourism and on cultural and scientific exchanges.

Gloating at such a turn of events, militarist forces and ultra-rightist elements in Japan have become more active. Whipping up a hysterical campaign in the press about the "threat from the North", they began openly to advocate Japan's rearmament and the repeal of Article 9 of the Constitution, allegedly infringing on the country's national interests. Government and senior military figures went so far as to admit openly that all new war preparations are directed against the Soviet Union.

It would seem that under such conditions public organisations favouring broader contacts with the USSR will find chances for their activities dramatically restricted and that the Soviet-Japanese friendship movement is doomed to extinction. Yet, facts of this very period are graphically showing that the friendship movement has become a force capable of holding its own against anti-Soviet zig-zags in the policy of Japan's reactionary circles.

The history of the last 25 years testifies to one more important point--- during this period public ties and the movement for friendship have been on the upturn while interstate relations have experienced highs and lows.

So, when Japan's ruling circles at the beginning of the 1980s began to take steps to limit contacts with the USSR, the Japanese public, the movement for friendship with the USSR, falling back on a previously created broad basis, took the initiative of preserving and furthering public, political, economic and trade ties with the Soviet Union.

The public contributed to the solution in the spirit of goodneighbourliness of a number of concrete problems of bilateral relations. For example, on the request of the Socialist Party of Japan, a positive solution was reached on the question of taking by Japanese fishermen of sea kale in Soviet territorial waters near the Signalny Island.

The more far-sighted representatives of Japan's business circles, her political and public figures, many of whom stand on positions far removed from communist ideology, clearly realise that normal interstate relations between the USSR and Japan, based on goodneighbourliness and mutually advantageous cooperation, constitute for Japan in the long term an abiding necessity and that this course has no reasonable alternative if one thinks seriously about the country's security and peaceful future. It is proceeding from the long-term interests of the nation that these people find it necessary to participate in the friendship movement so as to lay down the groundwork for goodneighbourly relations in the future. The

statesman and politician and many times LDP parliament deputy Munenori Akagi, who is the permanent president of the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society, said the following on this score: "The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decorated me with the Order of Friendship Between Peoples. I was awarded it for my many years' work in the interests of Japanese-Soviet friendship, for development of contacts among people and cultural exchanges between the two countries. I engage in this activity first of all in the interests of Japan."²

Another prominent public and political figure, president of the Japanese Association for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries Matsumae Sigeyoshi, also decorated with the Order of Friendship Between Peoples, touching on the prospects of ties between our countries, said the following: "Japanese-Soviet relations have a great future. There is no doubt that thanks to cooperation between the USSR and Japan in working the natural resources of Siberia, as well as to joint efforts by Japan and the USSR in the cause of stabilising the situation in Asia, the state interests of the two countries will be ensured into the distant future. Therefore our duty is to work patiently in removing one after another the obstacles and negative factors that exist in the relations between the two countries at present for the achievement of these major objectives."³

Many representatives of Japan's business community came out against the Japanese government's course toward reducing business contacts with the USSR and the so-called "sanctions" against the USSR, undertaken under US pressure, for they consider these actions contrary to Japan's national interests.

Representatives of the Liaison Council of five organisations friendly to the USSR addressed in the autumn of 1982 the Japanese Prime Minister with the demand of immediately removing the "sanctions" and creating conditions for the unimpeded development of economic cooperation and trade with the USSR.

Speaking at the International Meeting of the Soviet and Foreign Public devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR, the chairman of the Association of Japanese-Soviet Trade, S. Yokokawa, said the following: "We, the leaders of the association, believe that close mutual ties in science, culture, trade, sport and all other fields are necessary for removing the threat of war, furthering detente and strengthening peace throughout the world. We proceed in our activity from the realisation of the necessity for close cooperation of our countries in the commercial and economic sphere as a basis of the whole complex of Japanese-Soviet relations."

Representatives of the Japanese firms of the Kansai district, which both trade with the USSR and participate in the friendship movement, at the height of the anti-Soviet campaign in the autumn of 1981, organised a series of meetings of Japan's leading businessmen with a Soviet delegation that arrived to hold a symposium entitled "Prospects of Japanese-Soviet Commercial and Economic Cooperation". The symposium made an important conclusion that economic and commercial cooperation between the USSR and Japan must expand in every way possible and help normalise political relations.

In February 1983 Japan saw off the largest ever delegation of the business world heading for the USSR. Consisting of 250 members, the delegation was led by S. Nagano, chairman of Japan's Trade and Industry

² M. Akagi, *Sugao-no sorempo (The USSR as It Is)*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 6.

³ *Azio-no heiwa-o kangaeru (Thoughts on Problems of Peace in Asia)*, Tokyo, 1982, p. 230.

Chamber. This visit took place despite the outrage of the right-wing extremists and open disapproval of the official circles. It showed the existence within the Japanese business community of a strong desire to develop and strengthen economic ties with the USSR, demonstrating at the same time that the "sanctions" against the USSR, imposed on Japan from outside, have no support in the country.

It should also be noted that attempts to involve Japan into Washington's anti-Soviet strategy, to turn it into a US "unsinkable aircraft-carrier" find no support among the popular masses either. This is also confirmed by public opinion polls. It is characteristic that, despite all the noise about the so-called "Soviet threat", the population of the Hokkaido Island, which is closest to the USSR, and fishermen in the first place are coming out in the most active way for goodneighbour relations with the USSR.

The most important factor of preserving and developing the assets of Soviet-Japanese relations is the principled, steady and consistent policy of the USSR toward Japan.

The Soviet Union has never taken steps to undermine Soviet-Japanese goodneighbour relations and reduce cooperation. On the contrary, the Soviet side has come up with quite a number of concrete actions and initiatives aimed at improving ties and strengthening peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region. What is more, all these proposals have been made not only with due consideration of global and regional interests of peace and security, but also with due consideration of our bilateral interests.

The Soviet Union is seriously concerned over the worsening of the international situation brought about by the aggressive forces of imperialism headed by the US. With the threat of nuclear war becoming ever more real, our country gives priority to the questions of preserving peace and of reactivating the process of detente. That is why we propose that confidence-building measures be applied in the Far East, and that they be spread to seas and oceans, which is of special importance for Japan, an island that depends on sea transportation.

The Soviet Union is also prepared to discuss with Japan trust-enhancing measures, acceptable to both sides, on a bilateral basis.

The USSR has made an historic pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In relation to Japan the USSR is ready to concretise this pledge by way of a guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against Japan at all, if she does not produce, acquire and keep such weapons on her territory. Let it be stressed that no political or economic concessions are demanded of Japan. It is only the question of Japan's strict adherence to the non-nuclear principles she herself has worked out.

It stands to reason that the implementation of these Soviet proposals in the form of concrete bilateral agreements would take the wind out of the sails of those forces that for the sake of their selfish interests are strongly pressuring public opinion with anti-Soviet concoctions proclaiming Soviet "military threat" to Japan. The anti-Soviet forces are trying to conceal Soviet peaceful initiatives from the Japanese people or to misinterpret their meaning. It is just ignorance of Soviet policy and Soviet reality that creates conditions for the spread of anti-Soviet propaganda.

Acquainting the Japanese public with the Soviet way of life, with the peaceful foreign policy of the USSR, Japanese societies and associations for friendship with the USSR are doing work of great importance from the viewpoint of improving mutual understanding and enhancing mutual trust between the peoples of Japan and the USSR.

That is why, despite all obstacles, the Japanese movement for friendship with the USSR, whose participants are partners of our Society, goes on growing in scope and activity.

At the end of the 1970s on Hokkaido there emerged a new direction in this movement—construction of Japan-Soviet friendship houses pioneered by Hokkaido's well-known businessman Y. Shibano, who organised a House of Japan-Soviet friendship and culture in Sapporo. His initiative was taken up by the towns of Kushiro, Wakkanai, Hakodate. The people behind these initiatives—M. Muto, Ts. Seto, T. Kato—are well known in the USSR. These houses, and first of all the House in Sapporo, have become beacons of Japanese-Soviet friendship on the island and centres of cultural contacts with the USSR. In five years of its existence the House in Sapporo, where exhibitions, lectures, film shows, seminars, etc., are regularly held, has been visited by over 150,000 people from Hokkaido and other parts of Japan.

For his great contribution to the development of Soviet-Japanese friendship, Y. Shibano was decorated with the Order of Friendship Between Peoples.

The USSR-Japan Society and Houses of Friendship in Sapporo, Kushiro and other towns first drew up annual plans of cooperation. At the present planning is done for two-three years.

Of late, exchanges have been widely practiced of artistic collectives, large-scale events have become traditional such as Days of USSR Culture, featuring Union republics and Days of Japanese Art in the USSR. In 1982 alone, Days of Culture of the RSFSR, Georgian and Lithuanian SSR were held in Japan, while the USSR hosted ballet groups from Niigata and Sapporo. In 1983, Days of Culture of the Moldavian, Armenian, Tajik SSR and of the RSFSR are planned for Japan, along with a joint Soviet-Japanese Week of Peace and Friendship in Uzbekistan.

The number of Japanese organisations interested in contacts with the UJS is growing. In 1982 first contacts were made between the UJS and the all-Japan association of ex-POWs, the Parliamentary association for international disarmament, and the religious organisations Rissho Koseikai and Tenrikyo. Fruitful exchanges are continuing with Soka Gakkai. Reminiscing about his visits to the USSR and meetings with Soviet leaders, the honorary president of Soka Gakkai, D. Ikeda, spoke thus of the importance of personal contacts: "I would like to value this friendship because mutual trust between states is in the final analysis based on mutual trust between individual persons. There is always a desire for mutual understanding between the countries that have many friends, even when alienation or hostility appear between these countries."⁴

We agree with these words and the practical work of the USSR-Japan Society provides graphic proof of them.

A lot of events and functions organised by the Society's Central Board, its departments, commissions and local organisations enable Soviet people to get to know the history, living and working conditions of the Japanese people and Japan's achievements in science and culture.

The Society gives vast opportunities to members of friendly Japanese organisations to meet Soviet people and establish contacts and friendly ties with them. In 1982 alone, the USSR-Japan Society's subdivisions assisted in organising or directly organised programmes of visits to our country of 4,500 Japanese tourists. Scores of "friendship caravans", spe-

⁴ D. Ikeda, *To Defend Human Life*, Tokyo, 1975, p. 100 (in Japanese).

cialised groups and individual tourists through their own experience learned of the scale and character of activities of the USSR-Japan Society.

Soviet friends of Japan and the USSR-Japan Society are directly related to such traditional forms of exchange as contacts between twin-cities. In all Soviet cities maintaining ties with Japan there are departments, commissions, clubs, etc., of our Society. Thanks to this, the population of these cities, their mayors or specialists in the city economy get the opportunity to participate in the development of Soviet-Japanese contacts. Many cities in Siberia, the Far East and Sakhalin maintain multilateral ties with the cities of Hokkaido Island, the West coast, the Kansai district and others.

An impetus to the twin-cities movement between, for example, Osaka and Leningrad, Kyoto and Kiev was given in 1982 by visits to Japan of delegations of the Leningrad City Soviet headed by L. N. Zaikov and of the Kiev City Soviet led by V. A. Zgursky. There were also delegation, tourist and sport exchanges between Ulan Ude and Rumoi, Nakhodka and Maizuru and Otaru, Bratsk and Hanao, Irkutsk and Kanazawa, Khabarovsk and Niigata.

Pressing problems of present-day international life are cause for concern of every open-minded person on earth. Worried by the world situation, the public of both countries has been taking concrete steps in recent years to counter the threat of a nuclear war. In 1982 a Soviet-Japanese meeting was held in the USSR under the slogan "Anti-War Oath". Hundreds of Japanese and thousands of Soviet participants held rallies in Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk, and Volgograd, firmly declaring their will to strengthen peace. The representative character of the Japanese delegation, which included Parliament deputies M. Akagi, S. Hasegawa, T. Ueda and representatives of the SPJ, the LDP, the Komeito, Soka Gakkai and of trade union and youth organisations should be given special emphasis.

Over the 25 years of its existence the USSR-Japan Society has not only collected rich experience of many-sided activity in forging contacts with friendly organisations but also has become a prestigious medium in establishing and developing ties between various organisations of the USSR and Japan. In recent years alone, with the assistance of the UJS, dozens of bilateral scientific symposiums have been held, whose topics included such problems as peace and security in Asia, questions of esthetic child education and different aspects of Soviet-Japanese cooperation. Together with diverse Japanese organisations, major art, scientific, and industrial exhibitions have been organised, including "The Art Engendered by the October Revolution", a paleontological exhibition, "Uzbekistan Today" and industrial fairs in Tokyo and Osaka.

A new important and promising form of activity of the USSR-Japan Society and its Japanese partners was introduced by three "round table" conferences held in the USSR and Japan together with the Liaison Council of five organisations friendly to the USSR. These conferences were instrumental in keeping up the dialogue between the Soviet and Japanese peoples right at a time when certain Japanese circles, under pressure from outside, were out to limit this dialogue by any means. The 3rd conference, held in Tokyo in April 1982, was attended by over 500 representatives of the Soviet and Japanese public, including political figures, heads and activists of public organisations, scientists, journalists, representatives of culture, arts, sports and business circles and about 40 deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Japanese Diet (Parliament) from the ruling and opposition parties.

The Soviet and Japanese participants in the "round table" conferences engaged in serious and thorough talks on a whole range of Soviet-Japanese relations, united by the mutual desire to find an answer to the present difficulties in these relations and realise the great potentials for their positive development.

The conferences once again stressed the importance of public contacts, especially in periods of interstate tensions.

"The friendship movement between the Japanese and Soviet peoples and expansion of cultural, scientific, sport exchanges, as well as visits by religious figures, have never been as important, as today for achieving mutual understanding among peoples,"—these words by the chairman of the Parliamentary Association of Japanese-Soviet Friendship, H. Ishida, said at the 2nd "round table" conference in Moscow in November 1980, meet the approval of all who are sincerely interested in bettering relations between the two countries.

People from all walks of life of the USSR take part in the activities of the USSR-Japan Society. It is headed by T. B. Guzhenko, the USSR Marine Minister, Hero of Socialist Labour, while prominent state, political and public figures, representatives of the Soviet working class, peasantry and intelligentsia take part in the work of the Society's Central Board and in the administration of its departments.

The entire 25-year-long history of the USSR-Japan Society is an integral part of the history of Soviet-Japanese relations, which call for serious improvement. Members of the Society, as well as their partners in Japan, see their task in further strengthening friendship and cooperation between the two great peoples and resolutely rebuffing all those who attempt to destroy Soviet-Japanese friendship and once again push Japan to the dangerous road of confrontation with the Soviet Union. We are sure that the majority of the Japanese people realise that our countries, being neighbours, have no other reasonable way besides maintaining and developing goodneighbour relations, relations of cooperation based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Marking its 25th jubilee, the USSR-Japan Society is fully determined, together with the entire Soviet people, to spare no effort in strengthening allround cooperation with our friends in Japan, with all those who realise the vital necessity of strengthening the basis of goodneighbourliness, and the cause of peace and friendship between the USSR and Japan, between the Soviet and Japanese peoples.

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ELEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 83 pp 154-157

[Article by T. I. Illarionova and V. N. Usov, candidate of historical sciences]

The 11th Congress of the Young Communist League of China (YCLC) took place in Peking December 20-30, 1982. It was convened four years after the 10th Congress (October 16-26, 1978) in conformity with YCLC Rules. In the period between the Congresses there were four plenary meetings of the YCLC Central Committee on the matters of organisation, current work and activities of the Young Pioneer Organisation. The 4th plenary meeting of the YCLC Central Committee, held November 4-8, 1982, discussed and approved the Report prepared for the 11th YCLC Congress, the draft of revised Rules of the YCLC, and resolved to submit those documents for consideration of the forthcoming Congress. The plenary meeting elected by secret ballot Wang Zhaoguo¹ First Secretary of the YCLC Central Committee. Han Ying, former First Secretary of the YCLC Central Committee had been transferred, it was announced, to the Economy Department.² Apart from the 4th plenary meeting there was also other spadework for the 11th Congress; conferences were called on issues of the youth and YCL of the People's Republic of China. Thus, on September 4, 1982, the executives of the CPC Central Committee, including Hu Yaobang, had a discussion with the YCLC Central Committee members. It was a debut for Wang Zhaoguo, who had been appointed to the YCLC Central Committee. The meeting examined the criteria of selecting cadres for new YCLC Central Committee membership.

On October 18, 1982, the meeting of the CPC Central Committee heard the Report of the Secretary of the YCLC Central Committee on the preparations for the 11th Congress. The point at issue at the meeting was a new section of draft Rules of the YCLC on executive personnel. Among its participants were Hu Yaobang and the Secretaries of the CPC Central Committee Wan Li and Chen Pixian. Two other meetings, on December 5 and December 9, 1982, were held at the closing stage of the preparations for the 11th YCLC Congress under the supervision of Hu Qili, former Secretary of the YCLC Central Committee and a member of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau. The issue of these meetings was the text of the Report to the 11th YCLC Congress.

On December 19, 1982, a preparatory meeting to the 11th Congress of the YCLC was held. A total of 1,954 delegates took part in its work. The meeting elected the presidium of the Congress of 172, the Credentials

¹ Wang Zhaoguo, 43, graduated in 1965 from Harbin Politechnical Institute. In 1968 he was assigned to a job at the 2nd Automobile Engineering Factory in the Hubei province. He began his career as a product engineer. For several years he was YCL Secretary of a factory subdivision Committee and then Secretary of the factory Committee. In 1976, when struggle against "right-wing deviations" commenced, he was listed into the category of persons "invested with powers and following the capitalist road". In July 1980, Deng Xiaoping, after visiting the factory, personally recommended Wang Zhaoguo for the YCLC Central Committee. Wang Zhaoguo was delegate to the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 2, 1982.

² *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 9, 1982.

Commission, and adopted the agenda of the Congress. In addition, it confirmed the decisions made at the 2nd, 3rd and 4th plenary meetings of the YCLC Central Committee of the 10th convocation and approved candidatures of the YCLC Central Committee members nominated after the 10th Congress.³

The 11th Congress of the YCLC opened its work on December 20, 1982. The proceedings of the Congress and performances of leaders were highlighted in the national press of the PRC. Among the Congress' participants were the executives of central Party and State institutions and CPC veterans including Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, Wan Li, Yu Quili and others.

The Congress was attended by 1,900 delegates and 149 delegates with the right to deliberative vote (2,000 delegates at the 10th Congress) who represented the 48-million army of the YCLC uniting 56 nationalities of China. In the period since the 10th YCLC Congress the numbers of the organisation did not change, but it had 26 million new members who replaced those who had left on account of age. In the same period 2.7 million YCLC members joined the Communist Party of China.⁴ At present, there are 2.2 million local YCLC organisations in the country.

The agenda of the Congress included three questions:

- (1) Report of the YCLC Central Committee to the 11th Congress, delivered by Wang Zhaoguo;
- (2) the adoption of new Rules of the YCLC;
- (3) the election of new YCLC Central Committee membership.

At the opening ceremony Hu Qili welcomed the Congress on behalf of the CPC Central Committee. Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, addressed the Congress at its closing.

Among the objectives outlined in the Report were: the consolidation and utmost augmentation of local YCLC organisations, particularly in the countryside; the training of a sufficient number of YCL executives meeting the requirements of today; the strengthening of YCL ties with the country's youth. The last four years, it was pointed out in the Report, had been the period of restoring YCL organisations in the country.

The Congress moved important amendments to YCLC Rules. Nominally, the Rules were enlarged with one chapter and eight articles. "Marxism-Leninism—the thought of Mao Zedong" remained as before the ideological foundation of the organisation activities. Age qualifications of YCLC members were enlarged. At present, young men and girls can be members of the YCL from 14 to 28 (according to the 10th Congress Rules—from 14 to 25). These changes are likely to bring about an increase in the number of the YCL.

In accordance with the new Rules the term of operation of the YCLC Central Committee is prolonged from 4 to 5 years. Plenary meetings of the YCLC Central Committee are to be held once a year (according to the 9th Congress Rules—one or twice a year). Provincial conferences and congresses—once in five years (10th Congress—once in two or three years); county and town conferences—once in three years (10th Congress—once a year or in two years); conferences of local YCLC organisations not less than once a year (10th Congress—twice or thrice a year). Those joining the YCLC should be recommended by two persons as before.

³ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 20, 1982.

⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 21, 1982.

The Rules include anew a provision on types of penalties imposed on YCL members: reprimand, severe reprimand, dismissal from the leading YCL posts, probation, expulsion from the YCL.

Probationer keeps membership to the YCLC from six months to one year. He is deprived of rights to elect, to be elected, to make decisions and to recommend those joining the YCLC. Upon passing the appropriate resolution by the organisation, a YCL member who lasted the probation period must be restored to his rights. Those who "persist in their errors and do not want to reeducate themselves must be expelled from the YCL."⁵

The Rules first include a special provision on an oath which is pronounced by those joining the YCLC. It runs as follows: I voluntarily join the YCLC and swear to defend the CPC leadership in every way possible, to observe YCL Rules, to put into practice the decisions taken by the organisation, to attend to YCLC members' duties, strictly to keep discipline, to study diligently, to work hard, to combat difficulties among the first, to enjoy benefits among the last, to fight for the cause of communism.⁶

At present the Rules also include a provision on forms of encouraging front-rank YCLC members of China.

Introduced in the Rules is a brand-new section on "YCL personnel". It emphasises the fact that "the executive personnel are the backbone of YCL organisations". The section defines five criteria of selecting executive personnel and their functions and duties. It makes special mention of the need "to establish a regular system of executive personnel training", to "improve the work of YCL schools of different level and refresher courses", and to "set up a system of examination of executive personnel and to apply it to all executives of the YCLC."⁷

It is perfectly evident that this section was necessitated by both the low quality of YCL work and the lack of ambitious, comparatively young YCL executive workers for guiding the activities of the YCL and the Young Pioneer Organisation of China. Taking into account the fact that the Preamble to the Rules, as distinct from former Rules, has the provision that the YCLC is not only the assistant but also the "reserve of the CPC", it can be said with certain confidence that Party cadres will be replenished with YCLC members. This is also confirmed by the general course of the CPC of replacing old, relatively uneducated personnel with more young cadres having a comparatively high level of general education and special knowledge. It follows that this section is introduced with the aim of providing the country in the near future with young executive cadres having high professional and cultural standards, which have gone through the mould of the YCL and presented themselves in a good light.

The general programme of the YCLC, formulated in the Preamble to the Rules, and which states that YCLC members fight against imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism is enlarged with a provision that the YCL must fight to "maintain peace in the whole world". At the same time the provision that "the YCLC comes out in resolute struggle against the hegemonism of two superpowers—the USSR and USA" is excluded from the Rules.

⁵ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 28, 1982.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

In his concluding remarks Hu Yaobang stated that the CPC was enhancing demands to members of the YCLC Central Committee, and that it was necessary to set up a system of annual examination of YCL executive personnel.⁸

On December 29, 1982, the 11th Congress of the YCLC elected a new Central Committee of 263 members and 51 alternate members. Reelected to new membership were 32 members and 11 alternate members of the Central Committee of the 10th convocation, in other words, only 14 per cent of former Central Committee membership.⁹

The first plenary meeting of the YCLC Central Committee of the 11th convocation was held on December 31, 1982. The plenary meeting elected First Secretary of the YCLC Central Committee, six Secretaries and one Candidate Secretary of the Central Committee and 16 members of the Standing Committee of the YCLC Central Committee. The number of Secretaries was not changed, but of former membership of four years' prescription only Li Haifeng was reelected. She had been a member of the YCLC Central Committee of the 10th convocation, YCL Secretary of Daqing oilfields. Reelected to the Secretariat were three out of four former Secretaries nominated at the 1981 3rd plenary meeting of the 10th convocation. They were Kaum Baodung, Chen Haosu and He Guangwei. Two new Secretaries, Hu Jintao and Liu Yandong, were elected. Zhang Baoshun, Alternate member of the YCLC Central Committee of the 10th convocation was elected Candidate Secretary. The Standing Committee of the YCLC Central Committee was reduced by 9 members, and its membership, except for Li Haifeng, was completely changed. Wang Zhaoguo was elected First Secretary of the YCLC Central Committee.¹⁰

⁸ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 5, 1983.

⁹ See *Ibid.*, Dec. 30, 1982.

¹⁰ See *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1983.

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FOREIGN EXPANSION OF CAPITAL

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[Review by Professor M. S. Kapitsa of book "Vneshnyaya ekspansiya kapitala: istoriya i sovremennost'" [Foreign Expansion of Capital: History and the Present Stage] by A. A. Gromyko, Moscow, Mysl', 1982, 496 pages]

The complexity of today's international situation, characterised by the growing activity of the most reactionary and militant quarters of imperialism, notably US imperialism, has brought to the forefront the need for an in-depth scientific analysis of the foundations of the foreign policy of the ruling quarters of the USA and other imperialist powers. A recent monograph by Andrei Gromyko, a prominent politician, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister of the USSR, deals with the outward expansion of monopoly capital. The author has gained renown among the scholars by his profound studies of the political economy of monopoly capitalism, as well as of international economic and political relations. Drawing upon his rich experience in international politics and quoting from a variety of sources, A. Gromyko offers a Marxist-Leninist analysis of this important element of imperialism's foreign policy that touches on such burning issues of today as preserving the peace and security of peoples, class struggle on the international arena, the formation of a new international economic order, etc.

The author comprehensively analyses the expansion of US monopoly capital simultaneously in two directions: historically and problematically. Noting the strong link between the domestic and foreign policies of state-monopoly capitalism, he also reveals the dialectical relationship between the different directions of capital expansion, which, according to Lenin, is the most important distinctive feature of imperialism.

Export of capital is discussed from two points of view: as a motive force of imperialist policies and as one of the methods of their implementation, along with political pressure, military adventures, etc.

Examining the problem profoundly, the author shows that the words of the bourgeois economist MacCulloch quoted by Marx are fully applicable to the modern imperia-

list state, which according to the founders of Marxism is a committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie, which had received its consciousness and will from capital;¹ in short, it is the insatiable craving for profit or *auri sacra fames* which always makes the capitalist tick.²

The author argues that not only has broad economic expansion in regard to other countries, including young developing nations, and economic diplomacy of imperialism failed to remove the great contradictions typical of the general crisis of capitalism, on the contrary, they have sharpened these contradictions (p. 4). Export of capital simply cannot solve the problems engendered by the capitalist mode of production; all it does is reproduce capital on a new material and territorial basis with all of its old inherent features: exploitation, violence, and the misery of the masses.

The crisis of today's capitalism is no longer a purely economic crisis, it is a veritable general crisis which has spread to all institutions of the capitalist society: the economy, domestic and foreign policies, deteriorating morals and culture, etc. One might say that, in contrast to classic, cyclic crises it has become a chronic phenomenon, stemming not from some breakdown in the capitalist economic mechanism but from the very fact of its functioning.

Nazism is an example of what such a crisis can result in. The entire power of the state apparatus is placed at the service of unbridled economic expansion in order to ensure the survival of capitalism and to lead it out of the deadlock in which it had found itself as a result of its mode of production.

In Chapter 1, which is devoted to a discussion of the export of capital as a material base for the monopolies' international expansion, the author offers a methodolo-

¹ See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 151.

² See MacCulloch, *The Principles of Political Economy*, London, 1830, p. 179.

gical approach to the problem based on Lenin's theory of imperialism, and considers its basic aspects. The author points to the historical limitations of capital as a category and to its inability to resolve vital problems not only nationally but also internationally. The chapter also analyses the sources of contradictions among imperialist powers that are most graphically manifested in the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs). No matter how hard Z. Brzezinski and other "theoreticians" try to strike this problem from the agenda, declaring that the very concepts of national independence, sovereignty, and national frontiers have become obsolete, the international reality constantly and acutely confronts the leaders of the capitalist world with the necessity to do something to reduce the heat of the struggle among the predatory imperialist countries, caused primarily by economic conflicts. Examples of this economic struggle are numerous: trade wars, bank rate wars, mounting protectionism, etc.

The author concludes that all attempts to ensure continuing survival of the capitalist relations of production and their derivatives with the help of state-monopoly regulation of the economy and assistance to the transnational corporations can only lead to the appearance of new contradictions and the aggravation of the old ones; historically such measures cannot save capitalism as a socio-political system. Equally futile are hopes that the problems of the bourgeois system can be resolved with the help of scientific and technological innovations. The classics of Marxism repeatedly showed that it is not the machine that is to blame but the capitalist mode of its operation. Those who naively believe that new technologies can change society repeat the fallacy of Antipater of Thessaloniki, a poet of Antiquity, about whom Marx wrote sarcastically that he had predicted an imminent fall of slavery and an onset of the Gold Age as a result of the spread of the waterwheel which freed man from arduous manual labour.

The introduction of new technological processes, management techniques, methods of "enriching and humanising labour" and the like cannot eradicate such perpetual evils of capitalism as exploitation and op-

pression of the masses, the conflict between labour and capital, and growing alienation. It is highly symbolic that precisely the United States with its vaunted wealth, which, according to Western ideologists, has already entered the post-industrial era, has a 12 million-strong army of unemployed and uses fierce measures to crush the labour movement. The race problem, the conflict between the generations, the urban crisis, crime and environmental pollution bordering on ecocide have reached unheard-of proportions. The richest nation in the capitalist world, which, according to Mark Twain, the great American satirist, could well replace the stars on its flag with human skulls and the stripes with barbed wire, spends hundreds of billions of dollars on arms and produces space-age machinery, but cannot deliver millions of its subjects from terrible poverty, or give them a modicum of education and health facilities. This is in sharp contrast to the idyllic picture drawn by W. Rostow and other preachers of "technological optimism".

The present economic downturn is particularly grave, because it is accompanied by structural, long-term crises in a number of key industries, of which the iron-and-steel, auto, shipbuilding, chemical, rubber and textile industries have been the hardest hit.

Commenting on the economic situation in the country, the *US News and World Report* says that the old industrial base is disintegrating; factory gates are slamming shut with alarming frequency: 13,195 factories have stopped work since 1975. The industrial Midwest is becoming a disaster area.

The French iron-and-steel mills have reduced their workforce by 30 per cent over the last five to seven years; the corresponding reductions in West Germany are 17 per cent, in Luxembourg—40 per cent, in Great Britain more than 50 per cent.

In Japan too, certain industries and whole parts of the country display symptoms of a depression. Auto and shipbuilding industries sharply reduced their outputs in the past year. Iron-and-steel, oil-processing, pulp-and-paper, most of the chemical industries are hit by a prolonged recession.

Andrei Gromyko notes that a characteristic feature of today's foreign expansion of monopoly capitalism is the steady growth of the export of capital. In the

postwar period total US foreign investments doubled practically every decade. While the first few postwar years were characterised by a growth of US investment in Western Europe and Japan, subsequent years witnessed the growth of another, neocolonialist trend—the desire to gain a foothold in countries which had recently freed themselves of colonial dependence and to impose control over their natural resources. During the last few years, however, foreign investment has been concentrated in the industrially advanced region of the capitalist world; the growing expatriation of profit from the developing countries can no longer quench the appetites of the monopolies, which funnel more and more money to developed capitalist countries where they get a higher rate of profit. At the same time the imperialist countries are trying to relocate the lower echelons of its economy, such as extraction of raw materials and fuel, primary processing, labour-consuming and ecologically “dirty” processes, to the periphery of the capitalist world, thus reducing most developing countries to a state of “step-sons” of scientific and technological progress.

Another distinguishing feature of the present stage of monopoly expansion is the growing aggressiveness of the export of capital which is due to the growing disparities between the rates of growth of individual imperialist countries, their increasingly militaristic policies and the attempts by the developing countries to resist imperialist rapine. It should be pointed out that the concept of disparities and uneven development refers not only to the group of countries which have been traditionally described as developed. There are several countries, for example, in Latin America, which, although still referred to as members of the “third world”, have overtaken the “outsiders” from among the developed countries in per capita GNP and in total output, and are fast turning into a sort of subimperialist centres of potential rivals of the imperialist countries. The United States seeks to take this factor into account in its foreign economic strategy by opting for extending relations with the most developed of the “third world” countries. The US has even changed the nature of its dependence on the latter by giving them the role of

an auxiliary link in the US economic mechanism.

The author goes on to note that the aggressiveness in the imperialist quarters’ drive to invest overseas stems from their inability to secure the desired rate and size of profit except by committing gross violations of the fundamental norms of international relations, trampling underfoot the principles of equality and mutual benefit and by undermining the foundations of national sovereignty, freedom and independence of the peoples.

The author reveals the connection between this aggressiveness of international capital, notably American, with the broader trend of mounting militarism in the policies of imperialist states, with the operation of military-industrial complexes which are an embodiment of monopoly capital as an enemy of socialism, peace and progress as imperialism spells rapine, reaction, war and the suppression of democracy.

Another salient feature of the monopolies’ expansion discussed by the author is the growing interrelationship between the export of capital and the foreign policies of imperialist countries. The postwar period has already dramatically revealed the trend toward the concentration of the bulk of exported capital in the hands of a small number of the biggest monopolies, along with a trend toward a much greater role by the state in this process. Consequently, the monopolies became increasingly interested in the state pursuing a foreign policy favourable to them and protecting their interests (incidentally, this may explain the fact frequently puzzling Western analysts, namely, that US bourgeoisie’s isolationist desires so quickly gave way to imperial ambitions). On the other hand, there has been a corresponding heightening of the role of economic imperialism in the foreign policies of the imperialist countries.

The author notes that the major exporters of capital are at the same time the “cause of major upheavals; the embodiment of the insoluble contradictions of the capitalist mode of production with all the consequences stemming from this fact for capitalism’s policies” (p. 28). This fact has already been recognised by the international public. For example, the UNCTAD Secretariat noted

in one of its official documents that "the system based on the IMF [in which the decision-making is monopolised by the USA and its imperialist partners.—M.K.] is in a state of crisis".

The chapters of the book dealing with investments, loans, and "assistance" to the developing countries make very instructive reading. The author shows how growing investment and "development loans" (in 1970s the foreign debt of the developing countries increased four-fold, topping the \$400 billion mark in 1980 and reaching \$528 billion in 1982) are accompanied by the growing expatriation of capital from these countries. In 1980 the developing countries paid the enormous sum of \$75 billion, against \$8 billion in 1971, in debt servicing alone (p. 33). The rate of growth of debts overtook the rates of growth of production and exports. The developing countries have to spend about 20 per cent of their export earnings on debt servicing. During the last four years the balance of payments deficit of the developing countries (with the exception of petroleum exporting countries) increased 2.5 times, reaching \$100 billion. This means that the financial burden on the developing countries has become such as to put them on the brink of bankruptcy. The author draws a comparison between the recipients of imperialist "assistance" and drug addicts: injections of dollars bring them only temporary relief, ultimately worsening their condition.

For the monopolies, economic "assistance" to the developing countries is nothing but a means of keeping up the level of their investment and conquering new positions. All financial assistance, to say nothing of military aid, which, as the author's data shows, is practically equal in size to the economic assistance in the case of the 10 largest recipients of US aid in 1981, "is invariably accompanied by the imposition of crushing terms as regards deliveries of strategic raw materials to the US, the creation of US military bases in these countries' territories, as well as their involvement in all sorts of aggressive military blocs under the US aegis".

After a close examination and analysis of a broad range of statistical and other sources Andrei Gromyko draws a picture of the growing might and influence of US impe-

rialism and its ambitions in the world arena. According to Lenin's brilliant contemporary analysis³ after World War I, which so enriched the US monopolies that nearly 20 countries including England and France found themselves in its bondage, US imperialism laid claim to a position of leadership in the world. The author cites interesting facts about the financing of the export of counterrevolution to Russia by US monopolies. Analysing the Young Plan, the Dawes Plan and similar activities, he throws bright light on the criminal role of US imperialists in the revival of German militarism and attempts to provoke it to attack the East.

Pages devoted to the analysis of the activities of the US Export-Import Bank, set up in 1934 allegedly to finance Soviet-American trade but actually an instrument of monopolistic expansion, make interesting reading. The bank is actively used by the present US Administration to increase economic pressure on the socialist countries.

The consideration of different aspects of the problems involved in the struggle of US capital for sources of raw materials and energy (Middle East and Latin American oil, rubber of Southeast Asia, tin, etc.) brings the author to the conclusion that the US monopolies seek not only to plunder the natural resources of vast areas in the world (presently described by the US as its "spheres of vital interest", very much in the same vein in which Acheson in 1950 declared certain areas of Asia, including Indochina, a vital sphere of the US) but also to line their pockets at the expense of their imperialist rivals. This is illustrated by eloquent figures of the US oil monopolies' sky-rocketing profits which were the root cause of the energy crisis, in the course of which the US oil giants shamelessly hiked fuel prices and recuperated their earlier losses by making both US consumers and its oil importing allies pay through the nose which concerned primarily West European countries and Japan.

³ It might be recalled in this connection that already at the time Lenin predicted the imminent disintegration of the Versailles system and the inevitability of war between the USA and Japan for spheres of influence in the Pacific.

The chapter devoted to an analysis of the main features of the export of US capital at the present stage will not fail to draw the attention of specialists.

Interesting data, including most recent ones and hitherto not used by other scholars, along with the meaningful conclusions drawn by the author, have a direct impact on many acute and pressing problems of today, making it easier to understand the inner workings of the imperialist powers' policy-making. This is especially true in the case of the dynamics and geographical distribution of exported capital, "assistance" rendered, balances of trade, gold and currency reserves, etc.

The fact that after World War II the US has been gradually losing its unchallenged hegemony in international trade and other economic spheres is not the least cause of the growing aggressiveness of the export of US capital. This was caused by the faster rate of growth of the GNP and industrial output of Japan and Western Europe. The shrinking share of the US in world capitalist exports is accompanied by a growing balance of trade deficit—from \$25.3 billion in 1980 to \$46 billion in 1982 (estimated). At the same time the output of these countries' foreign subsidiaries is still lower than that extracted by US overseas firms. In the mid-1970s the output of US firms' foreign subsidiaries, frequently and justifiably referred to as the third industrial power in the capitalist world, accounted for more than 30 per cent of the total gross national product of the country.

The author points out that between 1967 and 1978 the volume of US capital invested abroad increased nearly three-fold. Nevertheless, the US share in the total volume of foreign investment by developed capitalist countries dropped somewhat, from 50.4 to 45.2 per cent, because foreign investment by Western Europe above all Japan was growing at a faster rate (an increase of 18 times during the same period).

Some of the most compelling pages of the book are devoted to the expansion of US capital in the Asian Pacific, where, beginning with the seizure of the Philippines, the imperialist nature of the US foreign policy revealed itself in the most dramatic fashion as here this policy was most con-

sistent and cynical. Analysing the US financial and economic assistance to Japan during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, A. Gromyko stresses that the desire to reap direct economic benefits, to make money on the war, was not the only motive: already at the time the US capital pursued obvious foreign policy objectives in its dollar diplomacy—to weaken Russia to have a chance to boss in the north of China and eastern parts of Russia (pp. 74-75). The author exposes the fallacy of statements of Western apologists to the effect that America not only observed strict neutrality but also played a peace-keeping role, that it was through its good offices that the war was ended and the Portsmouth Treaty signed. He convincingly shows that it was the US that effectively pushed Japan toward a conflict with Russia and financed her military adventure: "US bankers acting in full concert with the then US government and its connivance saved Japan from a financial and economic collapse during the Russo-Japanese war and in the final analysis also from a military collapse" (p. 76).

Analysing the expansion of US capital in China, the author concludes that "historical facts give the lie to those US historians, economists and sociologists who are spreading the myth that the relations between the USA and China are characterised by "traditional friendship", that the US always wanted to see China a "unified and independent state" (p. 81). He goes on to show how beginning with mid-19th century, the US bourgeoisie pursued the same policy with respect to China as other capitalist predators (including opium trade, *de facto* participation in the opium wars, gun-boat diplomacy, imposition of unequal treaties, etc.). That, unlike England, France, and Germany which in the words of the great Chinese revolutionary democrat Sun Yatsen "were tearing China to pieces", the Americans proclaimed the "open doors policy" was due to the fact firstly that the spheres of influence in China had already been auctioned off among principal capitalist powers before the United States appeared on the international stage as one of the major powers and, secondly, to the industrial might of the US which enabled it to successfully compete against other countries in China's markets.

US imperialism's economic expansion in China was closely intertwined with direct aggression against the country, with the USA readily resorting to force or the threat of the use of force against it.

In postwar years US imperialism became even more powerfully attracted to the Asian Pacific region. It was here that it most strikingly manifested its readiness to use every means at its disposal, including direct aggression, to slow down the historical process and to prevent newer and newer states from leaving the orbit of the capitalist world.

The role of the US in the revival of Japanese imperialism is notorious. Preventing that country's development along a road of democracy and contributing to the restoration of *zaibatsu*, the United States hoped to turn postwar Japan into a structural component of its system of domination, a junior partner in maintaining *Pax Americana* on both sides of the ocean, and a staging area for the "roll-back of communism".

The United States spent enormous sums of money to keep the US puppet Chiang Kaishek in power and to prevent China's development along a socialist path. Incidentally, it is worth recounting these facts to those short-sighted politicians who pin

high hopes on using the US economic potential to help blaze a "Chinese path to socialism".

The popular revolution in China put an end to these calculations.

The futility of US imperialism's attempts to prevent the shrinking of the "peau de chagrin" of imperialist domination in the Far East is most clearly seen in Southeast Asia. The collapse of the puppet regime in Saigon, the reunification of Vietnam, the strengthening of allround relations of fraternal friendship, alliance and cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, with the three countries becoming a stronghold of socialism in Southeast Asia, have put an end to the attempts of US imperialism to use the bomb and the dollar in order to perpetuate its domination in this part of the world.

Unfortunately the scope of a short review precludes a more detailed discussion of the book's contents and conclusions. Hopefully, the new book by A. Gromyko will be appreciated by readers who take an interest in today's international relations and recent history, and who undoubtedly are looking forward to new publications by the author.

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SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN VIETNAM

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[Review by K. M. Ligay, candidate of economic sciences, of book "Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika V'yetnam. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye problemy" [SRV: Socioeconomic Problems], edited by Ye. P. Glazunov (USSR), Editor-in-Chief Dao Van Tap, Le Vinh (SRV), M. Ye. Tregubenko (USSR), Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 214 pages]

The reviewed book is the first collective work by a group of Soviet and Vietnamese scholars from the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Economics Institute of the Committee of Social Sciences and other institutions of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The authors analyse the results and prospects of socio-economic development in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The book features a broad and comprehensive approach to the study of the problems involved in the creation of a socialist economy in Vietnam: from the economic strategy of the Communist Party of Vietnam, as well as forms and directions of its implementation, to Vietnam's participation in the international division of labour and the development of foreign economic relations.

Socialist construction in Vietnam is taking place in complex and specific conditions: the country is effecting a transition to a new social order not only bypassing the capitalist stage of development, on account of its low economic and social development level, but also within a relatively short period of time (since 1945), the country had to deal with the problems of transition to socialism twice—first in 1945-1975 in the north of Vietnam and then after the formation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976, over the whole of the country's territory. What makes socialist construction more difficult is the fact that there are still considerable differences between the North and the South of the country in many spheres of social life—in the levels of economic development, social structures, etc. Whereas during the first years of people's power the North had made the initial steps toward creating a material and technological base of socialism and largely completed the socialist transformation in agriculture, trade and the cotta-

ge industries, for obvious reasons the South still has a different economic and social structure. Along with the state and co-operative sectors, the economy of the South still has survivals of state-private, private-capitalist and small-scale modes of production. In 1980 the socialist sector of unified Vietnam produced 57.7 per cent of the gross national product and its cooperatives produced up to 53.4 per cent of agricultural output (p. 44).

Discussing the processes involved in the creation of the socialist economy in Vietnam under new historical conditions, the authors of the book make numerous quotes from the resolutions of the 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (1976). The main conclusions and propositions of the Congress were reaffirmed by the 5th Congress of the CPV in March 1982. Consequently, although the book does not include the materials of the latest CPV Congress, its analysis of the Party's strategy and tactics under the conditions of transition to socialism is in full line with the Congress resolutions.

The resolutions of the 4th and 5th Congresses of the CPV provide for the creation in the course of the transition period, i. e., during the next 15 or 20 years, of the economic foundation of socialism through socialist industrialisation, socialist transformation of agriculture, trade, cottage industry and, ultimately for the transition from small-scale to large-scale socialist production. This would enable the country to build a modern industrial and agrarian economy, to irrevocably entrench the collective mode of production, and to create new social relationships. The socialist economy is to be built in two stages.

During the first stage it is planned to liquidate the multistructural nature of economy in the South and to tip the economic balance in favour of socialism, to eliminate the aftermath of the protracted war, parti-

cularly in the supply of food, and to gradually erect a unified social structure in Vietnam and promote the cultural revolution.

However, the first stage can only create preliminary conditions for the fulfilment of the tasks of the second stage: the transition of the country to socialist industrialisation through its own domestic capital formation, substantial growth in the living standard, culminating in the creation of the material and technological base of socialism.

Drawing upon a wealth of factual material (some of the references are quoted in Soviet economic literature for the first time) the authors offer a detailed description of the state of Vietnam's economy during the pre-socialist period. They analyse the many modes of production in the economy of the South, its social structure and ways and means of rebuilding its private sector along socialist lines. They look into problems involved in managing the economy of the country when its economic integration has not yet been completed and multi-structural economy in the South still preserved. Many of these problems are not easy to solve. However, their solution is facilitated by the fact that the country has rich experience of socialist transformations in the North and can also draw upon the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries.

It is known that for the successful construction of socialism it is absolutely necessary not only to use its principal laws but also to take into account the specific conditions in individual countries. The authors discuss both the features Vietnam has in common with other socialist countries and features unique to it. As an example of the latter they point to the characteristics of the cooperation of agriculture which is accompanied by "turning the county into an agrarian-industrial economic unit" (p. 24). Also of much interest is the use of the small-scale, including private, production in socialist construction. For this purpose special amalgamations have been created in the South of the country, made up of state enterprises and private workshops manufacturing similar products. The partners in the amalgamation have numerous and close links. The private enterprises and work-

shops produce parts which are used in the assembly of the final product by the state enterprise. Whenever necessary state enterprises assist partners in retooling, introduction of new products, supplying materials and fuel, etc. (pp. 158-159). This form of production organisation which is widespread in many industries in the South, (e. g., engineering, textile and garments industries, in wood-working and agricultural processing) makes it possible to increase output and employment. On the whole, this creative approach has helped to overcome many difficulties usually arising as a result of the underestimation of a country's specific characteristics.

The book dwells at length on matters of structural policy at the initial stage of socialist construction. It is not accidental that a great many of the book's chapters concern themselves with these matters to various extents, since the resolution of the socio-economic problems of the transition period, as the authors rightly point out, depends on a correct choice of the directions of economic development during the initial stage of socialist construction.

Generalising the experience of socialist transformations in the country's North in 1945-1975, both Vietnamese and Soviet authors conclude that at the first stage of the country's transition to socialism priority attention should be paid to the development of agriculture and other traditional sectors: forestry, fisheries, light and cottage industries (pp. 20, 37, 82, 120 and 163). First of all, the country possesses exceptionally favourable conditions for the development of agriculture and has vast labour resources. Suffice it to note that the area under cultivation can be increased several-fold, to total 10-11 million hectares, while the country's workforce exceeds 23 million people. Second, in spite of the country's achievements in socialist construction, there are still shortages of basic necessities, the level of economic development is still low, domestic capital is inadequate and the employment problem has not been solved (pp. 25, 34, 36).

At the same time the discussed course of economic construction is not equivalent to renunciation of the development of industry, of the long-term policy of socialist industrialisation, which, according to the

resolutions of the 4th and 5th CPV Congresses, is the central task in the country's transition to socialism. During the first stage it is planned to develop and create a number of industries, primarily those involved in the servicing of agriculture and other traditional economic branches. Subsequently, as the necessary prerequisites are created, the country will embark on a programme of large-scale industrialisation. "The main content of the first stage, along with the all-round development of agriculture," the authors conclude, "is the creation of a diversified industrial structure, including branches which create conditions for the intensive development of agriculture... Without the development of these branches it would be impossible to complete the first stage and move toward the second one. What is more, obstacles may appear in the way of the country's transition toward large-scale industrialisation" (p. 82).

Other advantages offered by this structural policy include Vietnam's more effective participation in the international division of labour which is of cardinal importance for the construction of the material and technological base of socialism. Already at this stage the country's foreign economic links, primarily with CMEA, play an exceptional role in its economic advance. This can be illustrated by the following data. The share of output produced by facilities built with the help of the USSR alone is: 25 per cent of electricity, 89 per cent of coal, 100 per cent of tin, 100 per cent of sulphuric acid, apatites and superphosphate, and 61 per cent of metal-cutting tools (p. 197).

The conditions for the further intensification of trade and economic cooperation between Vietnam and CMEA are most favourable. A CMEA member since 1978, Vietnam can now coordinate its economic development plans with those of other CMEA countries more comprehensively than in the past, and improve its export-import links with them. The book's authors point out that "Vietnam's active participation in the coordination of economic plans in 1981-1985 will enable it to overcome the most typical trend of the last few years, when the creation of diversified economic structure involved a simultaneous rapid development

of many branches, unaccompanied by a corresponding progress in vocational training, scientific research base and the necessary infrastructure" (pp. 173-174).

The authors examine the main directions of the specialisation of Vietnam's economy in a socialist economic integration, as well as problems of increasing the country's export potential during the transition period.

As a member of the socialist community Vietnam possesses a number of advantages in several industries. In the next few years the country will become a major supplier to the CMEA markets of citrus fruits, coffee, tea and certain raw materials, such as tin, rubber, bauxites, etc. However, there are limitations on the growth of the country's export potential imposed by the shortage of machinery and equipment, fuel, chemical fertilizers, agricultural machinery and consumer goods. After an exhaustive analysis of Vietnam's trade and economic links with other CMEA countries, the authors suggest possible avenues of Vietnam's participation in socialist economic integration, particularly in the joint implementation of long-term cooperation projects in the production of food and consumer goods, greater cooperation in the use of Vietnam's labour resources through organising labour-intensive industries in its territory, further development of such time-tested forms of production links as cooperation in compensation projects, raw materials supply, and stepped up trade and economic cooperation between the Far Eastern parts of the USSR and Vietnam (pp. 100, 171, 183). While increasing exports of its traditional products, especially agricultural produce to CMEA and other countries, Vietnam will be able to import goods which it does not produce itself or produces in insufficient quantities.

The reviewed book is an undoubted success of a group of Soviet and Vietnamese scholars. It will undoubtedly be welcomed by readers who take interest in problems involved in the transition of countries with weakly developed economies to socialism and in the specifics of socialist construction at initial stages.

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ROOTS OF THE U.S. CHINA POLICY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 83 pp 167-169

[Review by V. S. Myasnikov, doctor of historical sciences and professor, and D. T. Kapustin, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Dvizhushchiye sily politiki SSHA v otnoshenii Kitaya" [Driving Forces of U.S. Policy on China] by Ye. P. Bazhanov, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 239 pages]

The relationship between the domestic and foreign policies of states in today's world can be defined at the extent in which different social classes and groups can influence the making of their country's foreign policy. Revealing the interplay of domestic factors which determine the posing of strategic foreign policy objectives and represent a decisive element among instruments of its implementation is a challenging problem for scholars of foreign policy today.¹ The process of formation of the US China policy, profoundly analysed in E. P. Bazhanov's book, is no exception.

The author undertook a new task for Soviet Sinology—to break down the US China policy into its component elements and to analyse the inner workings of the US stance toward the "Chinese issue", that is not only to reveal in general the motives of US activity in respect to China but also the role of the bearers of these motives—monopoly capital, Congress, State Department bureaucracy, political commentators, the mass media, lobbies and certain public quarters.² This approach, as the author rightly stresses, "provides a wealth of material for the elucidation of the laws governing the formation of the US foreign policy as a whole" (p. 4).

The first two chapters of the work, devoted to a description of a theoretical model of the US foreign policy as a whole and its motive forces in respect of China, con-

vincingly show that in an imperialist state only the interests of the ruling class—the bourgeoisie or its certain strata, social and political groups and institutions—can be the main springs of foreign policy-making. It is only too natural that "the main thrust of the US policy toward China, its direction and objectives are determined by class and ideological motives" (p. 33). The author has identified several other factors, albeit of lesser importance, which are also instrumental in defining the character of the US China policy (traditional-historical, commercial, and domestic policy factors), but it is the interests of the US ruling class that are preeminent in the making of US foreign strategy.

In a short but clear description of the history of relations between the US and China, including the period before the formation of the People's Republic of China, E. Bazhanov shows that, whatever the twists and complexities of the US Far Eastern policies in the last few decades, its main thrust has always been anti-socialist and anti-Soviet; it amounted to attempts to impose upon Japan and China a line of opposition to the USSR, to prevent a "Bolshevisation" of China. After the defeat of Chiang Kaishek and the formation of the People's Republic of China, the class and ideological content of Washington's China policy manifested itself with a vengeance in the Dulles doctrine of "rolling back communism". Today the substance of the US administrations' global and regional strategy in respect to China remains the same, although the arsenal of tactical means of attaining it has changed. It is not fortuitous that, hopeful of a turn in Peking's policies in the 1970s, the US political strategists decided to "take advantage of a chance unparalleled in the 200 years of the US history".

The author begins his analysis of the contribution made by different social and political strata and their institutions in the

¹ See *The Making and Implementation of Foreign Policy by Capitalist States*, Moscow, 1981 (in Russian); A. A. Kokoshin, *USA: Behind the Facade of Global Policy*, Moscow, 1981 (in Russian).

² US Far East watchers also note the "multi-layer" character of the US China policy. See, for example, W. R. Kintner, J. F. Cooper, *A Matter of Two Chinas. The China-Taiwan Issue in US Foreign Policy*, Philadelphia, 1979.

making and evolution of the US China policy with an examination of the role of monopoly capital (Chapter III). It was monopoly capital that toward the end of the 19th century drove Americans to "discover China", raised hopes of profits in the limitless Chinese market and then lavishly financed the "containment of Red China" and nourished the Chiang Kaishek regime in Taiwan. At the same time, the author goes on, during the "second discovery of China" US monopoly capital, giving its blessing to the Nixon administration's new policy toward the "Chinese issue" was guided by political-strategic objectives, with commercial interests being of small significance (p. 87). However, as the dialogue continued and especially after changes in Peking's foreign economic strategy the appetites of the US business quarters began to grow and more and more US monopolies began to emphasise the importance of the Chinese market, hoping to place a solid material foundation under US-China relations.

The author shows the ups and downs in the mood of US firms which put a stake on trade with China. He looks into the reasons why "real business" between China and the USA has failed to materialise and why the US ruling quarters have to use strong political stimulants to give it a boost (an example is the announcement that the US is willing to sell dual-purpose technology to China, followed by the promise to sell weapons). The author stresses that, although prospects of Sino-American trade and economic relations do not depend on the US side alone, unless hopes of the US business come true, "one might expect an opposite, negative impact of US business on US-Chinese cooperation, including its strategic and political aspects" (p. 87).

In later chapters, particularly in Chapters IV and X (which deal with the role of US Congress and the President) the author provides a convincing answer to the question as to who was primarily responsible for the reorientation of the US China policy. Expressing the interests of their class, the US President and Congressmen had realised by the mid-1960s the changes in the international alignment of forces and the declining global role of the USA and began to earnestly look to China in search of a face-saving retreat from the Vietnam adventure. Bazhanov offers a detailed analysis not only of the changes in the US approach to China but also of the complex process of the slow emergence and subsequent implementation of Sino-American "normalisation". He reconstructs the time when President Nixon, a notorious anti-

communist and an old hand in Washington's corridors of power, concluded that it would be possible to play the "Chinese card" in order to attain his strategic objectives, found a likeminded person in Henry Kissinger and, on the basis of a number of congressional hearings in 1965-1970, became convinced in his view that a rapprochement with China would be supported by a majority on the Capitol Hill (pp. 111-113). Still uncertain that his initiative "from above" would be properly understood by those quarters in the country whose support he needed at a time when the Taiwan lobby was still strong and when Taiwan had strong support in the academic community, the President, as Kissinger later recalled in his memoirs, shifted the propaganda machine into high gear.³

A veritable "China boom" broke out in the mass media. Imaginations of businessmen were fired by prospects of conquering the vast Chinese market. There was an about-face in the public's attitude toward China; political scientists and Sinologists vied with one another in suggesting recipes for new US China policy (p. 149); the US State Department bureaucracy espoused the Nixon policy.

This example is a graphic illustration of the intimate interrelationship of all the above components which, closely intertwining and complementing each other, produce a sort of a resultant of domestic forces influencing the formulation of the country's China policy. Although the author of the book makes a separate examination of each of these forces on the domestic scene, the pattern of their interrelationship constantly makes itself felt on the pages of the book. This approach enabled Bazhanov to produce an accurate, complete and multidimensional picture of the inner workings of US policy in respect to China.

However, as time went on, the role of individual factors changed. Whereas Congress was an ally for Nixon in carrying out the new approach to China, for Carter it became to a certain extent a rival which insisted that its demand be taken into consideration in establishing diplomatic relations with China (that of greater accent on

³ H. Kissinger, *A la Maison Blanche, 1968-1973*, Paris.

preserving "special" relationship with Taiwan). The author shows in graphic detail that after public opinion, bureaucracy, the new China lobby, the press, the Sinologists and political scientists as well as big business had already been supporting the Carter administration, it succeeded in preventing Congress from participating in the drafting of terms of the PRC's complete diplomatic recognition (1978) on terms actually put forward by China's diplomacy. However, as soon as this had been done, the US administration threw the Taiwan Relations Act as a sop to the piqued and disaffected Congressmen. As a result, according to an admission by the Chinese press now, "after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the USA, the US authorities have failed to keep their promises and, under the pretext of protecting their interests and having adopted the Taiwan Relations Act, continue to view a piece of China's territory—Taiwan—as a political substance and sell Taiwan arms, vainly pursuing their old objective, that of torpedoing China's unification".⁴

Another of Bazhanov's important idea that deserves emphasis is that the inner workings of the US China policy, despite their scale and complexity, are subordinated to a definite programme. This can be illustrated by the political record of the present administration. At the behest of the reactionary wing of the US ruling quarters and the military-industrial complex which are resentful of the progress of detente, Reagan began to steer an unswerving course toward restoring the US to its "past

grandeur". This toughness also reflected itself in the China policy, although the President and his administration still proceed from the old strategy in respect to China already defined by the US ruling class, making adjustments only to the tactics of Washington's China policy and leaving its essence intact (p. 204).

In conclusion the author shows that the sources of repeated zigzags in Washington's China policy could invariably be traced to the US ruling elite which is ultimately always guided by its class interests (p. 212). After the "running-in" with the help of the academic community, mass media and lobbies, new ideas are then sold to the country's public opinion and translated into the government's foreign policy strategy with the White House preserving a certain freedom of manoeuvre in implementing it.

The many positive features of the book include the wealth of sources and the multitude of accurate and insightful observations that the author amassed during his practical work in the USA. These make the work even more topical and interesting. The book is also highly relevant, for it exposes the methods and means which US monopolists use to try to "domesticate" a country with the largest population in the world, to draw China into capitalism's economic orbit and to place its foreign policy at the service of plans of consolidating political, military and strategic superiority of imperialism in the world.

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 31, 1982.

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ASEAN: POLICIES AND ECONOMICS

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[Review by A. B. Khokhlov of book "ASYeAN: politika i ekonomika" [ASEAN: Politics and Economics] by V. V. Samoylenko, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 192 pages]

The events of the last few years bear witness to the fact that Southeast Asia remains a hotbed of tensions. Pursuing their selfish interests and cooperating with one another, the imperialist powers and reactionary forces are trying hard to prevent a normalisation of relations between the socialist states of Indochina and the members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), a subregional political and economic group. It is no wonder therefore that the interest in the developments in Southeast Asia has heightened of late. This interest is exemplified by the book by V. Samoylenko. In this comprehensive analysis, the first of such nature in the USSR, the author discusses the many aspects of the activity of the ASEAN which includes five states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. The author draws on a wealth of factual material to describe the ASEAN sources, history and objectives and to analyse the political and economic cooperation among its members as well as their relations with other countries both in this region and elsewhere.

After an overview of the organisation's history, the author looks into the reasons for the failure of earlier attempts of Southeast Asian countries to set up their subregional organisation. The author notes that the situation in Southeast Asia in the second half of the 1960s confronted the countries in the region with the need to look for new ways of safeguarding their political and economic interests. The defeat of the US aggression against Vietnam dramatically showed the absurdity of hopes that foreign intervention even by the world's strongest imperialist power can ensure the survival of a regime which has lost support of the people. The concept of security through foreign military assistance and participation in pro-imperialist military blocs was utterly discredited. This prompted the countries in the region to rely on their own forces and on cooperation in the preservation and strengthening of the existing order (p. 15). Another im-

portant factor behind the creation of the ASEAN was the desire of its five members to use subregional cooperation as an instrument of speeding up their economic development, which, as the countries' ruling quarters hope, would take the edge off social problems. The author points out that the ASEAN's political foundation is the class-ideological community of their ruling regimes, which compels the five countries to organise multilateral cooperation and to search for ways of overcoming the existing differences. The author dwells at length on matters of political cooperation of the ASEAN "Five". Although ASEAN was created as an organisation for economic, cultural and social cooperation, political matters also figured prominently among its activities, from its very inception. The latter include not only the settlement of political conflicts, for example, those between Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and the Philippines, but also broader measures such as the creation of a favourable political climate and an atmosphere of mutual trust which would facilitate all other forms of cooperation, including those in the economic sphere.

The author justifiably highlights the concepts of security put forward by the ASEAN's members. For example, he considers Indonesia's concept of the so-called national and regional resistance designed to help the ruling regimes in the five countries survive in the process of social change in Southeast Asia. Malaysia's concept of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia is consonant with the first idea. The initiators of these two concepts imbued them with their own class views, trying to use them as a barrier preventing the spread of the revolutionising influence of the victorious struggle of Indochina's patriots against the US aggression. At the same time the author rightly notes that the idea of neutralisation was supposed to be carried out on the basis of such universally recognised principles of peaceful coexistence as mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality, non-inter-

ference in the internal affairs of one another, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes. These principles were also enshrined in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of Southeast Asia which imparts certain stability to the relations among ASEAN members.

In 1977 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam launched a comprehensive programme of cooperation in the name of genuine independence, peace and neutrality in the region. During his 1978 tour of the ASEAN countries, Pham Van Dong, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the SRV, discussed the problem of turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability with the leaders of the five countries. The head of Vietnam's government announced his country's readiness to cooperate with ASEAN members in maintaining peace and security in the region. He stressed that socialist Vietnam had no unfriendly designs in respect to ASEAN states. It was reaffirmed during the talks that there were no fundamental differences between Vietnam's and the ASEAN's views on the zone of peace in Southeast Asia, as both were based on universally recognised principles of the UN Charter.

However, after the 1979 revolutionary events in Kampuchea which resulted in the overthrow of the anti-popular regime of Pol Pot, the ASEAN chose to freeze relations with Vietnam and other countries of Indochina. The Association's members still refuse to recognise the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which amounts to the support for the Pol Pot gangs operating from the territory of Thailand.

Naturally such a stand of the Association members is not conducive to the creation of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia, to the strengthening of security and stability in the region. The author rightly observes that only an early normalisation of relations among all the countries in the region, only the recognition of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the development of good-neighbourly relations with socialist Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea can create favourable conditions for turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability. The author thoroughly analyses other factors standing in the way of the implementation of the zone-of-peace idea, such as the continuing

anti-Vietnamese sentiments of certain sections of ASEAN ruling quarters, attempts to organise military cooperation among Association members, proposals to forge closer military and political links with the United States, the desire to keep the US military bases in the region and several others.

The author also dwells on the cooperation of ASEAN members in the field of domestic security. These matters have been discussed during a number of meetings of ASEAN leaders. The Association's members are bound by mutual obligations in the sphere of security. However, ASEAN members' leadership carefully avoids playing up this aspect of the Association's activity, emphasising that it is outside the framework of official cooperation. Despite outside pressure, the ruling quarters of the five ASEAN members invariably stress their intention to abstain from turning the ASEAN into a military-political alliance. They are aware that the transformation of the organisation into a military bloc would result in its isolation from other developing countries and increase tensions in relations between the ASEAN and the socialist countries of Indochina.

Problems of trade and economic cooperation among ASEAN members feature prominently in the book. The author examines the continuing economic dependence of the ASEAN "Five" on the imperialist world. He cites data showing that as a rule the economic links between individual ASEAN members on the one hand and Japan, the USA and Western Europe on the other, are stronger than those among themselves.

The author points to the dual approach of the ASEAN members to trade and economic cooperation with other countries of the world. On the one hand, their own economic interests are preeminent for them, on the other, they seek to take advantage of the subregional cooperation in the field. The second trend has become stronger as a result of capitalism's economic crisis, galloping inflation and skyrocketing prices. This in turn encouraged regional cooperation among ASEAN members which presented a common front in the solution of economic problems. For example, in 1976 the "Five" planned measures to step up trade and economic relations and to promote industrial cooperation. It was envisaged to build

joint industrial ventures, one in each ASEAN member-state, such as facilities for the production of urea, calcinated soda and so on. In this policy of joint ventures the Association's leaders not only count on direct economic benefits but also on interest of foreign investors who may be attracted to the area if the group's economic potential is properly demonstrated by setting up joint firms. The ASEAN members have also made certain progress in pulling down customs barriers. At the same time, the author rightly remarks that trade liberalisation alone cannot automatically bring about increased trade among the ASEAN members. What is needed is broader economic diversification, expanding the list of products and a restructuring of trade and economic relations between its members.

The chapters devoted to the coordination of foreign policies of the ASEAN members in their relations with China, the countries of Indochina, Japan, the USA and the European Economic Community make informative reading, for, as the author notes, ASEAN was created primarily under the influence of outside factors.

For obvious reasons the relations with China are constantly in the centre of attention of ASEAN members. It is regularly discussed at meetings of the five states' representatives. In 1970 the normalisation of US-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese relations resulted in considerable changes in the ASEAN policies concerning China, prompting them to look for ways of normalising their relations with that country. The author conducts a detailed analysis of this process which was initiated by Malaysia.

Although all ASEAN members were aware of the need to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, they held different views on the timing of the process. Diplomatic relations between China and Malaysia were established in 1974. In 1975 the Philippines and Thailand followed Malaysia's example. Indonesia has so far refrained from normalising diplomatic relations with China. Singapore has no diplomatic relations with China either.

Viewing ASEAN as an obstacle in the way of the "spread of communism", the West has a stake in the development of capitalism in the association and seeks to make its members a raw-material-supplying

and industrial-agrarian appendage of the imperialist monopolies. That is why the imperialist world renders certain assistance to the ASEAN members in strengthening their economic potential and political stability. Japan plays a key role in the process. It is the biggest trading partner of all ASEAN members and one of the major investors in their economies. Tokyo's interest is explained by the fact that ASEAN members are becoming Japan's active trade partners as Japan imports practically the whole of its tin, natural rubber and some other raw materials from the Association. In addition, the sea lanes along which Middle East oil is brought to Japan pass through the ASEAN zone.

ASEAN members maintain close economic, political and military links with the US which is one of the major investors in the countries' economies. Washington has an increasing stake in cooperation with the ASEAN, which is prompted primarily by its military-strategic concepts.

Analysing the different aspects of relations between the ASEAN "Five" and the imperialist countries, the author concludes that the latter's interest in the Association has increased of late because they view the organisation as an outpost protecting their interests in Southeast Asia. The imperialist states are pushing the Association toward becoming a military alliance. They frequently attach political strings to economic, trade and financial concessions to the ASEAN members.

The policy of the USSR and other socialist countries in respect to ASEAN radically differs from that of the imperialist countries. The author devotes sufficient space to the struggle of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Indochina for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Of great importance in this respect is the proposal of the Foreign Ministers of the socialist Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos to the ASEAN members to sign bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation or non-aggression pacts, as well as the proposal to hold an international conference on Southeast Asia to settle the regional problems as well as problems of the Southeast Asian countries' relations with other nations of the world.

The extent and usefulness of the author's in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the ASEAN and its activities can hardly be overestimated. The book was welcomed both by the foreign relations analysts and the reader at large alike.

A DANGEROUS TREND IN JAPANESE POLICY

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 3, Jul-Sep 83 pp 173-175

[Review by V. N. Bunin of book "Rost militarizma v Yaponii" [The Rise of Militarism in Japan] by M. I. Ivanov, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, 159 pages]

Whereas until quite recently, in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the world press was focussed on the Japanese "economic miracle" which struck the imagination not only of foreigners, but of the Japanese themselves, at present the "miracle" of the Land of the Rising Sun is replaced by a sinister phenomenon of restoring militarism. The course of the Japanese ruling circles in stepped up armament, which is gaining in scope with each coming year, has become quite an urgent problem going beyond the national borders of Japan.

The process of rearmament of Japan is broadly discussed by the world public. This new phenomenon causes particular concern among the peoples of Southeast Asia, who suffered innumerable calamities from Japanese military occupation.

This is convincingly shown in the book *The Rise of Militarism in Japan* by Voenizdat, whose author M. I. Ivanov is known to Soviet readers for his eyewitness notes *Japan in Wartime* published in 1978.

Despite the fact that the book under review belongs to the journalistic genre and is intended for the general public, the importance of problems raised in it, which are illustrated by an extensive body of original sources in Russian, English and Japanese, as well as the general conclusions drawn and inferences made, make it possible to regard M. Ivanov's book a serious, analytical work of scientific-historical nature. The author has set himself the task of tracing the evolution of militarist tendencies' restoration in postwar Japan, to reveal their close interrelationship with the aggressive policy of Japanese militarism before and during the Second World War and to show that the process of rearmament not only challenges peace in the Far

East, but as well prevents establishment of stable, mutually beneficial and goodneighbourly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

The book is composed of five chapters. The first chapter provides a brief historical account of the origin of the formation, development and consolidation of the militarist spirit peculiar to the *samurais* and rooted in the feudal past of Japan.

The book points out that in a bid to win "Lebensraum", Japan created on the eve of the war a powerful military economy, accomplished allout mobilisation of resources, and developed a large Army, Navy and Air Force (p. 18). Its ruling circles worked out programs of territorial conquests in the Far East and Southeast Asia, while wars against China and the Western powers were viewed as a prelude to a major armed struggle with the Soviet Union.

Defeat of imperialist Japan in war resulted in the complete collapse of militarism and dealt a crushing blow to the reactionary policy and ideology of monopoly capital. Japanese brass hats were discredited in the eyes of their people, who paid a heavy price for the war. The consequences of the war brought about revolutionary activities in the country and stirred up a broad tide of anti-militaristic sentiment.

The postwar Constitution of Japan, which came into force on May 3, 1947, renounced "for ever" war and the use of military force as a means of settling international disputes. Article 9 of the Constitution eliminated legal foundations for restoring militarism and outlawed all military formations.

The book reveals the fact that the policy of US occupation authorities, right from the start of their activities in Japan and

in violation of the Potsdam accords, was directed at hindering genuine democratisation of the country, at keeping intact the rule of Japanese monopoly capital and at reestablishing military-economic potential and the Japanese Army.

In the second chapter the author shows with good justification that US military-political leadership views Japan as its major ally in the Far East. Important for strengthening military cooperation between the two countries were the Japanese-US Treaty of Guarantees of Security (the "Security Treaty") signed on September 1951, and Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Guarantees of Security, revised in 1960, which legalised US troops and bases stationed on the Japanese soil and laid down the foundations of the country's militarisation (pp. 28-29).

US military bases and armed forces, on the maintenance of which Japan spends about \$ 1 billion annually (p. 33), were used as the aggression force in US military adventures in Korea and Vietnam. Today, coupled with the Rapid Deployment Force, they constitute a component part of American global strategy (p. 34).

The monograph points out that a large network of joint bodies such as the Security Consultative Council and the Session on Defence Cooperation (1975), working out the general military strategy (p. 38), has been established, to bring into effect the agreements under the "Security Treaty".

Analysing a broad enough problem of Japanese military expansion in Asia, the author dwells at length on the military cooperation of Japan with the South Korean regime, which constitutes an important link in common security system of Japan and the USA, since large numbers of US armed forces are stationed in the south of the Korean Peninsula.

The ambitions of Japanese monopoly capital which lays claim to winning by Japan not only of economic but also of military-political influence in the world, find their expression in its desire to create a new regional body—the "Pacific Community".

The third chapter describes the trends in militarisation of Japan. It lays strong emphasis on the problem of revising the Constitution, Article 9 of which keeps back the

militaristic appetites of Japanese "hawks". This is why, the author writes, the reactionary circles—the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party in the first place—are long nurturing plans of advancing amendments to exclude the anti-war article from the Constitution and thus "to be given a free hand in building up the military might" (p. 60).

Of late, the book points out, in the light of the spreading myth about "Soviet military threat", a campaign of war propaganda in Japan, backed by the revanchist claims to the southern part of the Kuril Islands, has assumed an unprecedented scope, which is part and parcel of ideologically influencing, in the militarist spirit, the population and personnel of "self-defence force" (p. 68).

The final chapter of the book investigates the state and the development prospects of the Japanese armed forces, which still bear the name of "self-defence force" despite the fact that it has long lost its initial meaning since the Japanese army is now involved in activities which go far beyond the limits of national defence.

In conclusion, the author quite correctly infers that the rise of militarism and further involvement of Japan in the global strategy of US imperialism increase tensions in the Far East, violate the established balance of forces, impede normal development of international relations and give rise to strong popular opposition.

M. Ivanov's work is not free from certain drawback and inaccuracies. The reader can not be satisfied with some dissociation of the material which hinders clear consecutive-historical perception of numerous documentary facts assembled in the book. It is hardly possible to agree with the author's division of the period of reestablishing the Japanese army into two stages, the second of which (1954-1957) he refers to the beginning of planned construction of the armed forces (p. 22). It is well-known that the construction of "self-defence force" on the basis of five-year programmes came into effect in 1958, when the 1st "defence plan"¹ began to be realised.

The author mistakenly refers the 5th

¹ *Japanese Militarism. (A Military-Historical Survey)*, Moscow, 1972, p. 310 (in Russian).

"defence plan" to the period of 1976-1981 (p. 131), whereas, in accordance with the long-term programme of "self-defence force" development, its construction in 1977-1979 was accomplished on the basis of annual plans. The 5th plan designed for 1980-1984 came into force only in 1980.

Besides, the author fails to define a number of concepts such as "self-dependent defence" and "base defence forces", which make the foundations of the military policy of Japanese ruling circles.

However, these drawbacks belittle in no way the topicality and scientific signifi-

cance of M. Ivanov's work, as well as its practical value for investigating the process of militarisation of Japan and the state of its armed forces. Based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, the book *The Rise of Militarism in Japan* gives the Soviet reader a sufficiently comprehensive idea of the aggressive purport of the Japanese-US military-political alliance, whose ultimate goal is to turn Japan into a major military power, which is fraught with a challenge to peace and security of the peoples of Asia.

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ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET SINOLOGISTS ASSOCIATION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, Apr-Jun 83 p 205

[Text] A Soviet Sinologists Association is being established. The USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium adopted a resolution on its organization on 21 October 1982. This body will function under the USSR Academy of Sciences Social Sciences Section and will be under its leadership. The USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Institute has been assigned the task of providing organizational services to the newly established association. This will enhance even further the institute's role as a center for coordinating all work on Chinese problems in our country.

The establishment of the Soviet Sinologists Association brings to life the long-standing desire of Soviet sinologists to have their own professional social-scientific organization.

Soviet sinologists, while ardent patriots of their own country, are also sincere champions of stronger friendship between the USSR and the PRC and between the people of the Soviet Union and China.

The association, established for the purpose of cooperating in the development of Soviet sinology, propagandizing its achievements and popularizing knowledge about China in the USSR scientific community and in public circles, will also represent Soviet sinology in the European Sinology Association and other sinological scientific bodies.

The basic tasks of the Soviet Sinologists Association are as follows:

To cooperate in developing, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, research into China's domestic and foreign policy, economy, history, social thought, language, literature and culture, and to cooperate in publicizing the achievements of Soviet sinology and the Leninist foreign policy of the USSR toward China and in popularizing knowledge about China;

To analyze the present state of affairs in sinology in the USSR and abroad, cooperate comprehensively in scientists' activity in the field of sinology and unite organizationally and attract to scientific research and propaganda the widest possible circle of people with sinological training;

To participate in the organization and work of composite inter-institute and international research committees and working groups;

To strengthen mutual understanding and international cooperation between scientists specializing in the field of sinology.

Soviet sinologists are in favor of developing contacts and links between the USSR and the PRC, especially along scientific lines, and of contacts and discussions with our scientific colleagues in the PRC.

In accordance with its tasks, the Soviet Sinologists Association will conduct meetings, conferences, symposiums, seminars and courses for the discussion of scientific and organizational matters.

The Soviet Sinologists Association's board will be located in Moscow, at the USSR Academy of Sciences Far East Institute.

The Soviet Sinologists Association will consist of individual and corporate members. Corporate membership in the association will be available to scientific organizations, teaching establishments, chairs, sectors and laboratories in VUZ's and scientific research institutes, editorial boards and publishing houses, as well as applied science organizations and enterprises.

Individual membership in the association will be available to all USSR citizens engaged in scientific research, teaching or propaganda work in the field of sinology.

The association's supreme organ will be the general assembly of its members--in other words, delegates representing its sections and the association's corporate members. Such assemblies will be held at least once every 3 years. The daily work of managing association activity will be performed by the board, elected by the general assembly, and by the board presidium.

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